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Soviet dissent is not a homogeneous movement: it is composed of a myriad of
individuals and groups, seeking a variety of goals and objectives. Nevertheless,
the phenomenon can be described relative to three basic interests: national self-
determination, a desire tor religious liberty, and guarantees of civil and political
freedoms. Despite a host of aggressive campaigns by the state to eliminate the
phenomenon, dissent continues to persist, Thus dissent poses the greatest
long-term threat to the Soviet regime since it represents the primary mechanism
by which all other factors of regime instability or<=i both enunciated and
perpetuated.
American foreign-policy support to Soviet dissidents provides the United
States with strategic advantages relative to the Soviet Union. For this reason,
as well as for moral and legal considerations, it is in the American national
interest to continue support to the various dissident movements in the USSR,
Such assistance is in keeping with American •/clues regarding a respect for
human rights and is consistent with U. S. diplomatic history.
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INTRODUCTION
Ours was the first society openly to define itself in terms of both
spirituality and human liberty. It is that unique self-definition which
has given us an exceptional appeal— but it also imposes on us a
special obligation, to take on those moral duties which, when
assumed, seem invariably to be in our own best interests, . . ,
Because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of
freedom elsewhere,
Jimmy Carter
The United States is a state founded upon ideas. It is somewhat unique in
the family of nations because it is not, per se, a national entity, It is not a
particular people that make up this country, but rather a variety of peoples with
a multitude of national origins that have bonded together to pursue an idea: the
actualization of the freedom and dignity of each individual. The laws, customs,
practices and policies, in short, the entire political, social and economic culture
are based on this idea. To be sure, many, if not the majority of citizens, rarely
consider this fact as they go about their normal day-to-day existence. The
majority of citizens are born "Americans''' and do not question their national
origin. The majority complacently accept the freedoms and guarantees of
democracy without a second thought. But that the majority rarely contemplate
the great freedoms that America offers is testimony to the effectiveness of the
system at guaranteeing these same freedoms. For it is in those countries that
lack such guarantees that the deprived people's clamor for them is the loudest.
Such is the state of the citizens of the Soviet Union, and of such is the origin of
Soviet dissent.
This study examines the phenomenon of dissent in the Soviet Union. It asks
from whence dissent arises., how significant it is., and what the regime is doing
about it. The study analyses the role of the United States in encouraging Soviet
dissidence and the effectiveness of this encouragement. It explores the
prospects for dissent in the USSR as a phenomenon and as a mechanism for
changing the nature of the Soviet system. Structurally, the paper is divided into
four parts: a rationale for American interest in Soviet dissent (chapters two
and three), an examination of the Soviet dissidence movement (chapters four-
through seven), a discussion of the Soviet regime's response to dissent (chapter
eight), and an exploration of some prospects for the movement's future
(chapters nine and ten).
Chapter two examines U.S. foreign policy regarding support for human rights
from a theoretical and historical basis. It examines the unigue political and social
nature of the United States and the role human rights play in defining this
nature. Next it contrasts the definitions of human rights in the American and
Soviet contexts. The chapter then traces the human rights policies of American
leaders from the am of the Founding Fathers through the Reagan administration.
Finally, it focuses on the varying interpretations of U.S. responsibilities toward
human rights under the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan administrations.
Chapter three examines the concept of the national interest and then applies
this concept to the issue of human rights in the international environment. A
theoretical rationale for American support of human rights as a component of
foreign policy is proposed, focusing on moral, legal and strategic justifications
for such a policy. Finally some of the costs of such a policy ar& examined,
especially as they relate to relations with the Soviet Union.
The second part of the study switches the focus to the Soviet Union,
Chapter four examines the concept of dissidence within the context of Soviet
society, focusing on how the phenomenon started and why it continues.
Following a general description of dissidence as a factor of regime instability, is
an analysis of the extent and scope of the movement. Next is a review of the
literature concerning how best to categorize the phenomenon. Three categories
or^ offered: notional, religious and political. These three categories serve as
the organization for the discussion of Soviet dissent in the remainder of the
study.
Chapter five examines the first category of dissent--groups that desire
national self-determination. The chapter discusses the regime's objectives
regarding the development of a "new Soviet people" and its attitude toward the
more than one hundred different nationality groups in the USSR. Following this
general discussion, is an historical description of the goals and objectives of the
more important nationally- oriented dissident groups: the Crimean Tartars, Soviet
Germans and Jews, the Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Central Asian Muslims.
An examination of religious dissent is the subject of chapter six. First, the
regime's attitude toward religion is explored along with an historical discussion
of the primary decrees and programs that have shaped the modern regime-
religion relationship. Then three of the most numerically important Christian
religions are examined— the Russian Orthodox Church, the Evangelical Christian
Baptists and the Pentecostalists--to discover the status of religion in this
haven of "scientific atheism".
The human rights movement has become almost synonymous with Soviet
dissent due to its activities in the 1970s. This movement is the subject of
chapter seven. The various organizations that emerged in the wake of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe are examined, as is the
regime's reaction to dissidence during the &ra of detente. The chapter explores
the goals of this movement and the development of what may be its greatest
contribution-- samtzdct Finally, groups advocating social and economic
reforms, which largely grew out of the human rights movement, are described.
The next section, chapter eight, examines the various responses of the
Soviet regime in attempting to eliminate or at the least manage the phenomenon
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of dissent in the USSR. The chapter considers the necessity for repression, as
well as the various mechanisms employed by the regime to eliminate dissidence.
An analysis is conducted of both the passive mechanisms of control., such as the
political culture of the USSR and Russia before it, and active mechanisms of
control, for example imprisonment and official terror, The chapter concludes
with an examination of the various periods of repression in the past twenty
years in order to determine patterns and see whether foreign or domestic
pressure has influenced the regime's policies.
The final two chapters ask whether dissent in the Soviet Union has made any
impact on Soviet society. It examines the current status of the three categories
of dissent and then provides short- and long-term predictions about the future
of the various movements. Finally, the future of the Soviet regime is considered.
The role of dissent in contributing to prospects for revolutionary change in the
current regime qv^ explored. This brings the discussion full circle back to
American objectives, Soviet dissidence is thus seen within its context of
American-Soviet relations.: as a key element in an ongoing ideological struggle
for influence and position in the international system,
This paper employs a largely normative approach to the subject of Soviet
dissent and the American national interest. I do not apologize for this method—
the aspirations of the dissidents as well as the goals of the United States and
the Soviet Union relative to human rights issues demand a consideration of
normative aspects. The purpose of the study is not only to describe the what
and how of the Soviet dissident phenomenon but also to attempt to provide an
answer to the why. Attempting such an answer requires an attention to certain
values and goals that do not easily lend themselves to an emperical-analytic
approach. Normative theory also seems especially relevant to this subject given
the particular political cultures of the two countries. Even a cursory
examination of official U.S. and Soviet pronouncements and policies on the
subject of human rights and dissidence reveals the highly developed and
prevalent ideological justifications for the two states' respective positions,
Nevertheless, the prime danger in such a normative approach is a tendency to
overstate the contrasts between the two political systems and minimize the
very real discrepancies between what ought to be and what presently is. These
dangers having been acknowledged, the author asks the indulgence of those
who might favor a more empirical approach to the subject of Soviet studies, 1
The study attempts to explore as many facets of Soviet dissidence as are
possible in a work of such length. The breadth of analysis, however, precludes
a detailed description of each component part of the phenomenon. Thus, the
notes and bibliography or& intended to supplement the lack of detail in some of
the descriptions. There is currently a wealth of reliable data available to the
Western scholar on most aspects of Soviet dissent. This is largely due to the
efforts of the dissidents themselves but also results from the increased
attention Soviet authorities have shown in public literature to various facets of
the phenomenon,
Hopefully a balance between the macro and the micro view comes through in
the following study, Soviet dissent is not solely an amalgamation of groups and
structures and organizations and processes; although this study will tend to
explain the phenomenon in such terms, Included are a number of ariecdoT.es
about the people involved in the movement. The purpose for these stories is to
convey the reality that dissidence is fundamentally a phenomenon of people-
people who affirm by their words and actions that the dignity and worth of each
individual takes precedence over the rules of the state.
1 Normative theory in international studies became unfashionable in the late
1950s and 1960s, being largely replaced by empirical-analytic theories.
Recently, however, many scholars, if not precisely embracing normative
theories again, are at least attempting to integrate values, goals and
preferences in behavioral theories. For a discussion of this trend, see David
Easton, "The New Revolution in Political Science," American Political Science
Review 65 [December 1969): 1051-1061, and James E. Dougherty and Robert L.
Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contendin g Theories of International Relations (New York:
Harper << Row, 1981), especially chapter 13,
II. HUMAN RIGHTS \N AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
America is the only nation in the world that is founded on a creed,
That creed is set forth with dogmatic theological lucidity in the
Declaration of Independence, perhaps the only piece of practical
politics which is also theoretical politics and also great literature.
G.K. Chesterton
A. THE AMERICAN CREED
Former Ambassador to the United Nations.. Jeane Kirkpatrick, has rightly
stated, that a lacl-: of homogeneity in American "history, race, language, [and]
religion gives added centrality to American values, beliefs, and goals, making
them the key element of our national identity".' This unique national identity
distinguishes the United States from the great majority of actors in the
international system and greatly shapes America's approach to foreign-policy
decision-making. The embodiment of America's political values and ideals that
compose her national identity have been termed the "American creed". &' The
origin of the creed is found in the foundational documents of the American state,
especially in the Declaration of Independence, Federalist Papers and the
Constitution.
In the American experience, the origin of the American creed predates the
formation of its political system. Since the creed predates the state, the use of
the creed as the foundation for state policy is fully justified, in fact, the
legitimacy of the state rests on its adherence to this creed. This differs
' Remarks by Jeane Kirkpatrick in a symposium conducted by Commentary
magazine, "Human Rights And American Foreign Policy: A Symposium",
Commentoru (November 1981): 42.
w The terminology of "American creed" has been employed by a variety of
writers, including such scholars, politicians and journalists as Peter Berger,
Jeane Kirkpatrick, Samuel Huntington, Eugene McCarthy and Gunnar Myrdal.
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significantly from the experience of the European and most other modern
nation-states, whose multitudes of ideologies emerge within the context of
existing state entities. Ideology, therefore, plays a relatively minor role in
providing legitimacy for these states and hence also plays a minor role as a
determinant or constraint on the formulation of foreign policy. In these states
the primary means of legitimacy is national identity.
The modern American creed is far from a static, rigidly codified, or
homogeneous body of values. Despite its specific origin, the creed has been
supplemented over time by the inclusion of ideals that originated outside of
America's northern European ideological birthplace, and as a result of the
changes brought about by the experiences of the American people.
Nevertheless, the core values upon which later values were added, remain
relatively intact and continue to serve as both the basis of current U.S. policy
and as the constraints upon that policy.
This is not to say that all American foreign policy in practice completely
conforms to the standards of this creed. ** Nevertheless, in order to be
successful, i.e. in order to be acceptable to the American people, U.S. foreign
policy must strive toward the ideals of the American creed and be clearly linked
to that creed in the perceptions of the American polity. As Peter Berger says,
"gs long as the United States remains a democracy, this linkage will always
reassert itself, for the simple reason that the American people will insist on it
even if an American administration should be tempted to set it aside.'' 4
3 Samuel Huntington traces the historical gap between American ideals and
institutions and the reasons for this gap in Samuel P. Huntington, "American
Ideals Versus American Institutions"", Political Science Q
.
uarterl u 97 (Spring
1382): 1-37.




A central feature of the American creed is a belief in the inherent dignity and
worth of the individual. In the American experience human rights are the
expression of human dignity and are derived from this concept of the intrinsic
worth of each person. Thus, human rights find their origin not in benefits
granted by the state nor by any particular political system but rather are
entitlements due each individual simply by virtue of his humanity. As explained by
the Declaration of Independence, all men are "endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable rights",
While the state is not the grantor of rights, as Jacl-: Donnelly wisely points
out the institutionalization of rights "is crucial to their effective enjoyment"."
Thus, while Americans are inherently entitled to such rights as the freedom of
speech, assembly and religion, the Bill of Rights (itself a product of the state]
serves not to grant these rights, but rather to guarantee the observance of
these rights by the state, Jack Donnelly asserts that:
Human rights are conceived as being held primarily in relation to
society and particularly to society in the form of the 5*.ote, As *.h*
natural rights of persons, they are seen as logically and morally to
take precedence over the rights of the state and society, which
rji-e viewed os major contributors to the realization of these rights
but also the greatest potential violators of basic human rights. b
[emphasis mine]
This concept of the origin of human rights is important as it is one of the
major differences between American and Soviet definitions of these rights, In
the Soviet context human rights are neither the endowments of God nor the
inherent entitlements of humanity, rather they are the benefits provided by the
" Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights And Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique Uf
Non-Western Conceptions Of Human Rights", The American Political Science
Review 76 (June 1382): 305.
6 Jack Donnelly, p. 306.
state. As benefits they are subject to the pleasure of the state, or to be more
specific in the case of the Soviet state., the ruling elite. The implications of this
distinction are clear. First, the "rights" of the Soviet people are conferred upon
them "by the same sovereign power that presides over the Gulag Archipelago.*
'
Thus, their application is dependent upon the benevolence of the ruling elite,
Second, the scope of rights granted by the state is limited to those rights that
are perceived to be in the best interest of the ruling elite, The scope of rights is
thus potentially arbitrary. With such an origin, these state-granted benefits
can scarcely be termed human rights since their universal manifestation would
be purely accidental,
In the Soviet conception of rights there is no external standard by which
state compliance with these state-granted benefits can be measured. Naturally,
there is no recourse for the individual who perceives his rights to be violated by
the state. This potential arbitrariness is further exacerbated in a political
system like that of the Soviet Union, which lacks both responsiveness and
accountability to its subjects.
Closely linked to this third implication is a curious but expected practical
result: "rights" or^ conferred upon those who enjoy the regime's favor and
denied those outside it. The Soviet regime makes no secret of this distinction:
The political freedoms— freedom of the press, of expression, of
assembly— are interpreted from class positions as conditions of
the consolidation of the working people and the spread of socialist
ideology which rules out the 'freedom' of anti-socialist
propaganda, the freedom to organize counterrevolutionary forces
against the fundamentals of socialism. 8
Or as another Soviet writer put it!
' Remarks by Robert Nisbet in "Human Rights And American Foreign Rolicy:
A Symposium", p, 54.
8 Vladimir Kartashkin, "The Socialist Countries and Human Rights", in Karel
Vasak, ed., The International Dimensions of Human Ri g hts , vols, 1 -2 (Paris:
UNESCO, 1932), p. 633. Quoted in David P. Forsythe, "The United Nations and
Human Rights, 1345-1385", Political Science Quarterl y 100 (Summer 1335J: 260.
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Any citizen of the Soviet Union whose interests coincide with the
interests of society feels the entire magnitude of our democratic
freedoms. But the matter is quite different if and when, in certain
cases, those interests do not coincide. In this respect, our
attitude is straightforward, namely, priority should be accorded to
the interests of the whole society, of all the working people, and
we consider this principle quite fair, J
This conflict between rights proceeding from the state vice being the
inherent entitlement of each individual is also revealed in the Soviet linkage of
rights and obligations. The preamble to the Soviet Constitution makes this
linkage clear: the USSR •"is a society of genuine democracy, whose political
system ensures . . . the combination of real citizen's rights and liberties with
their duties and responsibilities to society". Both Articles 53 and 130 contain
the phraseology: "the exercise of rights and liberties is inseparable from the
performance by citizens of their duties -''. This linkage is not restricted solely to
legal documents but is a frequent theme of Soviet writers writing on the subject
of human rights and is also a feature of the latest Party program: "The Soviet
citizen's exercise of his rights and freedoms is inseparable from his fulfillment of
his constitutional duties. There are no rights without duties and no duties
without rights— this is the immutable political principle of socialist society" J
-
This linkage of rights and duties is so close that in some instances there is
no practical distinction in the use of the two concepts. For example, Article 40
of the 1377 Constitution states that "USSR citizens have the right to labor , , ,
including the right to choice of occupation, type of employment and work. , ," On
the other hand, labor is also the duty of each Soviet citizen. Article 60 states
that "conscientious labor in one's chosen field of socially useful activity and the
y S. Rozhkov, "Humanitarian Problems in Interstate Relations", International
Affairs (April 1 384): 38,
1
"The Draft Party Program (New Version)", The Current Di g est of the
Soviet Press I.CDSP), 37 (November 27, 1385): 15.
observance of labor discipline are the duty of, and a matter of honor for, every
able-bodied USSR citizen. vl ]
To be fair, in American society there is also a correspondence between
rights and obligations, but there is a fundamental difference. In America one's
obligation is a result of another's rights, not one's own rights. For example, my
obligation to not murder another human being does not result from my right to
life, rather it results from another's right to life. The implication of the Soviet's
linkage of rights with obligations makes one's own rights contingent upon the
correct discharge of obligations. As Donnelly explains,
despite the apparently unqualified character of the right to work
mentioned in Article 40, jobs in their fields or-€: regularly denied
dissidents and Jewish activists, in accordance with Soviet law and
administrative practice, on the grounds of the individuals having
failed to discharge their social duties. The right to education,
according to Article 45, 'is ensured by the free nature of all types
of education', Nonetheless, emigres may be required to buy back
this 'free' education as a legal condition of exit.'*
A final distinction between American and Soviet concepts of human rights
pertains to political versus social or economic rights. From the preceding
discussion of the origins of human rights and the relationship of these rights to
the state it should be clear why Americans have generally framed the discussion
of human rights in terms of individual and political freedoms whereas Soviets
have tended to stress social and economic benefits. It is difficult for the
American to conceive of such rights as, for example, "the right to work* as an
inherent entitlement since the realization of that "right" is dependent upon an
1 1 Jack Donnelly, p. 303.
•2 Jack Donnelly, p. 310.
external entity providing the employment.' ° In the Soviet system, since rights
are by definition benefits of tne state, the right to work is easily accommodated
within the Soviet understanding of the nature of human rights, On the other
hand, the exercise of a political right, such as "freedom of speech'-', frequently
finds itself abridged because such exercise questions the origin or" rights as the
benefit of the state rather than the entitlement of individuals. ' ^ The quest by
Soviet citizens for political rights as defined in the American system is what I
believe to be at the root of the dissidence phenomenon and will be addressed in
subsequent chapters. At this point it is sufficient to call attention to the
significant differences between the two political system's respective
approaches to defining human rights and underscore the importance of human
rights within the American creed.
C. HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS
The present U.S. administration has affirmed the centrality of support for
human rights as a component of American foreign policy. Jeane Kirkpatrick has
stated that "not only should human rights play a central role in U.S. foreign
policy, no U.S. foreign policy can possibly succeed that does not accord them a
central role. The nature of politics and the character of the United States alike
guarantee that this should be the case."'^ But how does this modern
'* This is not altogether clear, however, as one of the three enumerated
inalienable rights in the Declaration of Independence is "the pursuit of
happiness". This has usually, but not always, been interpreted as an individual
right to pursue happiness with minimal interference by the state rather than a
mandate for the state to provide a means to achieve "happiness". Nonetheless,
President Carter included social and economic rights in his definition of the
primary human rights objectives for U.S. foreign policy as will be shown below,
'4 There are, of course, other reasons for the abridgment of political rights
in the Soviet Union that have little to do with the theoretical justifications for
human rights. These reasons will be examined below,
'" Remarks by Jeane Kirkpatrick in "Human Rights And American Foreign
Policy: A Symposium", p. 42.
interpretation of the centrality of human rights support conform to historical
understandings of the role of human rights in .American foreign policy?
In fact, America has a long history of support for human rights, both foreign
and domestic. From its earliest days— from its very inception as a nation
—
America's statesmen have extended the core ideals of individual freedom and
dignity to the rest of the world. 16 The universality of these concepts is
embodied in the very document that declared America's emergence as a state in
the international system. The opening words of the Declaration of Independence
affirm *, . . that a// men qpq created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments ore instituted
among men . . . ."[emphasis mine] The governmental procedures enacted to
secure these rights ore described in the Constitution, while many of the rights
themselves are articulated in the amendments to this Constitution—the Bill of
Rights, Not many years after the founding of the nation, the chief architect of
the language and procedures of American democracy reemphasised the
universality of these notions of individual freedom and dignity. In a letter to
James Madison in 1 783 Thomas -Jefferson wrote: "A. bill of rights is what the
people are entitled to against every government on earth"J '
It is one thing to articulate the universality of these concepts of democracy
and human rights, it is quite another to attempt to modify the domestic policies of
another nation to conform to these rights. Despite Jefferson's call for
universal applicability of these rights, neither he nor any of the other founding
fathers advocated U.S. policy initiatives to impose these concepts on the rest of
the world. From the foundations of the country in the late 1700s through the
See Henry Steele Commager, The Empire of Reason (Garden City, NY:
Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1978) for a discussion of how early American
applications of rennaissance ideas were proclaimed as universally relevant.
17 quoted in Nicolai N. Petro, The Predicament of Human Ri g hts (New York:
University Press of America), p. 5.
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bulk of the nineteenth century, the U.S. was characterized by general
nonparticipation— to say nothing of non-intervention-^in the affairs of the rest
of the world. The advice of George Washington in his farewell address to avoid
participation in "European politics, friendships, or wars", was generally heeded
by his successors, and American support for human rights abroad was primarily
restricted to pronouncements and rhetoric. As John Q.uincy Adams stated:
Wherever the standard of freedom and independence has been or
shall be unfurled, here shall be America's heart, her benedictions,
and her prayers. But she goes not abroad in search of monsters
to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and
independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator of her
own, she will recommend the general cause by the countenance of
her voice, and by the benignant sympathy of her example . , , , [If
she did more] she might become the dictatress of the world. She
would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit".''-'
It was not until the twentieth century that the United States began to add
policy substance to her vocal support of the universality of human rights.
Woodrow Wilson was the first president to seriously challenge the concept of
non-interventioriism in the domestic affairs of other states. He unabashedly
called upon other states to adjust their domestic practices to conform to what
he claimed were universal truths concerning the freedom and dignity of each
individual. He reaffirmed the role of human rights as the cornerstone of the
national interest and stressed the transcendent nature of this concept:
"America will come into the full light of day when all shall know that she puts
human rights above all other rights, and that her flag is the flag not only of
America but of humanity*. '^ However, the optimism of Wilson and others that
believed human rights were realizable through peaceful processes and
democratic institutions suffered a severe setback by the revolution in Russia,
the Nazi seizure of power in Germany and finally the Second World War.
b Quoted in Nicolai N. Petro, p. 6.
^ Quoted in Nicolai N. Petro, p, ?.
The optimism suffered a setback, but was not extinguished. Franklin Delanor
Roosevelt expanded Wilson's definition of. human rights by claiming that these
rights rested on certain universal freedoms. As he declared in his 1341 State of
the Union address, an enduring peace for America could only be realized by the
freedom of other people: *. . . the world order which we seek is the cooperation
of free countries, working together in a friendly, civilized way.'" He went on to
say that "we look forward to a world founded upon four essential freedoms":
freedom of speech and expression, freedom to worship as one chooses, freedom
from want, and freedom from fear of aggression, 2 *-1 President Roosevelt
realized that support for human rights abroad was a major component of
national security when he stated, "we ourselves shall never be wholly safe at
home unless other governments recognize such freedoms. **' These principles
were soon codified in a variety of international agreements, among which were
the Atlantic Charter and the founding documents of the United Nations.
Roosevelt's support for human rights through the United Nations reflected
what A. Glenn Mower calls "the uncertainties and hesitations which have so
freguently marked the American approach to human rights in their international
0'">
context."" On the one hand, the United States proposed that human rights-
pronouncements be included in the organization's purpose statement, in the
definitions of the U.N.'s economic and social goals, and in the the call for the
creation of a human rights commission. On the other hand, the U.S. opposed
changing the organization's mandate from "promoting and encouraging" human
rights to "promoting and protecting" these rights. The United States objected
that for the United Nations to involve itself in pr-oteclian would "raise the
question of whether the Organization should actively impose human rights and
fundamental freedoms within individual countries and would lead many people of
20 Quoted in A. Glenn Mower Jr., The United States , the United Nations and
Human Ri g hts (Westpart, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1379), p. 3.
21 Q.uoted in Nicolai N. Petro, p. 7,
22 A. Glenn Mower Jr., pp. 6-7.
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the world to expect more of the Organization than it could successfully
accomplish."- -'
Harry S, Truman continued Roosevelt's linkage of U.S. support for
international human rights and American national security. In a speech to the
United Nations Conference on International Organization, Truman supported the
inclusion of an international bill of rights in the charter of the U.N.:
We have good reason to expect the framing of an international bill
of rights, acceptable to all the nations involved. That bill of rights
will be as much a part of international life as our own Bill of Rights
is a part of our Constitution. The Charter is dedicated to the
achievement and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Unless we can attain those objectives for all men and
women everywhere, without regard to race, language, or religion,
we cannot have permanent peace and security. **
In addition to the rhetoric, the Truman administration initiated practical
efforts to support human rights in Eastern Europe within the larger context of
American efforts to contain and rollback the Soviet Union's world influence. As
John Gaddis has observed, despite evidence that the USSR was attempting to
expand its control over Eastern Europe, "the administration devoted much time
and thought during 1943 to ways of encouraging further dissidence in the
satellites, ranging from Voice of America broadcasts and human rights
campaigns in the United Nations to economic pressures and covert action*,
"
The claim has been made that the Eisenhower administration's domination by
the cold war and efforts to combat communism superseded all other interests,
including that of human rights.cD This is not precisely the case. As early as
1948, prior to becoming Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles encouraged the
" A, Glenn Mower Jr., p. 7.
24 A. Glenn Mower Jr., pp. 9-10.
t,J John Lewis Gaddis, Strate g ies of Containment I.Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1982), p. 68.
2^ Such is the argument, for example, of Townsend Hoopes, author of The
Devil and John Foster Dulles.
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General Assembly of the United Nations to endorse the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. He stated:
We must go on with the drafting of a Covenant which will seek to
translate human rights into law, It does not minimize our own
Declaration of Independence to recognize that the Constitution and
its Bill of Rights were required to establish the body of law
necessary to achieve practical results. So with the Declaration
before the Assembly.
^
Despite this appeal to codify concepts of human rights in international law in
1948; as Secretary of State, Dulles later retreated from this stance, In 1953,
Dulles announced that the United States would not sign or ratify any United
Nations' covenant on human rights; that it would not sign the Convention on the
Political Rights of Women; and that it would refuse to press for Senate
approval of the Genocide Convention. *8 Much of the reason for this retreat
was caused by congressional pressure, especially the efforts of Senator John
W. Bricker.
Senator Bricker's objections to United States involvement in international
conventions on human rights was not a renunciation of the basic concepts of
individual freedom and dignity nor the principles of universality of these notions.
Bricker claimed he "unqualifiedly supports the position of the United States" in
promoting human rights "in every country" through the United Nations and that
he "favors recommendations by the United Nations on all human rights and
fundamental freedoms.*" Rather, his objections were to the proposed
mechanisms to be employed by the U.N. to support these concepts and the fear
that once the U.S. joined into binding international agreements, it would forfeit
*' John Foster Dulles, "The Future of the United Nations'', International
Conciliation No, 445 (November 1 948): 535.
Vernon van Dyke, Human Rights , the United States and World
Communitu (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p, 130,
" Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, U.S. Congress, Human Rights
Conventions
. 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967, pp. 64-65. Quoted in Vernon
Van Dyke, p. 133,
~>1
its sovereignty to on international body. In a speech to Congress, Senator
9richer claimed that ''the United Motions ... is setting up a form of government
that is directly imperiling the basic fundamental freedoms of the citizens of the
United States. *°' 1-1 He stated that he did not want "any of the international
groups , . to betray the fundamental, inalienable, and God-given rights of
American citizens enjoyed under the Constitution."--' 1 This reluctance to bind
foreign policy concerning human rights to international agreements continued to
influence U.S. policy makers until the Nixon era.
D. MODERN RESPONSES
What is clear from the review of the historical precedents of American
foreign policy, is that America has always, either consciously or unconsciously,
pursued some sort of human rights policy. The difference in each
administration's approach has been the relative importance or priority of human
rights issues and the particular mechanisms for operationalizing support.
These historical differences are underscored by the distinctions among the
goals and policies of the three presidents of the past eighteen years: Nixon,
Carter, and Reagan.
"
The primary foreign-policy goal of the Nixon administration was the
achievement of international stability. The quest for stability so dominated all
other considerations of foreign policy, that many accused Richard Nixon—and
especially his foreign-policy czar, Henry Kissinger— of amorality in foreign
relations. As John Gaddis has asserted, "there was a widespread sense 1', that
Nixon and Kissinger "had neglected the proper alignment between policy and
principle that any nation must have in order to maintain self-confidence".^
30 Vernon van Dyke, p. 134.
3' Vernon Van Dyke, p. 134.
°2 Gepaid Ford, of course, also had a term of office during this period, but I
have included his human rights policies under Nixon/Kissinger,
Jo John Lewis Gaddis, p, 337.
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It is not that Kissinger lacked a moral view of America. As he stated in his
memoirs: v l believed , . . that no nation could face or even define its choices
without a moral compass that set a course through the ambiguities of reality and
thus made sacrifices meaningful,"34 But in Kissinger's view, as well as Nixon's,
it is not the active expression of morality and human rights values in the
international milieu that guarantees these freedoms for Americans, rather it is
the achievement of international stability that allows the U.S. to secure domestic
freedoms. The achievement of similar freedoms in other countries may be
desirable in a moral sense, but should not be a concern of U.S. foreign policy,
especially if it detracts from the achievement of this stability goal. Thus, Nixon
and Kissinger often viewed an active support of human rights issues as
detrimental to America's primary interests, and ignored human rights issues as
much as possible. **
The United States was not devoid, however, of support for international
human rights during the Nixon era, but this support did not originate within the
administration. To Congress must go the credit for maintaining the historical
linkages with America's declaratory support of human rights. In 1973, Senator-
Kennedy sponsored an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act that
encouraged the administration to take a more serious approach to securing
human rights compliance in states seeking U.S. trade: "It is the sense of
Congress that the President should deny any economic or military assistance to
the government of any foreign country which practices the internment or
imprisonment of that country's citizens for political purposes. w3 ° As this
statement of the sense of Congress was not strong enough to achieve
significant changes in the administration's foreign-policy behavior, it was
-^ Henry Kissinger, White House Years I.Boston: 1979), p. 65. Uuoted in
John Lewis Gaddis, p. 342.
35 Nicolai N. Petro, p. 10.
36 Quoted in Peter 6. Brown and Douglas Maclean, eds., Human Ri g hts and
U.S. Forei g n Polic u (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1979), p. 7.
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followed the next year by an amendment by Senator Harkin. The Harkin
amendment to the International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1 974
specifically prohibited the use of U.S. funds to aid any government ''which
engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights . . . unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy". i/
James Earl Carter's approach to human rights was fundamentally different
from that of Richard Nixon's. He desired to forge a linkage between America's
historical declaratory support for the universality of human rights concepts with
clear and uncompromising operational support. Carter was interested in
resurrecting the era of the first half of the 20th century when "'ideals and
interest did coincide, when American diplomacy created the Marshall Plan and
NATO and discovered that it served not only interest but conscience. **°
President Carter outlined his foreign-policy goals in his first speech to the
United Nations on March 1 7, 1977: "First, to maintain peace and to reduce the
arms race.: second, to build a better and more cooperative international
economic system; and third, [to] work with potential adversaries as well as our
close friends to advance the cause of human rights.
'
v^9
In a speech delivered at the University of Georgia, Carter's Secretary of
State, Cyrus Vance, described which human rights the United States believed
were both universally applicable and worthy of the attention of American
foreign -policy initiatives:
First, there is the right to be free from governmental violation
of the integrity of the person. Such violations include torture;
cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment; and
arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. And they include denial of fair
public trial, and invasion of the home.
37 Nicolai N, Petro, p. 12.
38 Theodore H, White, America in Search of Itself (New York: Harper k
Row, 1982), pp. 219-220.
3% Judith F. Buncher, ed., Human Ri g hts &. American Diplomac u : 1975-1977
(New York: Facts On File, 1977), p. 179.
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Second, there is the right to the fulfillment of such vital needs
as food, shelter, health care and education. We recognize that
the fulfillment of this right will depend, in part, upon the stage of a
nation's economic development. But we also know that this right
can be violated by a government's action or inaction ....
Third, there is the right to enjoy civil and political liberties-
freedom of thought; of religion; of assembly; freedom of speech;
freedom of the press; freedom of movement both within and
outside one's own country; freedom to take part in government.
Our policy is to promote all these rights. 4 *-1
The fundamental difference between Carter's view of human rights and
Nixon's was Carter's belief that international stability is only possible as all
countries subscribe to and implement basic guarantees of human freedoms. The
promotion of individual, social and political freedom in other countries, by means
of U.S. foreign policy, thus, was viewed as a prime component of American
national security. American national security "need not depend on our inherent
military force, or economic power or political persuasion", Carter asserted, but
rather, "it should derive from the fact we try to be right and honest and truthful
and decent", 4'
In many respects, Ronald Reagan's declaratory policy regarding human rights
continues the redirection begun by Jimmy Carter. Like Carter, Reagan sees
American support for human rights as based upon moral considerations and
historical precedents: "This Administration believes that human rights is an issue
of central importance both to relieve suffering and injustice and to link foreign
policy with the traditions of the American people"42 The linkage between
national security and support for human rights has been repeatedly reaffirmed;
4<
-
1 Cyrus R. Vance, "Human Rights and Foreign Policy", Address delivered
at the University of Georgia, April 30, 1977. Quoted in Judith F. Buncher, ed., p.
181.
41 Quoted in Nicolai N. Petro, p. 16,
42 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1381 , Department of
State report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 97th
Congress, 2nd Session (2 February 1982), p. 3.
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"We believe that human rights are not only compatible with our national
interest; they are an indispensable element of the American approach--at home
and abroad. Our objective is to make our security interests and our human
rights concerns mutually reinforcing so that they can be pursued in tandem. "43
As Secretary of State George Shultz has stated:
In our world, our ideals and our interests . . . are intimately
connected. In the long run., the survival of America and American
democracy is essential if freedom is to survive .... We are the
strongest free nation on earth. Our closest allies are democracies
and depend on us for their security. And our security and well-
being ar& enhanced in a world where democracy flourishes and
where the global economic system is open and free. We could not
hope to survive long if our fellow democracies succumbed to
totalitarianism. Thus, we have a vital stake in the direction the
world takes—whether it be toward greater freedom or toward
dictatorship. 44
While at the same time embracing a strong declaratory stand, the Reagan
administration has attempted to enunciate the limits of foreign-policu
effectiveness towards achieving changes in the world's compliance with human
rights principles. In testimony before the Congressional subcommittee on
International Development Institutions and Finance, the administration
recognized that U.S. sovereignty ended at its own borders. That although the
U.S. would continue to strive to improve both its own compliance and that of the
rest of the world, the administration conceded that the country could only
mitigate suffering, not eradicate it.45
In fact, the Reagan administration has acknowledged that sometimes an
active support of human rights is counterproductive to achieving human rights
43 Human Rights and U.S. Polic u in the Multilateral Development Banks ,,
hearings before the Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and
Finance of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of
Representatives, 97th Congress, 1st Session (21,23 July 1981], p. 35.
44 George Shultz, "Morality and Realism in American Foreign Policy",
Current Polic u no. 748 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, 1335), p. 2.
4° Human Ri g hts and U.S. Polic u in the Multilateral Development Banks , p. 35.
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goals. Elliott Abrams cites the experience of post-World War I Germany as an
example of this! "The founders of the Weimar Republic, by aiming at a
democracy stripped of all the authoritarian features of Imperial Germany,
created a system so fragile that it was overwhelmed by something wholly
barbaric in only fourteen years."^
Because of the limitations of U.S. policy in effecting change and the danger of
encouraging processes that are in reality counterproductive, the Reagan
administration has been forced to grapple with some difficult moral choices.
Secretary Shultz has expressed the dilemma:
We have friends and allies who do not always live up to our
standards of freedom and democratic government, yet we cannot
abandon them. Our adversaries am the worst offenders of the
principles we cherish, yet in the nuclear age, we have no choice
but to seek solutions by political means. We are vulnerable to
terrorism because we are a free and law-abiding society, yet we
must find a way to respond that is consistent with our ideals as a
free and law-abiding society. 4/
Unlike Nixon and Kissinger, Shultz has not viewed the dilemma as leading to
the rejection of the principles of support for human rights nor a complete
subjugation of these principles to national security considerations. While
acknowledging the difficult moral choices, Shultz also acknowledges (as did
Carter) the value of ideology in effecting changes in the world situation: 'We
have learned that our moral convictions must be tempered and tested in daily
grappling with the realities of the modern world. But we have also learned that
our ideals have value and relevance, that the idea of freedom is a powerful
force." 43
The Reagan administration has adopted a pragmatic approach to supporting
human rights abroad in an effort to resolve the dilemma of morality and realism.
46 Quoted in Nicolai N. Retro, p. 45.
47 George Shultz, p. 2.
48 George Shultz, p. 3.
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The target country of the specific foreign policy has tended to enjoin the type of
response the administration has tahenj i.e.., the existing bilateral relationships
between a human rights offending country and the United States dictates the
level of U.S. foreign-policy response. In those countries with which the United
States has developed political or economic relationships, the administration
adopts quiet diplomacy to effect changes. On the other hand, those countries
with which the U.S. has little or no political or economic clout are dealt with
more visibly, since public criticism is viewed as the only viable resort. As Elliot
Abrams acknowledges, the government is guided primarily by
the criterion of effectiveness [; i.e.,] choosing the response that is
most likely to actually improve human rights. The most effective
means, generally, is traditional diplomacy, which maximizes the
limited leverage we do possess, while minimizing counterproductive
reactions, damage to bilateral relations and international tension,
Traditional diplomacy has the drawback of being least visible
precisely where it is most successful. But this Administration is
pledged to employ traditional diplomacy vigorously on behaif of
human rights.^
The preceding review of U.S. diplomatic history demonstrates the central
role human rights support has played in the policies of American leaders, This
again demonstrates the unique character of the American nation. This character-
is eloquently summarized by a Yugoslavian dissident, Mihajlo Mihajlov,"
The United States is not a state like France, China, England,
etc., and it would be a great tragedy if someday the United States
became such a state. What is the difference? First of all, the
United States is not a national state, but a multinational state.
Second, the United States was founded by people who valued
individual freedom more highly than their own country.
And so the United States is primarily a state of freedom. . . .
Whole peoples from other countries can say, Our homeland is
^J Countru Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1381 , p. 1 1
•on9
Germany, Russia, or whatever; only Americans can say, My
homeland is freedom, 50
*Q Mihajlo Mihajlov, "Prospects for the Post -Tito Era", New America
(January 1 980): 7,
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III. THE AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST
The United States is largely a romantic country. It has
encountered little opposition and does not think in terms of moves
and counter-moves in a never-ending game. It sees no reason that
it can't accomplish its presumably formidable objectives. Its
history is marked by a belief in Manifest Destiny—abetted by a
Puritan past in which the American nation was foreordained to be
a Beacon unto the World. In order., therefore, to understand
American policy, one should not simply go through a careful
calculation of the national interest. However important such a
calculation may be to officials of the Department of State, it would
acquire little visceral support among the American people.
James R. Schlesinger
A. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Several trends should be apparent throughout the preceding discussion
of American diplomatic history. The first is that American statesmen have
unanimously espoused the universality of the same freedoms that serv^ as the
basis for the American nation. From Washington to Reagan, presidents,
congressmen and government administrators have viewed these rights as the
foundation for democracy both at home and abroad. A second trend is the
support of these freedoms as a component of U.S. dec/oratory foreign policy.
Even leaders who refused to include support for international human rights
compliance in their operational policies affirmed the centrality of such rights in
the domestic environment and the desire for such rights to be embraced
throughout the world. Finally, those who have espoused support of these
freedoms as a component of operational policy, have done so on moral, legal,
and strategic criteria. It is to this third trend that I now turn in an effort to
summarize the historical arguments for supporting an operational human rights
policy, especially as it relates to support of dissidence in the Soviet Union.
Donald E. Nuechterlein defines the national interest as "the perceived needs
and desires of one sovereign state in relation to the sovereign states comprising
its external environment".^ He explains that the aggregate national interest has
four component parts, which he terms "basic"" interests: defense interests,
economic interests, world order interests, and ideological interests,- The order
of presentation does not necessarily imply a priority of interests, neither ar&
the categories closed, i.e., particular interests may and frequently do cross over
category boundaries, Neuchterlein also categorizes intensity of concern for
each of these categories of basic interests as follows:
1. Survival: threatening the very existence of the nation.
2. Vital: threatens serious harm to the state.
3. Major: corrective action is required to redress dangerous trends
and events and preclude their escalation to the vital level.
4. Peripheral: state not effected directly but interest groups within
state are adversely effected.
Applying Neuchterlein's framework of analysis to the concept of human
rights reveals the United States' national interest is served by support of human
rights primarily in the two components of ideological and world order interests;
to a minor degree in the defense component; and to a negligible degree in the
economic component. The historical review demonstrates that the intensity of
support for international human rights vis-a-vis other interests has varied
significantly throughout America's two hundred years, ranging from a low
intensity during the 1 SClUs to a high under the administrations of Woodrow
Wilson and Jimmy Carter, Support for human rights has never been at a
survival level, seldom achieves a vital level, but is usuallu treated at the major
' Donald E. Nuechterlein, National Interests and Presidential Leadershi p:
The Settin g of Priorities (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 137S), p. 3.
2 Donald E. Nuechterlein, p. 4-5.
° Donald E. Nuechterlein, pp. 3-10.
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level of intensity. This is an important point: likewise, it should be kept in mind
that while I will argue for an operational policy of support for Soviet dissidence,
this policy may conflict with national security interests that occupy a higher
level of intensity— a prime example of this potential conflict is the threat of
general nuclear warfare between the United States and the Soviet Union.
When and if policies conflict, the more intense interest, naturally, takes
precedence.
Because support for human rights does not fit neatly into any single one of
Neuchterlein's basic interest categories, I have chosen to discuss the
theoretical rationale for support in different terms than Neuchterlein employs,
However, Neuchterlein's analysis of the components of the aggregate national
interest remain an important backdrop to the following discussion. U.S. support
for human rights is an important component of U.S. foreign policy; but it is not
the sole goal of policy nor even the most important goal of policy. I will not
attempt to enunciate the priorities of U.S. foreign policy because: (1) that would
be beyond the scope of this paper; and (2) priorities change depending on the
world and domestic situations. Nevertheless, I wfll address some of the costs of
pursuing human rights and try to place support of human rights within the
context of other defense, economic, world order, and ideological interests.
B. HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST
The historical analysis of U.S. foreign policy reveals that American leaders
have justified worldwide support for human rights on the basis of moral, legal
and strategic considerations. The arguments within these three considerations
will now be summarized in order to provide a rationale for an operational
support of human rights as a component of U.S. foreign policy.
The United States has a moral obligation to support international human
rights. America is obliged to support human rights because it is the "right thing
to do v . Such an obligation flows out of the unique character of the United
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States as being founded upon moral absolutes. Despite the indigenous
emergence of pragmatism in the nineteenth century and its widespread
acceptance in the twentieth, America remains a country whose laws, customs,
political structure and foreign policy conform by and large to its original moral
foundations. The constant appeal by contemporary American leaders to moral
principles as embodied in the Constitution and in the practice of American
history affirms that morality is as relevant today as an explanation for policy
formulation as it was in the days of our Founding Fathers. Although addressing
himself to a different issue than that of the present discussion, James
Schlesinger captured the essence of "the moral basis of American foreign policy
in an address to European leaders:
American support for Europe does not reflect any precise
calculation of the national interest.^ Otherwise why would we
spend 7 percent of GNP to help those whose own estimate of the
value of their security was only, say, 3 percent of their GNP?
Americans support Europe out of a sense of moral obligation ....
In the American democracy, no expert opinion, no government
bureaucracy, no East Coast establishment would be able to
maintain forces in Europe—unless the American public believes
that Jt Js right:-' [emphasis in original]
Since American political culture has such a moral basis, a failure to embrace
the same freedoms for all humanity calls into question the very foundations of
our own system. Samuel Huntington asserts that "for Americans not to believe




[which] runs counter to the strong elements of moral absolutism
and messianism that or^ part of American history and culture. . . .*® A failure to
extend American freedoms to the rest of the world raises many of the same
** Schlesinger's use of the term not/ono/ interest is used here in the limited
sense of national security interest.
'-' James R. Schlesinger, "An American Perspective", in Robert E. Hunter, ed.
NATO: The Next Generation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 44-45.
6 Samuel P. Huntington, pp. 21-22.
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legitimacy questions that were raised in America's domestic history when
significant parts of the population were denied the full entitlements of
citizenship. Failure to make foreign-policy actions conform to declaratory
stands sets America up for charges of hypocrisy and relegates public
statements in support of human rights to little more than propaganda.
Having claimed that morality rather than pragmatism is the foundation of
American foreign policy is not to deny the practical utility of specific foreign
policies. The United States is not the only country that is constrained and/or
driven by ideological considerations. America's chief adversary in the
international sphere is also motivated by ideology. Adoption of a morally based
foreign policy is an effective weapon in the current war the U.S. is waging
against the US3R--the war of ideas. Alexandr Solzhenitsyn captured the
essence of this conflict in his remarks at Harvard University in 1378:
Very well known representatives of your society, such as George
Kennan, say: 'We cannot apply moral criteria to politics/ Thus we
mix good and evil, right and wrong, and make space for the
absolute triumph of absolute evil in the world. Only moral criteria
can help the West against communism's well-planned world
strategy. After a certain level of the problem has been reached,
legalistic thinking induces paralysis; it prevents one from seeing
the scale and the meaning of events.'7
Solzhenitsyn's sentiment is shared by Thomas Buergenthal, another noted
spokesman for human rights:
In today's world, ideology is as much a weapon as is sophisticated
weaponry. A sound human rights policy provides the United States
with an ideology that distinguishes us most clearly from the Soviet
Union and seriously undercuts the ideological appeal of communism.
It is the only ideology, the only dream, if you will, that the people of
7 Alexandr I. Solzhenitsyn, A World Split Apart (New York: Harper L Row,
1373), p. 33.
35
the United States share with the majority of people of the Second
and Third Worlds. 3
A strong moral stand allows the United States to be proactive rather than
reactive in foreign policy; to seize the moral "high ground" in our struggle in the
international environment. As Warren Christopher wrote, *, . , our human rights
policy . . . identifies the United States with leaders around the world who are
trying to improve the lot of their people .... It gives us a way of taking the
ideological initiative, instead of merely reacting". 9
In addition to moral considerations, by virtue of being a signatory to a variety
of international agreements concerning human rights, the United States has a
legal obligation to support international human rights. I use obligation in a very
loose sense here because obligation toward international law has never been
embraced by American leadership as superior to domestic law. Nevertheless, as
a country that actively espouses the rule of law as universally normative,
voluntary abidance by that law lends credence to this concept. Conversely,
failure to abide by the provisions of any specific international agreement
undermines the utility of all international agreements and returns the
international environment to a chaotic state where "might makes right". As
President Carter said in an address to the United Nations:
All the signatories of the U.N. Charter have pledged themselves to
observe and to respect basic human rights. Thus, no member of
the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is
solely its own business. Equally, no member can avoid its
responsibilities to review and to speak when torture or
unwarranted deprivation occurs in any part of the world .... The
solemn committments of the U.N. Charter, of the U.N. J s Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, of the Helsinki accords and of many
8
"Nomination of Ernest W, Lefever"., hearings before the Committee on
Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 97th Congress, 1st Session (18,19 Mag, 4, 5
June 1981), p. 2.
9 Warren Christopher, "For the Record", Washington Post . August 14,
1 930.
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other international instruments must be taken just as seriously as
commercial or security agreements. 11-1
In fact, it is the creation of legal institutions within the domestic systems of
other nations to ensure compliance with human rights that is one of America's
goals in pursuing human rights oriented policies. It is not public pronouncements
by leaders of the world in support of human rights principles that is the goal of
U.S. human rights policies, rather it is the development of institutions and
structures within a society to protect the inherent rights of the individual
against capriciousness and arbitrariness by the state and other power centers.
As Jeane Kirkpatrick rightly observes,
the freedom of the American people was based not on the
marvelous and inspiring slogans of Thomas Paine but on the careful
web of restraint and permission and interests and traditions which
was woven by our Founding fathers into the Constitution and
explained in the Federalist Papers--and rooted, of course,
ultimately in our rights as Englishmen.' '
A final reason for advocating U.S. support of international human rights is for
strategic considerations. I have already stated that the war currently waged
between the Soviet Union and the United States is a war of ideas. But this war
of ideas is not solely confined to the international sphere. Both the U.S. and the
USSR seek to influence the ideas of each other's respective populace. American
support for human rights and human rights activists within the Soviet Union
attacks the legitimacy of Soviet regime. As with any totalitarian regime,
domestic legitimacy is the weakest spot in Moscow's armor. The Soviet Union is
susceptible to toppling due to its top-heavy pyramidal structure that lacks-
alternative sources of authority. By encouraging the development of alternative
power centers within the Soviet political system, the United States can
encourage the ultimate collapse of the system.
lu Address to United Nations, New York, NY, March 17, 1977, Quoted in
•Judith F. Buncher, ed., p. 180.
1
' Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Establishing A viable Human Rights Policy*, World
Affairs 143 (Spring 1981): 333-334.
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Michael Novak claims, however, that the United States has been losing the
war of ideas with the Soviet Union and precisely on the human rights issue:
Human-rights issues have become the very center of the cold war,
particularly in the war of ideas and in public opinion. In this
ideological assault, the USSR has been particularly astute. By an
aggressive assault on other nations, it has been able to divert
international attention from the abuses of human rights within its
own empire J *
Such an approach is a clear acknowledgment by the Soviet leaders of the force
of world opinion both on their own actions and the actions of the United States.
Soviet leaders are not immune to the effects of world opinion, especially as a
factor of state legitimacy. Lacking a popular domestic legitimacy, the USSR
seeks acceptance by the world community and especially recognition as both a
world power and the premier progressive nation. Challenges to Soviet
compliance with human rights obligations have an effect on Soviet leaders as is
aemonstrated by their reactions in public statements and counterchallenges. 1 °
What is ultimately at stake in the war of ideas between the United States
and the Soviet Union is the continued existence of the two opposed political
systems. There can be no "peaceful coexistence" between these two systems,
at least not in the terms that these words connote in the English language. Both
the U.S. and the USSR have messianic visions for the rest of the world; and
these visions are mutually exclusive. The ultimate survival of each state in both
its present form and its desired form depends on the degree to which the rest
of the world embraces one or the other's world view. Both the United States
1
~
d Remarks in "Human Rights And American Foreign Policy: A Symposium", p.
F.-7
d For examples of recent Soviet reactions to continued Western pressure
on human rights see "On Human Rights, Real and Illusory", Pray da , July 18,
1983, translated in International Affairs (Moscow ) (October 1983): 82-31 and S.
P.ozhkov, "Humanitarian Problems in Interstate Relations", International Affairs
(Moscow ) (April 1984): 36-44. For a Western analysis of the reaction see
"Countering America's Crusade", Time , November 25, 1985.
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and the Soviet Union, therefore, have a strategic interest in the victory of their
respective systems and the defeat of their opponent's.
The Soviet leadership clearly understands this conflict. In both rhetoric and
actions the Soviet ruling elite demonstrate a conscious strategy to achieve
victory. American leaders are loath to frame the struggle between the two
systems in such terms. This of course derives from the American political
culture, which by its very nature is reluctant to impose its values and
institutions on others. But this is precisely the reason American leaders should
embrace a strong operational support for international human rights. Support
for this issue (unlike, for example, support for capitalism) avoids charges of
cultural imperialism because it supports the intrinsic right of people to shape
their own destiny by shaping the political institutions necessary to obtain and
sustain personal freedoms. It exposes the Soviet myth of the need for a
temporary "dictatorship of the proletariat" in order to construct a future utopia
where human rights are possible. It replaces this chimera with its own example
of a presently functioning democratic state--warts and all.
Human rights on therefore at the core of this conflict. American-style
democracy and Soviet-style socialism each pose a question to the rest of the
world. The question is whether rights an inherent to individuals and thus to be
protected against state interference— the basis of American democracy— or
whether individual rights or^ the benefits of the state and thus subordinate to
collective interests— the basis of Soviet socialism. Curiously, American
politicians often avoid acknowledging the eithei— or choice involved in the
answer to this question. Administration officials often seem to lack an
appreciation for the Soviet elite's denial of human rights to their subjects. For
example, Ambassador Richard Schifter, U.S. representative to the United
Nations Human Rights Commission, appears naively unaware of the reason the
Soviet totalitarian state refuses to grant human rights to significant segments of
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its population. In a review of Soviet violations of fundamental political and
personal freedoms. Schifter muses:
The Soviet system would not be at risk if it allowed full freedom of
conscience by permitting the Ukrainian Catholic church and the
Lithuanian Catholic church, as well as Baptists, Jehovah's
Witnesses, Seventh Day Adventists, and Pentecostalists to
exercise their religion in peace .... Are [Pussification policies]
truly needed to maintain the Soviet state? . . . Can't the Soviet
system survive without resorting to [abuses of psychiatry]? 1 '4
The answer is clearly that the Soviet system would not survive without sucn
practices. The reasons for this will be explored further in subsequent chapters.
Finally, it must be stressed that human rights policies must be a component
of a larger strategic policy of strength if they are to have any effect at
changing the behavior of other states. Samuel Huntington has demonstrated
through an analysis of U.S. diplomacy during the twentieth century, that human
rights advocacy and the support of libertarian values abroad has been effective
only when U.S. power has been strong relative to other nation-states. While
"the expansion of American power is not synonymous with the expansion of
liberty/ Huntington claims, ". . , a significant correlation exists between the rise
and fall of American power in the world and the rise and fall of liberty and
democracy in the world."^ To prove his hypothesis, Huntington offers the
examples of the post-World War II establishment of democratic regimes in
Western Europe and Japan—where American power was high—vis-a-vis the
Soviet imposition of socialism in Eastern Europe--where American power was
negligible. Huntington also discusses the rise and in some cases fall of
democracy in Greece, Turkey, the Philippines, South Korea, Nicaragua, Haiti, the
1
4
Richard Schifter, "U.S. Statements Before The United Nations
Commission On Human Rights", World Affairs 147 (Winter 1334/85); 231.
15 Samuel P. Huntington, pp. 26-27.
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Dominican Republic, Peru and Chili. His conclusion is: "the future of liberty in
the world is • • intimately linked to the future of American power," ' -
This was the major criticism of the Carter administration's approach to
human rights: that it failed to link the moral strength of its human rights position
with political, economic and military strength. This linkage is the declaratory
approach of the Reagan administration. The record of American diplomatic
history of such a linkage indicates that it should be more successful. Whether it
has or not in the specific case of Soviet treatment of dissidence is addressed in
later chapters.
C. COSTS
Admittedly support for human rights is not risk free. There are a number of
costs associated with such an approach and any human rights policy to be
effective must consider these costs. Colin Gray has termed the 1980s "'the most
dangerous decade". He says that "the 1980s will be uniquely dangerous to the
United States not so much because of the strength of the Soviet Union but,
rather, because of its weaknesses."' He contends that the "correlation of
forces" which had steadily been increasing in favor of the Soviet Union since
the mid-1950s, began to reverse in the 1980s such that Soviet leaders may now
perceive the correlation to have shifted in favor of the United States by the
1990s. Such a reversal might call into question the very legitimacy and stability
of the Soviet regime and move it on a course of irreversible decline, Since this
would clearly not be in the interest of the current Soviet leadership, Gray
argues they may be tempted to take uncharacteristically drastic action while a
"window of opportunity" exits in the mid- 1930sJ'7
16 Samuel P. Huntington, p. 33.
'
' See Colin S. Gray, "The Most Dangerous Decade: Historic Mission,
Legitimacy, and Dynamics Of The Soviet Empire In The 1980s", Orbis 25 (Spring
1931): 13-23.
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While the scope of Gray's argument is much broader than the effect of U,S,
human rights policies and their impact on regime instability the same arguments-
can and have been made about the costs of such a U.S. policy. No less an
authority on diplomacy than Henry Kissinger certainly felt support for
international human rights was destabilizing, as has already been noted. But one
must seriously question the Soviet options in this regard. It is far from clear-
that the Soviets could presently achieve a victory in a military confrontation
with the United States and certainly not in a nuclear exchange. Do proponents
of this argument seriously believe that if the Soviets perceive they are going to
ultimately lose in the correlation of forces that they might as well take out their
main adversary in the spirit of "if I don't win then everybody loses"? Are there
not a variety of other options to the Soviets short of a preemptive war? I think
it much more likely that the Soviet ruling elite, if threatened internally, would
tend to retreat from external confrontations and devote more energy to
consolidating internal power. It is not inconceivable that the regime might even
attempt some movement toward liberalization in order to achieve a domestic
legitimacy. In other words, it is far from clear that U.S. support for a policy that
is admittedly a challenge to Soviet regime stability would cause the Soviets to
exercise their military options. This theme will be addressed further in
subsequent chapters' discussions of the destabilizing nature of Soviet dissent.
Even if one accepts the argument that the risk of destabilization of the world
order is greater than the potential gain in undermining the Soviet system, what
are the options left to the United States? The USSR is obviously not
constrained in its ideological war with "capitalist imperialism" and its desire to
undermine the American system, in fact such a goal is a long-standing Soviet
declaratory policy. The ideological war continues whether the U.S. actively
participates in it or not. If America refuses to respond to the Soviet ideological
challenge, she is left in much the same position as were France and Great
4.
Britain in the pre-war era of appeasement: seeing the boundaries of freedom
draw ever tighter due to a f^ar- of unilaterally destabilizing the world order,
Another potential risk for the United States in pursuing a policy of support
for universal human rights is the effect such a policy might have on the
achievement of other more important foreign-policy goals. For example, such an
attempt to challenge the institutions and values of other societies may
antagonize and irritate American allies thus frustrating American national
security and economic goals. This is the problem that Secretary of State Shulz
addressed in his aforementioned comments on the conflicts between morality
and realism in foreign policy. The answer to this risk would again appear to be
an integration of human rights concerns within a comprehensive approach to
foreign-policy objectives and a clear establishment of priorities. This is the
value of the use of an analytical framework such as that designed by
Neuchterlein to insure that as many goals and objectives of the American
national interest as possible are included in policy decisions and that the
intensity of interest is identified. But American's must also understand that the
American agenda is not always the agenda of its allies. Because this is a given
in the international system, the pursuit of any foreign-policy objective is bound
to carry with it certain costs. American leaders must weigh the competing goals
and objectives and adjust policies accordingly.
A final cost is the potential expansion of American military and economic
power in order to achieve substantive results in human rights. As Samuel
Huntington has shown, liberal democracies and a respect for human rights have
flourished in those places in which American strength has been projected. But
an expansion of American power carries with it significant risks— both at home
and abroad. The potential for an uncontrolled war or unrestrained escalation of
a conflict can be increased if force is not applied cautiously and by means of
well-conceived and well-executed plans. There is the heightened risk of
alienating world opinion through a perception that America is bent on global
4:
imperialism. There are the costs to the domestic economy of diverting
resources from social, economic and other requirements to meet military
demands. Finally, an unrestricted expansion of military strength might even pose
"dangers to the operation of democratic government within the United
States*. 18
Thus, the pursuit of human rights as a component of American foreign policy
is not without its inherent costs. But neither is this pursuit without its
benefits. A desire to extend American concepts of human rights to the rest of
the world has been shown to be the product of the American creed and is
consistent with contemporary American values and American diplomatic history,
Our focus now shifts to the Soviet Union. In the next chapters the dissident
movement will be examined to determine if support of this movement is
consistent with U.S. objectives regarding human rights.
18 Samuel P. Huntington, p. 21.
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IV. THE PHENOMENON OF SOVIET DISSENT
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media
and regardless of frontiers,
Article XIX, U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
A. DEFINITIONS AND ORIGINS
Is support for Soviet dissidence as a component of American support of
international human rights in the U.S. national interest? In order to adequately
answer this question it is necessary to examine the Soviet dissident movement
to see whether the movement conforms to American expectations for human
rights. This chapter will define the phenomenon of dissent within the Soviet
context, examine dissidence as a factor of regime instability, and explore the
extent of the phenomenon within Soviet society. Finally, the various dissident
groups will be categorized in order to examine each group in detail; the subject
of the next chapter.
Political dissent, by definition, is an expression of dissatisfaction with
political goals, realities and processes in a given regime. It is a phenomenon
existing in all modern states because, as Robert Dahl notes, "no government
receives indefinitely the total support of the people over whom it asserts its
jurisdiction".' A Soviet dissident "is an ideological heretic who expresses
disagreement either with the system's rules of the game or with its policies or
who questions aspects both of official ideology and of the practices of political
' Robert A. Dahl, Re g imes and O p positions (New Haven, Conn: 1973), p. 1.
Quoted in Susan Gross Solomon, Pluralism in the Soviet Union (New York; St.
Martin's Press, 1383), p. 131.
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culture".' There ore several renderings of the English words "dissenter''' and
"dissident" in Russian, the most common in Soviet uses being inokomysiicshcni,
which is defined as a "differently minded" person or os one "of a different trend
of thought". 1* The various terms are almost always used by Soviet officials in a
pejorative sense. For example, in an article printed in Provda in 1972,
dissenters were divided into two categories: those who are "ideologically
unstable" and . those who want to "restore capitalism" and are therefore
"counterrevolutionaries". On the other hand, as might be expected., dissenters
use the terminology in a more positive sense.
The modern Soviet dissident movement has its origins in the "reactions of
both the people and the party elite to the Communist Party's philosophy and
methods of dictatorship and terror in the years of the Russian civil war."'-'
Thus, Soviet dissidence is a long-standing phenomenon in the USSR, dating back
even to the very beginnings of the Bolshevik siezure of power. Early
governmental attempts to eliminate dissidence were largely effective. Through a
combination of fear, violence and terror, Joseph Stalin both sought and achieved
the elimination of open dissent as well as active opposition.
2 V. Stanley Vardys, "Lithuania's Catholic Movement Reappraised", Survey
25 (Summer 1 980): 51
.
* A. I. Smirnitsky, Russian-En g lish Oictionaru (New York: E. P, Dutton, 1981).
Other terms qcq dissident., r-oskoinik, and sekiani, which, like inakomtisiiGsncni
all originally had religious connotations (See Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The
Post-Khrushchev Campaign to Suppress Dissent: Perspectives, Strategies, and
Techniques of Repression", in Rudolf L. Takes, ed. Dissent in the USSR
[Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1 975], p. 47).
"* V. Bolshakov, "The Subversive Strategy of the War of Nerves", Pravda
,
January 13, 1372.
5 Rudolf L. Takes, ed., Dissent in the USSR (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1975), p. 1 1
,
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The costs to the regime resulting from the Stalinist era of repression are not
only measured in the twenty-nine to sixty-five million Russian lives lostD but
also in the memory of terror that continues to plague the current political elites.
This Stalinist legacy acts as a restraint upon present leaders on the one hand",
but provides a corresponding impetus to modern dissidents swho are able to
raise the specter of terror to elicit popular support. Bohdan Bociurkiw, a
professor at Carleton University in Ottawa, observes that the "emancipation
from the paralysis of fear has been especially noticeable among the younger
members of the Soviet intelligentsia who are not inhibited by the memories of
Stalinist terror and do not share a sense of guilt with their elders. "°
Due to the very nature of the Soviet socialist system, manifestations of
dissent have proven to be and give every evidence of continuing to be a
persistent phenomenon. As long as the system denies itself adequate processes
for acknowledging and responding positively to the needs and desires of its
people, dissatisfaction will continue to find expression through dissident activity.
Dissidence, thus, reflects a feeling of estrangement from the regime and a
perception that there are no alternative legitimate and viable means to effect
change within the system. Yet in the modern era Soviet political and sociological
dissent has not developed into political opposition— although the potential for
** The precise number of dead resulting from Stalin's reign of terror is the
subject of debate; authoritative Soviet records are not available. For more
information see Robert Conquest, The Human Cost of Soviet Communism ,
(Washington, D.C: GPO, 1971) and Eugene H. Methvin, "Twentieth Century
Super-killers", National Review , May 31, 1385.
Alexandr Solzhenitsyn writes about an interview he had with the Military
Collegium in 1 963, at which time those in attendance "'admitted that the picture I
painted (of forced labor camps in the novel One Dau in the Life of Ivan
Oenisovitch ) was decidedly on the bright side, that every one of them knew of
camps worse that that....They were eager for reform." (Gula g Archipelag o,
[Philadelphia: Harper &. Row, 1373], p. 11. Quoted in George T, Colman Jr.,
"Soviet Sociological Dissent: An Irritating Political Constraint", Professional
Study No. 5558, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, AL, Apr 1975, pp. 38-9,
}
s Michel Glenny and Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Dissent in the USSR", Studies in
Comparative Communism 3 (April 1370): 74.
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such a development may become more likely in the next few decades. 3 It is
precisely this possibility that compels the regime actively to monitor and repress
expressions of dissent whenever and wherever they occur,
The persistence of dissent offers the Soviet leadership a dilemma. For in
trying to avoid the rampant terror of the Stalinist era, the governing elite runs
the distinct risk of harboring a long-term ideological threat to the regime,
Dissidence calls into question the very basis of legitimacy of the Soviet regime
because it challenges the monolithic nature of the regime's ideological
framework. Legitimacy., in the Soviet lexicon, is not a contract between rulers
and ruled but rather is based on what Svetozar Stojanovic calls '"the statist
myth of socialism". In the Soviet system, "the truth of authority replaces the
authority of truth".^ Legitimacy and stability are thus inexorably linked, the
one being the foundation of the other and vice versa.
Dissidence is, of course, a factor that faces all modern nation-states. This
fact is frequently used by the Soviet Union in countering Western objections to
the Soviet's treatment of their dissidents. The fundamental difference between
dissidence in the West and in the East is the opportunity and legality of
articulating dissenting views. In the Western pluralistic democracies, the
expression of dissenting views is not only a legally sanctioned activity, but also
an essential component of the democratic process. For in these countries, the
political culture believes that social progress occurs as the individual citizens of
the country actively participate in the political process. This is not the case in
3 The distinction between dissent and opposition is a matter of degree. In
the sense in which I am using the terms, to dissent is to hold a different opinion
or idea and give expression to that idea; to oppose is to offer resistance, This
distinction is a bit problematic, as there is considerable controversy among
scholars about the meaning of these two terms. See, for example, Robert M,
Cutler, "Soviet Dissent Under Khrushchev: An Analytical Study", Comparative
Politics 13 (October 1980] for a discussion of the various points of view.
lu Svetozar Stojanovic, Between Ideals and Realitu, translated by Gerson S.
Sher (New York, 1973), pp. 37,87. Quoted in Rudolf L. Tokes, p. 33.
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the Soviet Union, where progress is seen os the responsibility of the "vanguard
of the proletariat", a political ejite that has exclusive understanding the laws of
Marxist-Leninism. Therefore, dissidence cannot be tolerated in the Soviet
Union, as it questions this monopoly of understanding enjoyed by the political
elite.
Dissent is but one of a variety of components of political instability in the
USSR today. Dissent, however, is both a separate component of instability and
also a means of articulating all the other forms of sociological instability. To
properly understand the significance of the modern dissidence movement, it is
necessary to view it within the broader context of current sociological
problems. A brief discussion of other destabilizing sociological factors is
therefore in order,
B. COMPONENTS OF REGIME INSTABILITY
A hey component of instability is the demographic trend within the Soviet
Union. The Soviet Union is a multiethnic, multilinguistic, and multicultural state
comprised of more than one hundred separate national groups. While this in
itself provides a myriad of challenges to achieving national unity, the problem of
regime instability is exacerbated by demographics that vary widely along
national, linguistic and cultural lines. Put simply, the Slavic nationalities have
declining birth rates and the non-Slavic nationalities have increasing rates. The
net effect is that by the year 2000 the population of the non-Slavic national
groups will outnumber the Slavic.'' The effect of this national diversity as it
1 1 Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Decline of an Empire (New York: Harper-
Colophon, 1981), p. 30. In addition to this very excellent treatment of the
implications of Soviet demographics see also Stephen Rapawy and Godfrey
Baldwin, "Demographic Trends in the Soviet Union: 1950-2000", Report to the
U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee; Warren W. Eason, "Demographic
Trends and Soviet Foreign Policy: The Underlying Imperatives of Labor Supply",
in Seweryn Bialer, ed., The Domestic Context of Soviet Forei g n Polic u (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1981); and M. B. Tatimov, Razvitie narodonaseleni ua i
demograficheshaua politika (Nauka, Alma Ata, 1378).
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relotes to dissident movements will be addressed later, At this point it is
sufficient to note that to the extent the non-Slavic peoples become conscious
that '-"they hold the key to the overall progress of Soviet society [this
consciousness] may lead them to demand that their role be expressed in terms
of new political responsibilities."'^
Another destabilizing sociological factor is what has been termed the
''ideological bankruptcy of the regime".^ The lack of ideological freedom and the
maintenance of a monolithic philosophical framework, according to some
scholars, fosters a stagnation of thought and desensitization of people to any
ideology. As Erik de Mauny says, *. . , the Soviet leaders ore offering a
perpetual insult to the intelligence of many of their compatriots"^ This factor
may help to explain the phenomenon of low labor productivity as well as to
chronic absenteeism, rampant alcoholism, and high rates of job turnover in the
USSR. Former General Party Secretary Andropov once characterized the labor
productivity problem as "working with your sleeves rolled down",' The
ideological desensitization is especially worrisome because of its effect on youth




Of course, there are a variety of non-sociological factors that ar^
components of instability and provide the basis for expressions of dissent, For
example, a command economy's inflexibility and unresponsiveness to consumer
interests, waste, shortages, and agricultural unproductivity on the domestic
side--and loss of political and ideological hegemony over the socialist world,
'* Helene Garrere d'Encausse, p. 90.
1 6 George T. Caiman Jr., p. 36.
14 Erik de Mauny, Russian Prospect (New York: W.W.Norton &, Co., 19691,
p, 47.
15 US News and World Report , 13 July 1983, p. 63.
lb Quoted in George T. Colman Jr., p. 36. Also see Stephen White,
"Propagating Communist Values in the USSR, Problems of Communism 34
(November-December 1385): 1-17.
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restiveness of Eastern Europe, and perceived threats from China and the United
States on the foreign side--provide a picture of the Soviet Union that is far
from glossy. When viewed in this context of general instability within the Soviet
regime, dissent takes on increasing importance both as a unifying aspect of
these diverse threats and as a catalyst for mobilizing opposition to the status
quo.
All of these factors of instability raise the question of the relationship
between general popular dissatisfaction with the regime and the phenomenon of
dissent. As I have defined the term, dissent refers to the articulation of this
dissatisfaction, thus the perceptions of estrangement by the general population
are the seedbed from which dissent grows. As we examine the dissident
phenomenon it is necessary to keep this fact in mind, for the failure of the
regime to deal with the source of dissent— the aforementioned factors of
instability—and deal only with the symptoms— the expression through dissident
activity-serves to perpetuate the dissident phenomenon.
C. EXTENT OF MOVEMENT
If dissent poses such a potentially destabilizing role in the Soviet Union, it is
fair to ask how broad the movement is at the present time. Robert Sharlet, a
noted Western expert on Soviet law and political justice, characterizes
dissidence as a "steadily emerging 'contra-system' in the U.S.S.R." He claims
this contra-system is
comprised of a flourishing 'second economy' in competition with the
state's planned economy, a vast subterranean system of religious
belief and practice contradicting the regime's policy of atheism,
and a widespread tendency toward privatization antithetical to the
party's advocacy of patriotism and participation of 'developed
socialism'.' ^
1 ' Robert Sharlet, "Growing Soviet Dissidence", Current Histor u, (October
1380): 96. For more on this "second economy" see Gregory Grossman, "The
'Secondary Economy' of the USSR", Problems of Communism 26 (September-
October 1977): 25-40.
The breadth of dissent claimed by Sharlet might lead one to conclude that
great numbers of Soviet people are involved., and yet most analysts conclude
that there ore relatively few Soviet citizens who are active dissenters. There
may, however, be a large number of latent dissidents. An indication of this is an
unofficial survey conducted by sociologists in Moscow in 1981 which indicated
as many as 20 percent of the sample had favorable opinions toward dissident
issues and another 60 percent were ambivalent.^ The real issue, of course, is
not the numerical size of the phenomenon at any given point in time, but rather
its ability to effect changes. The CPSU itself only accounts for a small
proportion of the population of the USSR and yet who would guestion its control
over the regime?
D. CATEGORIES
When speaking of dissent it is tempting to speak in terms of a dissident
movement, but movement implies organization and direction. To be sure, there
are organizations of dissenters in the Soviet Union, but these organizations am
far from the norm and are transitory at best, Dissent is varied and diverse; it
covers all socio-economic groups, the entire political spectrum and exists
throughout the Soviet territory and even beyond it. There are various ways to
categorize dissent in the Soviet Union, One of the earliest Western typologies
was developed by Rudolf L. Takes. His framework is based on a combination of
characteristics, stated goals and behaviors vis-a-vis the political authorities.
He identifies three basic ideological positions: the moral-absolutist, the
instrumental-pragmatic, and the anomic-militant.
The moral-absolutist attempts to reshape the beliefs of Soviet society along
non-Leninist ethical, religious, intellectual and/or cultural ground. He is not
interested in reaching an accommodation with the regime, rather he desires to
ld Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan
University Press, 1385), pp. 455-6.
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confront and combat existing social, economic, and political realities. The moral-
absolutist's goal is "to obtain the benefits of first-class citizenship and, with it,
the totality of rights and privileges that the letier of the USSR constitution
confers on all Soviet citizens -" [emphasis in original]. 13 His appeal is not to the
masses, rather it is directed to the intelligentsia— including those within the
political elite. Examples of this kind of ideology include religious thinkers, moral
philosophers, most writers, poets, and humanistic social critics.
Instrumental-pragmatic ideologies represent competing interpretations of
Marxism, alternative methods of regime modernization and scientific progress, a
commitment to free experimentation in all fields of human thought, and
intellectual autonomy in scientific matters. The primary method of influence
tends to be communications with political elites whom they hope to both criticise
and persuade. The ultimate aim of this communication is to convince these elites
to create conditions in the Soviet Union that would favor a purely scientific
approach to societal development. Ironically, the instrumental-pragmatist merely
calls the regime to practice the scientific approach to problem-solving that
Marxist-Leninism theoretically espouses but is unable to conduct due to its
philosophical presuppositions. Major advocates of the instrumental-pragmatist
school of dissidence are., naturally enough, scientists— the most well-known
being Andrey Sakharav and Zhores Medvedev, 2 ^
The last of Takes' categories is the anomic-militant. This ideological
classification represents "affirmations of national identity or spiritual autonomy
or expressions of extreme alienation from the political philosophies, institutions,
laws, and governing practices of the Soviet system". =• ' Advocates of these
ideologies see little or no hope for the achievement of their aims within the
existing regime since they view themselves os alienated from the system and
19 Rudolf L. Takes, p. 13.
20 Rudolf L. Takes, p. 14.
21 Rudolf L. Tokes, p. 14.
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relegated to second-class citizenship. They seek to confront and combat the
existing political, social and economic realities, such as religious, ethnic arid
racial discrimination, Russification and "neo-Stalinism". Their appeal is often to
political elites, imploring them to fulfill the letter of the Soviet Constitution as it
pertains to human and civil rights guaranteed to all Soviet citizens. Included in
this group are the persecuted religious believers (e.g. Evangelical Christian
Baptists, Pentecostalists, True and Free Seventh-Day Adventists), the national
self-determinationists (e.g. Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Georgian, and Crimean Tartar-
nationalists), and those seeking emigration (e.g. German and Jewish groups).
Takes also includes in this category those politically estranged groups on the
extreme right of the ideological spectrum, such as neo-Slavophiles, Stalinists,
Fascists, and anti-Semites who desire to overthrow the existing regime and
restore a more traditionally Russian form of government.
Robert Sharlet simplifies Takes typology somewhat by dividing the spectrum
of dissent into two broad categories based again upon the means of societal
change. The first category includes those advocating instrumental or pragmatic
changes, such as those scientific and literary dissidents frequently labeled as
human rights advocates. The second category refers to those dissidents that
seek "humanistic concessions of an absolutist nature", such as the various
religious dissenters whose basic belief systems are antithetical to the Party's
official ideology and who reject the Party's "scientific atheism*."
Whereas Tdkes and Sharlet categorize dissident groups primarily by their
advocacy of the means for societal restructuring and their relationship to the
regime power structure, a more common categorization is by the specific issues
raised by the various groups. Ludmilla Alexeyeva, a leader in the human rights
movement in Moscow in the 1960s and early 1970s, provides seven categories in
her very informative book on contemporary dissidence in the Soviet Union: self-
c2 Robert Sharlet, "Dissent and Repression in the Soviet Union", Current
History (October 1 977): 1 1 2.
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determination, deported nations, emigration, religious liberty, human rights,
social end economic justice, and Russian national. 1- Peter Reddaway, the noted
British analyst of Soviet dissent, divides the field into four groups: national,
emigration, religious, and political,24 and George T. Colman, a U.S. government
analyst, divides it into three: national, religious and cultural.^
While the typologies provided by Takes and Sharlet are compelling because
of their attempts to categorize by the instrumental means used by the various
groups, this paper will follow the more traditional form of categorization by
objectives and issues. I will use three categories: national, religious, and
political. This categorization is more in line with that used by the dissident
writers themselves and therefore aids in comparing and contrasting the various
groups without having to redefine terminology. The category names reveal much
about the general goals of the various dissident groups, but it remains to
examine the groups themselves. This is the lash of the next three chapters.
- c: Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent .
24 Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", Problems of Communism
32 (November-December 1983): 1-15.




The victory of October put on end once and for all to national
oppression and the inequality of nations. The voluntary unification
of free and equal peoples into a single multinational state—the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
—
played an enormous role , . , .
Discord among nationalities became a thing of the past, and
fraternal friendship, close cooperation and mutual assistance
among all the peoples of the USSR became a norm of life.
Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1986
A, THE NATIONALITY PROGRAM
Nationally-oriented dissent must be understood in the context of the
regime's nationality program for in large part it is a reaction to that program.
From the beginnings of the Bolshevik reign, Party leaders have differed on the
question of national self-determination. Ultimately communists desired the
development of a •"new man*, unbound by traditional nationalistic distinctives.
The process by which this new man is developed has been envisioned as
occurring in three dialectic phases. The first phase--the •"flourishing 1' [roxtv&t]
of nations— refers to progress and cultural development within each distinctive
Soviet nationality. It asserts that national cultures have existed at differing
levels of maturity within the Soviet federation and that in order for future
progress toward consolidation to occur, each culture had to be developed
individually. This process of individual flourishing was largely accomplished,
assert Soviet theorists, in the early periods of the Soviet regime when written
languages and other cultural distinctives were created and/or legitimized by the
central Soviet government.
The second phase, in which the USSR currently resides, envisions the
rapprochement or "drawing together" ( sbtizhenie ) of the various national
56
cultures. This phase emphasises cultural traits common to all the Soviet groups,
however, it admits that certain cultural distinctive-; will continue to be
maintained and even continue to flourish. As this phase runs contemporaneously
with the construction of socialism, the various nationalities are expected to
become more similar as the processes and realities of socialism begin to
overcome the vestiges of the capitalist and preceding periods.
The final phase is the complete unity ( ed/nstwa } of the nations. This unity is
the product of the fusion [siiyonie) of the disparate national cultures into a new
Soviet culture. Precisely what the components of this new culture will be has
not been made particularly clear. Soviet theorists usually couch their
discussions of this final stage in much the same sort of Utopian language as is
employed for other aspects of the future communist stage of development,
Although ideologues frequently claim that this new culture will be composed of
the best attributes of the hundred-plus current Soviet nationalities, exactly
what attributes and from which groups is not clearly enunciated. And as will be
seen shortly, there is little doubt among the minority nationalities that the View-
culture will continue to strongly resemble the old Russian one.
Exactly what programs are required in order to achieve the desired unity
and fusion of national cultures given the realities of national sentiment posed a
problem for the original Bolsheviks and has continued to be problematic for the
modern leaders of the Soviet state. For largely pragmatic considerations, Lenin
supported the inclusion of large national republics under a federal system. Each
of these republics had and still has the theoretical right to secede as well as
many other institutional structures to guarantee the cultural distinctiveness of
the region. But Lenin did not develop a detailed ideological justification for his
national policies and it was left to Stalin to establish the ideological framework
that continues to guide the present regime.
Stalin defined a nation as an "historically evolved, stable community of
people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and
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psychological make-up manifested in a common culture". 1 Rather than being the
result of racial or tribal background, he believed that a nation was an "historical
category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism"'. Despite
the belief that nationalism had its origin in capitalism, Stalin did not believe that
socialism would do away with nationalism, although he allowed that the nature of
nationalism would change:
The victory of socialism in one country does not create the
necessary conditions for the merging of nations and national
languages, ... on the contrary, this period creates favorable
conditions for the renaissance and flourishing of the nations that
were formerly oppressed by tsarist imperialism .... The socialist
nations of the Soviet Union . radically differ from the
corresponding old bourgeois nations of old Russia both in class
composition and spiritual complexion and in social and political
interests and aspirations.-^
Although there was little ambiguity in Stalin's actual policies--he strongly
favored the Russian culture and mercilessly persecuted several minority
groups — his ideological methodology for eliminating national differences was
somewhat ambiguous. Khrushchev attempted to rectify this situation. In 1981,
at the Twenty-second Party Congress, Khrushchev advocated an
"internationalist'" strategy for the "formation of a future unitary culture of
communist society, common to all mankind":
In our country there is a process of rapprochement ( sbiizhenie ) of
nations, that strengthens their social homogeneity. In the course
of the full-scale construction of communism complete unity
' Josef Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (Moscow! Foreign
Language Publishing House, 13501, p. 16. Quoted in Grey Hodnett, "What's in a
Nation?" Problems of Communism 16 (Septembei—October 1967): 15.
2 Josef Stalin, The National Question ' and Leninism (Moscow: Foreign
Language Publishing House, 1950), p. 16,23. Quoted in Grey Hodnett, p. 5.
J At a Kremlin banquet for Red Army commanders after the victory in
Europe, Stalin toasted: "I drink first of all to the health of the Russian people
because it is the most outstanding nation of all the nations forming a part of the





( ed/nstwo) will be achieved. But even after communism is basically
constructed, it would still be early to declare the fusion ( s/,yo.r>/e
)
of nations as accomplished. Lenin, as is well known, declared that
state and national differences will exist long after the victory of
socialism in all countries.
^
Thus began a debate between assimilationists and those favoring the
continuation of national differences. Assimilationists argued that nationalism
was a product of class conflicts during the capitalist period and thus with the
victory of socialism in the Soviet Union and the destruction of class conflicts no
objective obstacles existed to prevent the various nationalities from now
merging. The state was therefore legitimate in forging ahead with programs to
eliminate the remaining vestiges of nationalism. The non-assimilationists argued,
on the other hand, that nationalism was older than the capitalist era and would
last longer than the socialist period, and therefore the regime should not attempt
to force the end of national sentiments artificially.
^
Whereas Khrushchev appears to have leaned more toward the
assimilationist school, Brezhnev appears to have been more moderate. He
vetoed moves by drafters of the 1977 Constitution to change the Soviet Union's
institutional structure to do away with the national republics. His ideological
pronouncements increasingly departed from Khrushchev's "internationalist"
language and stressed present problems:
Speaking about the historical community of people, we
absolutely do not have in mind that national differences have
already vanished, or more so that the fusion of nationalities has
already occurred. All nations and nationalities that live in the
Soviet Union preserve their national peculiarities, traits of national
character and their best traditions.
At this time . . . our people have, independent of their national
affiliation, manu common traits which unite them in one monolithic
* Quoted in Martha B. Olcott, "Yuri Andropov And The 'National Question'/'-'
Soviet Studies 36 (Januaru 1385): 103-4.
u See Grey Hodnett, -"What's in a Nation?" for a discussion of these two
arguments.
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whole. This is a community of ideology, a community of historical
fates, , , . of socio-economic life, of basic interests and goals. This
is the developing community of Soviet socialist culture, which
subsumes all that is valuable from each national culture,
^
The three leaders since Brezhnev have continued to espouse a more
moderate national program than that of Khrushchev. While Andropov, in a
speech on the anniversary of the formation of the USSR, used the same term,
fusion {s//ifOw'e}, as had Khrushchev, the rest of the speech indicated that he
was not embarking on a change in national policies from that of Brezhnev.'' The
Party program adopted at the twenty-seventh Party Congress in February
1386 continues to emphasize the remote nature of the "complete unity of
nations" and the impermissibility of •''artificially prodding" the process of
"convergence", °
Despite the rhetoric about the "new Soviet man" and the debate between the
assimilationists and the non-assimilationists, in the view of many national
minorities the Soviet state has consistently pursued a policy of
"internationalism ,'--although in their view it has amounted to little more than
"Russification". This is most apparent in the regime's language policy, in which
Russian has been institutionalized as the official language of the state. Vernon
Aspaturian identifies several areas in which Russian has taken precedence over
the other indigenous languages: (1) Russian is the official language of the state,
diplomacy and international contact; (2) Russian is a mandatory official language
in all non-Russian areas alongside the local language; (3) Russian is the single
language of command in the armed forces; (41 Russian is the only language
inscribed on all official awards, decorations, medals, postoge stomps, ond
e Quoted in Martha Brill Olcott, pp. 104-5.
7 Martha Brill Olcott, p. 113.
8
"The Draft Party Program (New Version)", p. 14.
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money; and (5) all public institutions and localities in non-Russian areas are
identified in Russian along with the local language.^
But in addition to the significant effect of the institutional imposition of the
Russian language on the non-Russian republics, there are other evidences of
the linkage of traditional Russian culture with the future socialist culture. First,
except for the Baltic, Armenian and Georgian languages, all non-Russian
languages use a form of the Cyrillic alphabet, including many of the Moslem
nationalities which had traditionally employed Arabic alphabets. The practical
effect of this policy is "to facilitate the learning of Russian, to erect artificial
barriers to communication with related peoples outside the Soviet Union, . . . and
finally to psychoculturally condition non-Russians to think that similarity of
alphabets indicates general cultural kinship to the Russians",^-1 Secondly, non-
Russians have almost universally adopted the Russian patronymic and
russianized their family names by putting Russian endings on them. Finally,
Russian art, literature and music is labeled and disseminated as Soviet to a much
greater extent than any other nationality's.^ In fact, it has been contended
that the "Moscow headquarters of the Society for the Preservation of
Historical and Cultural Monuments is colloquially known as the Russian Club and
provides a forum for blatantly Russocentric propaganda and agitation*.'*
Although each of the various national dissident movements has its own
particular complaint against the regime and its own national goals, all share a
subordinate position to the Great Russians. This is not solely a per-ce.ived
° Vernon V. Aspaturian, Process and Power in Soviet Forei g n Polic y
(Boston: Little, Brown, &. Co., 1971) p. 17.
' Vernon V, Aspaturian, p. 1 8.
' ' Vernon V, Aspaturian, p. 18.
'* Jeremy Azrael, "The 'Nationality Problem' in the USSR: Domestic
Pressures and Foreign Policy Constraints", in Seweryn Bialer, ed.. The
Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Pol icu (Boulder, CO: Vv'estview Press,
1981), p. 141. See also Alexander Yanov, The Russian New Right (Berkeley:
Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1978), pp. 13, 113,
141,
subordinate position as might occur as a result of the "psychocultural"
conditioning that Aspaturian refers to, but is also the result of political.,
economic, and social institutions that continue to promote the dominance of the
Russians at the expense of all other national groups, A study by John Echols
has demonstrated the continued racial discrimination carried out by Russians
against Central Asians, despite the express policies of the Soviet regime and the
expected ability of a totalitarian regime to eliminate institutional discrimination.
Using political control at the local level and positions of importance at the
highest levels as indicators of political power, Echols has shown that Central
Asians rarely achieve positions at the top of the Soviet government or Party
hierarchy and while freguently holding political office at the local level, Centrai
Asians are invariably "backed up" by Russians in the number two position.
Echols also demonstrated that Central Asians have incomes significantly lower
than Russians and hold occupational positions of a much lower socio-economic
standing—and the trend is for the situation to worsen, '^
National dissent therefore stems from both perceived and actual disparities
between the Russian majority and the hundred plus ethnic minorities. The
diversity of complaints and objectives within national dissent is as varied as the
number of national groups in this the world's largest multinational state. The
remainder of this chapter will examine the evolution and goals of the more
'3 John M. Echols, "Racial And Ethnic Inequality: the Comparative Impact Of
Socialism", Comparative Political Studies 13 (January 19811: 403-444. For other-
studies on national problems see Helene Carrere d'Encausse, Decline of an
Empire
, and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the
USSR", Problems of Communism 23 (May-June 1974): 1-22. For an analysis of a
rare Soviet publication of data on the distribution of ethnic groups by social
class see Darrell Slider, "A Note On The Class Structure Of Soviet
Nationalities", Soviet Studies 3? (October 1985): 533-340.
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important dissident groups: the Crimean Tartars, Soviet Germans, Jews,
Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Central Asians,^
B. CRIMEAN TARTARS
The first groups to organize themselves in the modern era in response to the
regime's nationality policies were the "outcasts of the outcasts'", the national
groups that had been deported from their national homelands and resettled in
eastern regions of the USSR following the Second World War, Several national
groups were allowed to emigrate back to their homelands after Stalin's death,
but the Crimean Tartars, who had been deported from the Crimea, the Meskhi,
who had been deported from South Georgia, and the Volga Germans, who had
been deported from the Volga river valley area, were refused.
The Crimean Tartars had lived in the Crimea from the thirteenth century until
1944. After "liberating" the region from the German army, Stalin charged the
entire Tartar nation with "betraying their country" through collaboration with
the German occupiers. The bulk of the Crimean people, more than 200,000 men,
women and children, were forcibly deported to special settlements in the Urals
and Central Asia. They were released from restrictions to live in these special
settlements by an edict issued by the Presidium in 1956, but the charge of
treason was not removed nor were they allowed to return to the Crimea. This
differed from the five other nations Stalin had charged with collaboration, who
were "rehabilitated", regained their territory and their national status.'"
Fallowing this decree, former Party and government figures and war
veterans began to organize petition campaigns to press the central authorities
to rescind the charge of treason and allow a return of the Tartars to the
'4 Much of the following descriptive information about the various
dissidence groups in this and the following two chapters is based on data
provided by Ludmilla Alexeyeva in Soviet Dissent .
'* Helene Garrere d'Encausse, p. 193. The five other nations art the
Chechen, Ingush, Karachais, Balkars and Kalmyks.
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Crimea. During the 1960s, more than three million signatures were affixed to
Crimean Tartar petitions. This is all the more surprising since the Crimean
Tartar population is only about 800,000. The movement was and remains the
only movement in the USSR that can be labeled an all-national movement. 16
In 1967, in response to these petitions, the Presidium issued two edicts! the
first removed the charge of treason against the nation, the second affirmed the
right of Tartars who had previously lived in the Crimea to settle in any territory
of the USSR provided it were done "in compliance with existing legislation on
labor and passport policies", While these decrees seemingly restored civil
rights denied the Tartars since 1944, in actuality the Tartars gained little in
substance. As individuals they were permitted to resettle anywhere in the
USSR, but they were not recognized as a collective nationality; i.e., they were
not refered to as the Tartar nation but rather as "Tatars who formerly resided
in the Crimea". Thus the Tartars were denied the right to restore a national
state in their traditional homeland.
Even as individuals, the Tartars have remained excluded from returning to
the Crimea primarily through the bureaucratic processes. Immediately following
the decrees of 1967 some 1,200 families returned to the Crimea. But only two
families and three bachelors met the local registration criteria and were
permitted to stay. i;7 Various mechanisms were employed by the regime to
frustrate Tartar efforts to return: (1) inhabitants of rural areas were issued
passports and reguired to register— a practice unique to the Crimea and
intended to prevent unregistered settlers, (2) "notary publics" refused to
legalize the purchase of homes by Tartars, 13) resettlers to the Crimea from any
nationality had to be specifically recruited by the regime, and (4) Tartars with
any known involvement with dissident organizations were refused permits for
resettlement. As a result of these bureaucratic restrictions, in the ten uears
16 Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 7,
' ' Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 144.
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following the 1967 decrees only 15,000 Tartars had successfully registered to
live in the Crimea.''-'
In reaction to these bureaucratic roadblocks to emigration, Tartars have
continued to illegally resettle in the Crimea. These illegal resetters live as
isolated families or small groups and or<i frequently deported when discovered.
While some petitions continue to be forwarded to government officials, the
regime's harassment over some twenty years has had its effect, Numbers of
signatures on petitions have declined significantly, mass protests are infrequent
at best, and the movement lacks the organization and leadership it enjoyed in the
1960s.
C. SOVIET GERMANS
The Soviet Germans, with a population in 1979 of almost two million, first
emigrated to Russia in 1764 under Catherine the Great and continued to do so
during the Napoleonic Wars, Most settled in the Volga ar&a or in the southern
Ukraine and the Caucasus. From 1924 to 1944 the majority of Germans lived in a
German autonomous republic located on the Volga.
From the beginning of their immigration, the bulk of the Russian people
—
along with the authorities— have mistrusted the Germans and have continually
questioned their loyalty. During the Second World War, the Volga Germans, like
the Crimean Tartars were forcibly deported to Siberia and Central Asia. They
were not charged with collaboration per se, rather the deportations were
conducted "as a safety measure, 'transferring' a people who might otherwise
have been tempted to collaborate".^ The restriction to live on special
settlements was cancelled in 1 955, and the Volga Germans were "rehabilitated
"
in 1964, but they were not allowed to return to their previous homeland along
the Volga.
1° Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 150.
13 Helene Carrere d'Encausse, p. 199.
The paper rehabilitation was not able to eliminate the legacy of discrimination
and mistrust the Soviet Germans hove experienced at the hands of the general
Soviet population. Much of this discrimination is tolerated if not encouraged by
the authorities. For example, the newspaper Chelygbinsky Rabochu published an
article on 2 April 1980 with strong anti-German sentiments. Aleksandr Bous, a
German resident of Chelyabinsk, was described by another resident as having:
a high forehead, thin reddish hair and bright blue eyes. . . . All of a
sudden my war days came bach. . . , I can still remember those
dark, venomously green helmets , . . with swastikas. . . . And the
eyes under the helmets. . . . Cold blue eyes az if touched with ice
went particularly well with those helmets. , . . Nordic eyes— the
sign of belonging to the 'higher race'.20
A failure to adequately assimilate drove many Germans to apply for
emigration to Germany in the 1950s, but a mass emigration movement began in
the mid-1960s "after all hope for the restoration of the Volga German Republic
had vanished". In 1971, the Soviet authorities began allowing emigration and
1 J 45 people emigrated. The number of emigres rose by about 1,500 people a
year to a high of 9,704 in 1976. In 1977, the rate began to fall steadily and in
1982 only 1,958 Germans managed to leave. 2 ' The authorities ar^ currently only
allowing a trickle of Germans to leave, and the discrimination continues.
The problem German emigration poses to the regime is the implied admission
that an ethnic group in the Soviet Union that has been in the regime since before
the revolution finds its traditional national ties greater than its ties with the
Soviet system. As Helene Carrere d'Encausse says, the phenomenon of German
emigration •"amounts to admitting the total failure of the Soviet nationalities
policy, recognizing the permanence of ethnic bonds to the detriment of bonds
created by a life in common, and thus implicitly acknowledging that any ethnic
group which does not identify with the USSR has the right to leave". 2i=:
20 Q.uoted in Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 171.
2
^ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 174.
=- 2 Helene Carrere d'Encausse, p. 202.
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Source: based on emigration figures appearing in Geoffrey Edwards, "Human
Rights And Basket III Issues: Areas Of Change And Continuity", International
Affairs.. 61 (Autumn 1985): 634,
For the regime, the answer to this predicament has for the time been
provided by the end of detente. No longer encouraged by the prospects of
economic gains from the West in response to token human rights concessions,
the Soviets have effectively halted the emigration of Germans.
D. SOVIET JEWS
Jews represent another group that has concluded that improvement of its
position within the Soviet Union is not possible and therefore desires to
emigrate. As in most of Eastern Europe, anti-Semitism has almost "always been
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a feature in the everyday life of the Soviet Union".' Juridically, the USSR
considers Judaism to be a nationality rather than a religion and it is so stated on
individual identification papers. Despite this, since the revolution Jews have
been almost completely deprived of their cultural distinctives, e.g., Yiddish
schools, art, literature, and synagogue? 24 Widespread discrimination is
practiced, most notably in attempts to restrict Jews from higher education and
white-collar employment."
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" Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 179.
*^ For an excellent summary of how the regime has systematically
attempted to eliminate Jewish cultural distinctives see Zvi Gitelman, "Moscow
and the Soviet Jews: A Parting of the Ways", Problems of Communism 29
(January-February 1980): 20-24.
*" Despite these restrictions, as a group, Jews have had and continue to
have the highest percentage of white-collar workers (Darrell Slider, p. 537).
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Escape from this discrimination by means of emigration to anywhere out of
the US9R woj the ultimate goal of the Jewish dissidents who began to organize
in the 1960s, but the movement began to be labeled the "Jewish Movement for
Emigration to Israel*. As with other groups, petitions and open letters, began to
be sent to the authorities requesting emigration visas. The Six Day War in 1367
provided a catalyst for an increase in petitions, as more and more Jews began
to identify Israel as a national homeland. In 1970, an event took place that drew
international attention to the movement. Twelve people were arrested and
charged with the attempted hijacking of a Soviet airplane; most of the hijackers
had unsuccessfully applied for exit visas to Israel. The twelve were convicted
and two were sentenced to be executed. The cruelty of the punishments "shook
the world". Under foreign and internal pressure, the Soviet authorities
commuted the death sentences, but conducted an especially aggressive
campaign against those within the Soviet Union who had drawn attention to the
trials,
The authorities had apparently hoped to frighten the Jewish movement
activists but the trials had the opposite effect. After these incidents, support
from the West increased and the movement became more active. While
continuing arrests, imprisonment and other forms of repression against the more
active Jewish dissidents, the regime began to approve exit visas. In 1976, when
German emigration reached its peak and started its decline, the number of
Jewish emigres began to rise dramatically. The rate went from 14,000 in 1976
to u hiyfi Of 5 i, 300 in 1373. However, in 1980, with the end of the detente era
with the West (and other factors that will be examined below), this improvement
was reversed, resulting In the number of emigrants falling sharply to 21,470.: by
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1383, only 1,315 Jews were permitted to leave.*6 Those refused exit visas,
called "refuseniks", were estimated at 40,000 in 193 1.27 | n aijdjtj n to being
refused permission to emigrate, most have lost their previous jobs and either
have no work or are employed at menial tasks with little prospect of
improvement.
E. UKRAINIANS
While the Crimean Tartars, Germans and Jews desire a return of their
nationalities to traditional homelands, other national groups which have not been
displaced simply desire national self-determination within their existing
homelands. Most of the 100 or so national groups in the USSR fall into this
category to some extent. Groups with notable organization include Georgians,
Armenians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and some of the central
Asian Moslem groups. The groups with the most developed dissident
movements, however, are the Ukrainians and the Lithuanians.
With a land area slightly larger and a population roughly equal to France, the
Ukrainian Republic represents "the largest European national ethnic group
Oft —iD Based on figures published in A Chronicle of Uurrent Events as quoted by
Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 136. Emigration figures differ widely depending on the
source; nevertheless, the same general pattern exists. Carrere d'Encausse, in
Decline of an Empire
,
provides the following figures based on data from the
Israeli Ministry for the Integration of Immigrants of Jews emigrating from the
USSR to Israel during the preceding time period: 1368: 231; 1363: 3013; 1370:
399; 1971: 12,832; 1972: 31,652; 1973: 33,477; 1974: 17,373; 1375: 8,531; 1976:
7,274. The final figure shows the great disparity between the dissident
provided figures and the figures of the Israeli government, although, the latter
only include those Jews who successfully immigrated to Israel. Along this line,
Carrere d'Encausse states (without reference to source) that "in 1375 nearly
50% of the applicants for emigration chose not to go to Israel" (p. 208). If that
percentage is representative for the entire period, then the disparity between
emigration figures is not as great as it appears.
' Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 137.
70
without an independent government. "*'-' Of a total population of more than 4G
million, 35.4 million are native Ukrainians. Dominated by the Russians for
centuries, the Ukraine enjoyed independence for only a short period during 1918
before being integrated into the USSR as a Union Republic in 1922.
It might be expected that assimilation of Ukrainians into a new "Soviet -"
culture would be relatively easy as they represent a nationality with similar-
historical, political and social patterns to the Great Russians. But this has not
been the case. While many of the key leaders of the Soviet regime have come
out of the Ukraine, including Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Podgorny and a host of
others, Ukrainians have frequently balked at the prospect of complete
assimilation.
Following integration, Moscow has repeatedly attempted a program of
Russification in the Ukraine. This has been done primarily through the
displacement of the Ukrainian language by Russian, the forced dispersal of
Ukrainians to other regions of the Soviet Union, and the placement of Russians
or Russified urban Ukrainians in positions of political power. But this program of
Russification has not been consistent. In fact there have been several periods
when an opposite program of "Ukrainization" has been pursued.
"
Resistance movements against Soviet domination have been prevalent
throughout the Ukrainian Republic's experience, but they were especially
noticeable during World War II. In the post-war, post-Stalin era underground
resistance continued in the rural countryside but it was confined in numbers and
dealt with vehemently by Soviet authorities when uncovered. In the 1960s, the
locus of the Ukrainian dissidence movement shifted from the rural peasants to
the urban intelligentsia, became more open, and focused primarily upon
maintaining the Ukrainian culture within the Soviet political structure. Calls for
" Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 24.
^^ See Robert S. Sullivant, "The Ukrainians", Problems of Communism 16
(September-October 1967): 47-58 for a discussion of these shifts from
Russification to Ukrainlzation and back.
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independence -.were rarely made. In 1365, the Soviet government increased its
pressure on Ukrainian dissidents. The Soviet authorities arrested more than
twenty intellectuals throughout the Republic, and forced them to recant in
widely publicized trials. While dissident activity continued, the movement went
underground again and shifted its major effort toward the production of
samvydov*®
In the 1970s, Ukrainian dissidents surfaced again and became heavily
involved in the human rights effort throughout the USSR, forming one of the first
"Helsinki Watch Groups". While national self-determination continued to be a
goal, many in the movement believed that this could be obtained within the
existing federal structure of the USSR if the regime would only comply with the
letter of the Soviet Constitution and existing laws. One of the more fascinating
incidents to occur during the heightened dissent of the early 1970s was the
removal of Petro Shelest from his position as head of the Ukrainian communist
party. His removal was precipitated by his alleged attempt to "re-Ukrainize his
motherland's political apparatus". 1^ A powerful and influential leader both in the
Ukraine and in Moscow—who was assumed to be completely assimilated
—
Shelest surprised many by publishing a book about the Ukraine in which he
praised Ukrainian history, culture and development with almost no mention of
Russian contributions.
Because of the urbanization pattern in the Ukraine, the intellectual based
dissent of the 1960s and 1970s had little mass support. Ukrainian national
sentiments have traditionally been located in the rural countryside. The cities of
the Ukraine have historically been considered suspect by the Ukrainian rural
^® Literally, somvydov means "self-published" and is the Ukrainian
counterpart to the Russian term samixdot The term refers to written material
produced unofficially and usually illegally. As Vladimir Bukovsky puts it: "I write
it myself, censor it myself, print and disseminate it myself, and then I do time in
prison for it myself." (Vladimer Bukovsky, To Build a Castle: Mu Life as a
Dissenter , [New York: Viking Press, 1979], p. 141.)
**' Helene Garrere d'Encausse, p. 215.
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population as centers of foreign influence. Ukrainians living in these cities have
been largely assimilated, more often than not considering themselves to be
Russians.32 Thus, the intellectual based dissent, arising as it did in urban
areas, found little support in the Ukrainian countryside,
In the face of increased repression in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and
with the failure of the movement to make significant gains during the 1 370s,
Ukrainian dissidents were forced back underground. Ukrainian dissent today is
far from dead, but it has certainly been reduced from previous levels.
F, LITHUANIANS
The modern dissident movement in Lithuania is a unique combination of
national self-determination and religious self-determination. It is also a
popularly based movement that "accounts for a disproportionately high
percentage of dissident activities in the Soviet Union". 33 Lithuania, with a long
history of independence and resistance to foreign domination, was annexed to
the Soviet Union in 1940 as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1333.
From annexation until the mid-1950s, the Lithuanians conducted armed
resistance to the Soviet regime. Thousands of Lithuanians were killed during
this period, over 50,000 were sent to forced-labor camps, and as many as
350,000 were deported without trial to the eastern regions of the USSR. 3-** By
1356, this active resistance had been crushed and the Soviet occupation became
a way of life. Many Lithuanians concluded that dissidence had become
counterproductive, and awaited the time when the Soviet system would fall "by
the internal laws of its own development". They felt that the most important
goal was to maintain a national identity, which could not be accomplished if the
32 Robert S. Sullivant, p. 47,
33 V. Stanley Vardys, p. 49.
34 Ludmilla Alexeyeva, pp. 60-61.
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Lithuanian people continued to conduct violent or underground resistance.^5
Organised dissidence was therefore suspended for almost fifteen years.
The contemporary Lithuanian dissident movement emerged in 1368, under the
auspices of the Lithuanian Catholic Church. Lithuanian priests organized pro-
Lithuanian demonstrations to celebrate historical accomplishments, and
organized petition campaigns to pressure the Soviet regime for liberalization of
religious practices. The first of these petitions involved a request to the Kremlin
for freedom of religious instruction, for independent religious publications, for a
return of deposed bishops, and for the cessation of discrimination against
church-attending Catholics. ^& About eighty-five percent of the diocesan
priests and thousands of parishioners signed the petitions, In addition to these
petitions, anti-Soviet grafitti began to appear and regular samtzo'ot journals
were published. While the aims of the Lithuanian dissident movement remained
the same— i.e., national and religious self-determination—there appeared to be a
recognition that the previously adopted method of armed resistance was
ineffective under the Soviet regime.
The petitioning of Moscow for religious and national liberalization proved to
be as ineffective as the earlier armed resistance. The petitioners did not
receive any response to the substance of the petitions, Rather, the regime
reacted by arresting several of the movement's more influential priests and
laymen, In 1372, the tactic changed to that of appeals to world opinion. A
petition signed by 17,054 people was sent to Brezhnev by way of the United
Nations. Petitions continued along with the publication of the som.'zdot
newspaper Chronicle of the Catholic Church of Lithuania , whose purpose was
to "gather and publicize information on discrimination against Catholics and on
violations of human rights as guaranteed by the United Nations Declaration of
35 Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 65.
36 V. Stanley Vardys, p. 56.
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Human Rights and by other international agreements."37 Information
represented power and dissidents concentrated their efforts on reporting
events so that the Western press would pick them up and rebroadcast them
back into the Soviet Union.
Another technique of directing attention to their plight was the practice of
self-immolation. In 1972, twelve Lithuanians., in separate events, killed
themselves in this manner. This appeal to world opinion may have been
effective, as from 1972 to 1983 no priest was arrested, although laypersons
continued to be sentenced to prison terms for "organizing religious processions"
and other religious activities. While the intensification of persecution against
Lithuanian dissidents has begun to increase in the last three years, the number
of arrests and sentences imposed there have been moderate in relation to those
in the Ukraine and elsewhere in the USSR° y
6. CENTRAL ASIANS
I have previously defined Soviet dissent as an expression of dissatisfaction
with political goals, realities and processes in the Soviet Union. Under this
definition, the phenomenon of religious nationalism in Central Asia is not strictly
speaking national dissent. There has been little of the protests, petitions or
appeals that have characterized dissent in the other regions of the Soviet Union,
The Muslims of Central Asia represent more a counterculture than a dissident
movement. Nevertheless, the regime's response to the cultural traditions of the
peoples of Central Asia has taken a similar form to its response to dissidents
and dissident movements in the rest of the empire, and it is the potential for the
emergence of national opposition in this region that warrants a discussion of the
phenomenon.
37 V. Stanley Vardys, p. 57.
38 Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 85.
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The Muslim population of the Soviet Union is the sixth largest in the world.
At over forty-five million people, this population represents over forty national
groups located largely along the Soviet Union's southern border, Soviet Muslims
primarily live in the four union republics of Central Asia proper— Kirghizia,
Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia, and Uzbekistan—the Azerbaidzhan SSR, the
autonomous republics of the northern Caucasus, and the Kazakhstan SSR. The
titular nationalities of the six union republics mentioned also reflect the six
largest Muslim nationalities in the USSR.
The Soviet regime inherited the Muslim lands occupied by the Tsars, and in
many respects has attempted to continue the previous regime's assimilationist
and colonial policies. The task of assimilation has been more difficult in Central
Asia because, as Geoffrey Wheeler says, the Muslim culture "confronted the
Russians with a far greater problem than did the other non-Russian peoples of
the Empire, the vast majority of whom were Christian and followed a way of life
not greatly different from that of the Russians themselves"." Despite the very
real differences, for example, between the Lithuanians and Russians, both
cultures qfq more Western than Eastern and the cultural differences are
minimal compared to differences between the Russians and the Central Asians.
Soviet measures in Central Asia have, therefore, tended to be more intense
and revolutionary than in other regions—and ultimately less effective. The goal
has been the replacement of traditional cultures with a new Soviet/Russian
culture. Mechanisms to achieve this end have included: (1) a somewhat arbitrary
political division of the region, (2) an assault on the Moslem family structure, (3)
a policy of colonization employing Russians and other non-Muslim groups, (4) the
elimination of nomadic migrations, (5) collectivization of agriculture, (6)
industrialization, (7) linguistic reforms, (8) an assault on the Islamic religion, and
(91 attempts to replace traditional Islamic rites with new Soviet ceremonies.
3$ Geoffrey Wheeler, "The Muslims of Central Asia", Problems of"
Communism 16 (September-October 1367); 72.
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Despite these measures, much of the traditional Muslim culture of the region
remains. The Central Asian nationalities continue to resist industrialization and
urbanization, 4 '-1 the former interfering with the rhythm of daily religious prayers
and fasting. Pilgrimages to the traditional Islamic holy places are prohibited for
the vast majority of Soviet Muslims, but these have been replaced by pilgrimages
to local holy places: tombs of indigenous holy men, So-called "life-cycle*
customs such as circumcision and religious ceremonies at birth, weddings and
burials continue almost universally. Although arranged marriages, polygamy,
infant marriage and the bride price {Ka/ym ) have been made illegal, some of
these practices may still continue.^ Central Asian Moslems am the most
endogamous group in the USSR; a survey conducted in 1363 of marriage
patterns among Soviet nationalities revealed that the major Central Asian groups
marry almost completely within their respective ethnic groups. 4c-' Finally, there
is a continued widespread commitment to traditional ethnic food, dress and
related customs.
^ In 1370, the last year for which data on urban/rural distribution by
nationality was available, the Soviet Muslim population was approximately
seventy-two percent rural (Rosemarie Crisostomo, "The Muslims Of The Soviet
Union", Current Historu [October 1382]: 327).
*' Wheeler claims "polygamy, though illegal, is still practiced through the
device of registering children of illegal marriages solemnized before a mulla as
the offspring of the first legal marriage" (pp. 75-76). Carrere d'Encausse claims
the Koiym is still fairly popular and is even covered by rules and established
rates (Helene Carrere d'Encausse, p. 256). Bennigsen disagrees on both points,
claiming these practices have largely been eliminated (Alexandre Bennigsen, The
Islamic Threat to the Soviet State (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983, p. 49).
^2 The following percentages of marriage within ethnic groups were
reported by official Soviet sources: (I. Tchuiko, Braki i razvod u [Moscow, 1375],
p. 76. Quoted in Helene Carrere d'Encausse, p. 251)
Kirghiz 95.4% Estonians 78.3% Belorussians 33%
Kazakhs 33.6% Lithuanians 63.2% Ukrainians 34.3%




Like the Lithuanians, the Central Asians also have an historical experience of
armed opposition to the Soviet regime. Between 1313 and 1333 a popularly
based resistance movement, knosA/n as the Bosmochi, attempted to establish
independent Muslim states in the Caucasus and Central Asia during these
formative years of the Soviet regime. Not an homogenous movement, the
Bosmochi had its origins within a variety of bandit gangs under various leaders,
which only in its later stages evolved into a true national-liberation movement.
When this national-liberation movement was finally suppressed by a combination
of direct actions by the Red Army and a political relaxation in Soviet anti-Muslim
policies, the Bosmochi reverted back to isolated bandit gangs which were
crushed by 1 933.^3 The various rebel leaders were never able to consolidate
their internal differences, which contributed greatly to their defeat. The
significance of the Bosmochi revolt was the widespread grass roots support the
rebel forces obtained and the identification of the struggle as being between
Russian colonization and the indigenous Muslims rather than being a struggle
between communism and anti-communism.
Organized dissent since the 1930s has been infrequent. It has been centered
in the growing movement of "parallel Islam'" or the Sufi brotherhoods. Located
primarily in the northern Caucasus and the southern portions of Central Asia,
the Sufi brotherhoods are "secret societies with initiatory rites, extraordinary
discipline, and a regular chain of command". Soviet sources have estimated the
size of movement as including at least half of all Muslim believers in the
Caucasus—more than five hundred thousand in this Soviet region alone. 44 The
significance of this Islamic movement is the degree of influence it claims upon the
daily life of its adherents. Soviet '.writers admit this influence in their
^3 Michael Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challeng e (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp
Inc., 1982), p. 49.
44 Helene Carr&re d'Encausse, p. 261.
propaganda attacks on the movements.^ Alexandre Bennigsen claims that the
survival of Islam throughout the Muslim areas of the Soviet Union Is mainly due
to these brotherhoods.^
-
So far there is little evidence of opposition by the Sufi brotherhoods to the
Soviet regime. Bennigsen does, however, quote the case of the assassination of
Sultan Ibrahimov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kirghiz SSR on 4
December 1980, as a possible act by the Sufi Brotherhood of the Hairy Ishans.
While the direct evidence linking this particular group or any other with the
assassination is weak, this schismatic sect has a long history of opposition to
the Soviet Union and the previous Tsarist Empire. Members of the brotherhood
have consistently refused to pay taxes, evaded military conscription, withheld
their children from the regime's schools and indulged in "violent anti-Soviet
propaganda"."*'7 Soviet authorities have repeatedly arrested the sect's leaders
when they have been uncovered and tried to eliminate the sect—but the
brotherhood continues to resurface.
Although petitions and letters by Muslim dissidents are infrequent, they have
occasionally appeared, A group of eighty-eight villagers in the Kirghiz Republic
sent a letter to the Soviet authorities, subsequently published in Izvestia ,
complaining about the lack of attention by local authorities to elements of
traditional culture. The villagers argued that "the population's national
traditions ought to be considered in housing construction'", Specifically, the
villagers declare, two-story houses should be built to accommodate the Kirghiz
family which traditionally consists of the youngest son's family remaining in the
home with his parents. The letter writers complain that Soviet authorities lack a
4® See Alexandre Bennigsen, "Soviet Islam Since the Invasion of
Afghanistan", Central Asian Surveu 1 (July 1982): 66-67,
46 Alexandre Bennigsen, "Sufism in the USSR: A Bibliography of Soviet
Sources", Central Asian Surve u 2 (December 1983): 82.
4? Alexandre Bennigsen, "Soviet Islam Since the Invasion of Afghanistan", p.
71-72.
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sensitivity to the long-term impact of local decisions and a feeling for the needs
of the local residents: "Why are problems solved so hastily, sometimes with a
stroke of the pen on a whim, when they will affect not only us, but our children,
grandchildren and great-grandchildren as well?*"48
There is also evidence of sa/nizdci in the Muslim areas of the Soviet Union.
While little has surfaced in the West, Soviet authors are mentioning its
existence more frequently. 48 Muslim samizdot is far less political than that
produced in the non-Muslim areas and is generally concerned with the spread of
Islamic religious ideas. An interesting related development is the growing
emergence of religious literature smuggled into Central Asia and the Caucasus
from neighboring Islamic states. This material is also primarily religious in
nature, although this is not always the case- and some anti-Soviet material has
been circulating according to official Soviet comments on the phenomenon.'-' 1-1
There is a certain ironical twist to the Soviet language Russification program in
relation to Central Asian sam/zdot : "Soviet power has provided Central Asian
Muslims with a common language to read these uncommon publications". ^
The current level of overt dissent should not be overstated, however. As
Corrkre d'Encausse says about the continued existence of the counterculture
of the Central Asian Muslims:
Homo Islamicus is not an adversary. . . . But simply by his
existence, by his presence in the whole area where the Moslem
civilization has existed, he bears witness that the Soviet people
48
"What Should Our Village Be Like?--lt's Worth Consulting the Residents
on This", Izvestio , 7 July 1983. Translated in CDSP 35 (3 August 1983): 21
49 See H. B. Paksoy, "The Deceivers", Central Asian Survey 3 (1984): 123-
131, and Alexander Bennigsen, "Sufism in the USSR: A Bibliography of Soviet
Sources", pp. 3S-92 for discussions of Soviet writings on Muslim samizdot,
^ Alexandre Bennigsen, "Mullahs, Mujahidin, and Soviet Muslims", Problems
of Communism 33 (November-December 1384): 36.
51
"Soviets Step Up the Propaganda War", Arabia (London) 36 (July 1984):
37. Quoted in Alexandre Bennigsen, "Mullahs, Mujahidin, and Soviet Muslims", p,
37.
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has at least two components: the Soviets and the Soviet
Moslems. *"
52 Helene Carrere d'Encausse, p. 264.
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VI. RELIGIOUS DISSENT
Religion is the opium of the people .... Religion is a kind of spiritual
gin in which the slaves of capital drown their human shape and
their claims to any decent life .... All modern religions and
Churches, all religious organizations, Marxism always regards as
organs of £>ourgeo/s reaction serving to defend exploitation and to
stupefy the working class.
V. I. Lenin
A. THE POLICIES OF SCIENTIFIC ATHEISM
"Every religious idea -", wrote Lenin, "every idea of God, even of flirting with
the idea of God, is unutterable vileness". ' Lenin and the other early Bolsheviks
believed religion would wither away like the state once the economic exploitation
of man by man was eliminated. Nevertheless, in contrast to their approach to
the institutions of the state, they felt it necessary to assist this withering away
process. Thus, they removed those institutional and social structures that had
supported religious practice under the Tsarist regime and embarked on an
aggressive atheistic campaign to discredit the religious world view. These two
principles— restricting the practice of religion and countering its ideology--have
continued to be the basis of the regime's approach to religion to the present
day.
On January 22, 1318, the regime published its first decree to regulate the
role of religion in the new Bolshevik state. The main provisions of this decree,
entitled "The Separation of Church and State'", continue to be in force: (1)
separation of church from state, (2) individual freedom of conscience with
emphasis on the rights of atheists, (3) secularization of schools, (4) religion
' quoted in Christel Lane, Christian Religion in the Soviet Union (Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press, 1373), p. 26.
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completely private and not to interfere v./ith the rights of others or with any
citizen's state obligations, (5) no church property ownership. 1- The severity of
this decree was somewhat mitigated in practice by the demands of other more
pressing concerns of the young regime, c:
Ten years later, Stalin amended the 1918 decree, and ended any ambiguity
about the severity of the earlier laws. Ludmilla Alexeyeva claims that with the
publication of this resolution, "the Soviet government embarked on a policy of
eradication of religion in the Soviet Union". 4 The major provisions of this new
decree, "On Religious Cults", were: (1) the registration of all religious
organizations, (2) the empowering of the government to emplace and remove
persons from executive positions in religious organizations, (3) prohibition of the
involvement of children in religious organizations, (4) restriction of religious
groups from social, cultural, and welfare activities, and (5) restriction of
religious leaders to specific geographical locations.
"
The Second World War brought a brief respite to the persecution of religion
in the USSR but in 1 359, a new anti-religious campaign was initiated by
Khrushchev. This campaign lasted until 1964 and, while directed at all religion in
the Soviet Union, affected the Russian Orthodox and Baptist churches the most
severely. An intensive atheistic propaganda campaign was conducted and
scores of churches were closed. Some relaxation of repression occurred in the
early Brezhnev ^ro but the state maintained "a tight rein on church
appointments in all denominations, so that there was a good cadre of church
leaders developed which could speak for Soviet policies . . . .
2 Christel Lane, p. 27.
° However, this varied with respect to the particular religious groups, as
we shall examine shortly.
4 Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 201.
5 Christel Lane, pp. 27-23.
° Remarks by Michael Bourdeaux in "The State of Religious Freedom",
World Affairs 147 (Spring 1985): 249.
Q 3
New repressions began in the waning years of Brezhnev's reign and were
continued during Yuri Andropov's short year at the helm. On 1 3 September
1983, the Russian Republic Criminal Code was changed to allow officials to
extend a prisoner's term for "malicious disobedience of the lawful demands of
the administration of a corrective-labor institution"/ The practical effect of
this policy has been the resentencing of religious prisoners for continuing
religious practices while behind bars, even for such seemingly minor offenses
such as "saying prayers in prison". ^ The number of Christians in prison has
also increased at least fourfold in the first half of the 1930s— from an estimated
one hundred in 1973 to over four hundred in 1385. ^ Thus, Gorbachev has
apparently continued this war on religion initiated by Lenin almost seventy years
ago,
Oespite the claim that "the exploitation of man by man . [has been] ended
once and for all" in the Soviet state, religion has failed to wither away. The
soviet state continues to find it necessary to pursue policies designed to
eradicate "customs that are at variance with the socialist way of life.*'^ Since
the original ideological explanation for the prevalence of religion in Russia--the
existence of classes--no longer exists in the "developed socialist society" of
the Soviet Union, regime ideologues must invent alternate explanations,
Andropov explained that the existence of religious extremism was due to
abnormalities in the individual, subjective deficiencies such as "political or
ideological errors, religious fanaticism, nationalistic aberrations, moral
degradation or simply an unwillingness to work". But Soviet officials are also
quick to blame Western influences, such as "the imperialist special services",
vedomosti Verhovnovo Soveto RSFSR , No. 37 (September 15, 1983): 796.
Q.uoted in CpSP 35 (21 December 1983): 9.
b Michael Bourdeaux, p. 250,
9 Michael Bourdeaux, p, 250.
lu
"The Draft Party Program (New Version)", pp. 3,17.
84
foreign visitors, and "Israeli propaganda centers", as well as blaming
"overzealous" local administrators.' '
The modern regime continues to deal with the different religious groups and
religious dissenters in the Soviet Union in varying manners. Bohdan Bociurkiw
describes five considerations that guide the regime in its approach to relations
with religion in the Soviet Union:
1. Marxist-Leninist ideology with its militant atheism together with
an exploitation of traditional Russian nationalism
2. Intolerance of alternative belief systems that cannot be totally
co-opted by the state
3. The sociological effect of modernization which breeds toleration
for religion
4. The utility of religious organizations in support of pragmatic
political policies, eg. influence of foreign publics
5. The attitudes of individual religious groups to the system '='
The variations in religious dissent have arisen as a response to the regime's
attitudes toward religion. Several religious groups have been mentioned already
because of their close association with national dissent: Lithuanian and
Ukrainian Catholics, Jews and Central Asian Moslems. I have restricted the
discussion of religious dissidence groups in this section to those Christian
groups in the Soviet Union without distinctive non-Russian national associations.
The most notable groups in this category ar& the Evangelical Christian Baptists,
the Pentecostalists, and the Russian Orthodox Church.
' ' E. G. Filimonov, "The Social and Ideological Essence of Religious
Extremism", Scientific Atheism
,
(August 1983), Translated in "Dealing with
'Religious Extremists'", CDSP 35 (26 October 1983): 1 1.
•2 Remarks by Bohdan Bociurkiw in "Support of Religious Witness in
Eastern Europe", World Affairs 147 (Spring 1985): 282-83.
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B. RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
During the Tsarist reign, the Russian Orthodox Church was the official state
church of the regime. It enjoyed special political, social, and economic rights and
privileges; e.g., state financial support, a monopoly over religious propaganda,
and representatives in the Council of Ministers. However, these rights and
privileges were not without costs. Under the reign of Peter the Great,
Orthodoxy became institutionally subordinate to the state; a Tsarist official
presided over the Holy Synod, the governing body of the Church. Institutional
subordination limited the Church's flexibility in both religious and secular affairs
and conditioned the Church toward accommodation rather than confrontation.
This legacy of accommodation has continued to the present day.
Unfortunately for the Church, the nature of the Russian state changed in 1317.
The Tsarist regime had enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with the Church; the
Church legitimized the rule of the Tsar and, in return, Orthodoxy was
interwoven into all aspects of public life. The Bolshevik regime required no such
traditional religious legitimization and the symbiotic relationship was broken.
The 1918 decree and subsequent Soviet laws were particularly damaging to
Orthodoxy, Church and state were legally separated, thus ending a two
hundred year relationship. The nationalization of land deprived the Church of its
chief source of revenue. Education, which had been a major purview of the
Church, was removed from the Church's responsibility and secularized.
Similarly, the registration of births, deaths and marriages was removed from the
Church and placed under the civil administration. The Russian Orthodox Church
was prohibited from providing religious instruction to those under the age of
eighteen. Finally, the clergy, considered members of the propertied class and
hence bourgeoisie, were greatly discriminated against, losing the right to vote,
ration cards, and education for their children, as well as being forced to pay
higher taxes. 1 3
1
^ David Lane, pp. 243-44.
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The Church did not immediately accept these restrictions, and neither was it
powerless to resist. During the Civil War, Orthodoxy generally sided with the
White Armies and paid for this opposition by imprisonment and death for many of
its clergy who gained a reputation for "counterrevolutionary*' behavior. While
the bulk of Orthodoxy resisted the new regime, there did emerge during this
period a reformation movement known as the "Living Church'". The aim of this
movement was to bring the Church into alignment with the broader political and
social reforms in Russia introduced by the Bolsheviks. It sought to accomplish
this by establishing "a relation between state and church which cast the church
into the same supportive and acclamatory role that it had held vis-a-vis the
Tsarist regime". 14 Proposed reforms were quite drastic in comparison to
traditional Orthodoxy. They included the destruction of the Church's
hierarchical structure, greater participation of the lower clergy and laity in
Church affairs, and other changes in dogma and ritual. The regime recognized a
tactical opportunity to weaken the strength of Orthodoxy and supported this
reformation movement.
Estimates of the strength of the "Living Church" at the apex of its influence
vary from one third to one half of all Orthodox parishes, yet the movement's
reforms were too radical for the majority of the clergy and peasant laityJ * As
the authorities realized the reformers would not replace the traditional
Orthodox Church, they shifted tactics to gain control of the weakened Orthodox
hierarchy. In 1927, a move for reconciliation was offered the state by
Metropolitan Sergei, who claimed loyalty to the regime in an official statement:
"We wish to be Orthodox and at the same time to recognize the Soviet Union as
our native country, whose joys and successes ore our joys and successes and
whose failures are our failures".' 1-* At the same time Sergei accepted the
14 Christel Lane, p. 31.
15 Christel Lane, p. 32.
'** Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 246.
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regime's demand for registration of churches, This accommodation was at least
publicly accepted by the vast majority of clergy., but several schismatic
Orthodox groups date their birth from this rapprochement of church and state.
The accommodation sA/ith the regime did not provide the Church with the
freedom it had expected in regards to its religious teaching and practice.
Thousands of churches were closed, purges of clergy were conducted and
thousands of believers were imprisoned and killed during the height of Stalin's
dictatorship. However, the repressiveness of the 1930s was lessened during
the Second World '/••/or when Stalin, needing the support of all rival power
centers, came to a further accommodation with the Russian Orthodox Church.
The fundament of this bargain, which, according to William Fletcher, "provided
the basis for all subsequent religious activity", was that "the State granted
certain minimal concessions to the Church, marginally sufficient to ensure its
continued survival in the country, in return for the Church's unwavering
support in political activities, primarily on the international scene".'''
This rapprochement between church and state continued in the immediate
postwar years. But in 1959 the period of relative calm between regime and
church was ended when "a new wave of legal restrictions and persecution
threw church life once more into jeopardy". 1 d Khrushchev began with on
intensive anti-religious propaganda campaign and the widespread closings of
church facilities. In 1917, the Russian Orthodox Church had over 54,000
churches, at the end of World War Two, this number had been reduced to
approximately 20,000 and Khrushchev further reduced the number to less than
7,500 in active use. 1 ^ But church closures only tell part of the story. In 1361
parish priests were denied both vote and voice in the administration of their
parishes through the promulgation of new Church regulations. These new
^ William C. Fletcher, Reli g ion and Soviet Forei g n Polic u 1945-1970
(London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p, 5.
'<* Christel Lane, p. 33.
13 Michael Bourdeaux, pp. 247, 251.
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regulations not only removed the local priest from leadership of his parish, but
also prohibited the conduct of visits and religious rites with parishioners outside
of the confines of the church facility, prohibited children participating in Church
rites, and obligated priests to report information of interest to the government
on their parishioners.
^
Despite these actions by the state and the acquiescence of the Church
hierarchy, there was little public dissent by the lower clergy. Part of the
explanation for this silence may be due to the fact that although over one
hundred dissident Baptist leaders were imprisoned during the period of
Khrushchev's repression, not one Orthodox leader was arrested.^ ' In any
case, the Orthodox hierarchy demonstrated and continues to demonstrate
unswerving support for the Soviet regime. This has been especially notable in
international affairs where the Church has consistently supported Soviet
positions since the early 1960s. Examples of this support include support for
the Soviet world peace campaign, "the abolition of race and class difference as
well as of the economic exploitation entailed by the colonial system", the Soviet
intervention in Czechoslovakia, condemnation of the US involvement in Vietnam,
and, ironically, the denunciation of Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, whose public support
and defense of Orthodoxy upheld it during especially troublesome times.
"
There have been voices of dissent in the Orthodox Church in the past
twenty-five years— but they have been few and far between. In 1965, Frs.
Nikolai Eshliman and Gleb Yakunin wrote a letter to Nikolay Podgorny, then
President of the Presidium, in which they demanded that the government's
Council on Religious Affairs and Cults "cease interfering in internal church
affairs". At the same time they sent letters to the Orthodox patriarchy and all
bishops calling for repeal of the 1961 regulations due to their violation of
2<
-' Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 248.
21 David Lane, p. 247.
22 Christel Lane, p. 35.
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canonical law and destructiveness to the Church. However, theirs were lone
Oo
voices and they were dismissed from the priesthood. •=-' A layman, Boris
Talantov, along with eleven others from the region of Kirov also sent a letter
criticising the regime's actions against Orthodoxy that later appeared in the
West and was broadcast into the Soviet Union over the BBC, The substance of
the charges was publicly refuted by the Church patriarchy and Talantov was
convicted in 1969 of "slandering the Soviet state". He subsequently died in a
prison hospital.^4
In 1976, the "Christian Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Religious
Believers in the USSR" was formed by Yakunin. Believing that the Orthodox
hierarchy had abdicated its responsibilities to defend the religious rights of
believers in the Soviet Union, this committee organized itself to undertake legal
defense of persecuted believers. Although the committee was composed of
Orthodox believers, it offered its assistance to any individual persecuted for his
or her religious beliefs. For almost three years, the committee amassed
documentation on the status of religious persecution in the USSR and provided
information to Soviet citizens, religious leaders, the state bureaucracy and
international human rights organizations. In 1979 Gleb Yakunin was arrested,
convicted of "slander" and imprisoned, but the committee continued to function.
Another dissident group to emerge from within Orthodoxy was a group of
young intellectuals who formed a group called the "Christian Seminar". Less
interested in political issues than in a need for vitality within Orthodoxy, the
members of this group wrote widely disseminated letters about the lack of
freedom to develop their religious practices within the restrictive conditions
imposed by both church and state, Alehsandr Ogorodnikov, founder of the
group, once wrote about the condition of Orthodoxy in its accommodation to the
modern Soviet state:
53 Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 250.
24 Peter Reddaway, Uncensored Russia
, pp. 326-26.
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In the Russian Church, the parish is not like a brotherly community,
where Christian love of one's neighbor becomes a reality. The
state persecutes every manifestation of church life, except for the
performance of the religious cult. Our thirst for spiritual
communion, for religious education, and for missionary service
runs up against all the might of the state's repressive
machinery. *=*
And Ogorodnikov discovered the "might of the state's repressive machineryM
first-hand when he was arrested and sentenced to eleven years of
imprisonment.
It is the emergence of young Orthodox dissidents that is especially
troublesome to Soviet authorities because it demonstrates the failures of the
system to "win the battle for the minds of the young". The pervasiveness of
interest by Soviet young people in religion is a frequent theme of Soviet writers
in addressing problems with youth." While reliable figures on the age
composition of Soviet believers is not readily available, according to Michael
Bourdeaux, "it seems that the number of young or middle-age people coming into
the church at least equals the number of old who >ir^ dying".
"
Despite these indications of dissent or potential dissent in the ranks of
Orthodoxy, the Church remains a publicly loyal tool of the regime. Unable to
totally eliminate the influence of the traditional church, the regime has at least
co-opted its leadership and minimized its influence as a rival source of power.
Orthodoxy today is generally restricted to the perpetuation of a liturgical
practice rather than offering an alternative world view or a religion that
influences a significant portion of an individual's daily beliefs or practices. It is
& ° quoted in Michael Bourdeaux, p. 252.
26 For example, see V. Vasekha, "To the Sounds of an Organ", Uchitelska ua
Gozeta (24 December 1983), in CDSP 35 (18 January 1984): 22; Maj. G, Ostrieko,
"Even If There's Only One", Krasnauo Zvezdo . (21 March 1984), in CDSP 36 (27
June 1984): 14; and A. Kamenev, "Between the Chorale and the Hit Song",
Sovetskoua Rossio , (14 December 1 383), in CDSP 36 (16 May 1984); 19.
^ Michael Bourdeaux, p. 251.
to the Protestant denominations that one must look for evidence of any genuine
religious dissent.
C. EVANGELICAL CHRISTIAN BAPTISTS
The government initiated campaign against the religion in 1318 was directed
mostly against the Russian Orthodox Church and Muslims; the Protestant
denominations, including the Baptists, were generally ignored. This was
undoubtedly due to the relatively small numbers of Protestant adherents at the
time--Baptists accounted for only about 100,000 Russians prior to the October
revolution—and also because the Protestant denominations had not been
'~iO
associated with the oncie-f) regime, rather, they had been persecuted by it.*-'-' In
this period of relative neglect, lasting until 1928, the Baptists grew in strength
to about 500,000 members.23
When Stalin began his anti-religious program in 1928, the Baptists were
included in government repression. As directed against the Baptists, this
repression was justified on three grounds, according to David Lane: First,
"they were charged with being connected with, and agents of, religious groups
abroad." Secondly, "they were regarded as kufak elements". Finally, their
religious beliefs were "at odds with historical materialism" and opposed to the
the government's goals regarding the education and upbringing of the youth. 3"
During the Second World War, Stalin modified his repressive anti-religious
policies in an attempt to exert internal control over the various religions— in
other words, to "tame" the churches and "undermine them from within". *'
Those Baptist ministers who were inclined toward collaboration were
encouraged by the regime and those who were not were denied licensing and
28 David Lane, p. 250.
29 Christel Lane, p, 139.
30 David Lane, p. 251.
*' Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 201
92
frequently imprisoned. The government created the Alf-Union Council of
Evangelical Christian Baptists I.ACECB) as its primary mechanism of control over
the Baptists.32
In 1360, the ACECB published two documents to regulate Baptist church
life. Both conformed to the government's position on religion and violated
Baptist doctrine in several ways; for example, while one of the fundamental
doctrinal responsibilities of Baptists is the proclamation of the Gospel and
evangelization, the documents condemned as "unhealthy" any such missionary
activity. These documents aroused indignation among believers and provided a
catalyst for dissent. The goal of the dissenters, called Iniisiativniki, was to
purify church doctrine and practice from the distortions imposed by the
government. In 1362, a counter— organization to the officially endorsed ACECB
was established, the Council of Churches of Evangelical Christian Baptists
(CCECB). This group continued missionary activity, but it did not escape
persecution by the authorities. From 1360 to 1363 about two hundred
Initsiativnihi were arrested and the persecution of this splinter Baptist group
continues to the present. 3 *
Despite this persecution, the Evangelical Christian Baptists have the largest
following of any Protestant denomination in the USSR. According to figures of
the World Council of Evangelical Baptists, in 1375 there were over 535,000
reg/st&r-ed Baptists in the Soviet Union. Some dissident sources have claimed
that registered Baptists account for only a third of the total number but oil
sources, including many Soviet officials, conclude that the number continues to
grow. 34
32 This union represented the merger of a variety of Protestant
denominations; eg., most Evangelical Christians, Baptists, Pentecostalists and
Mennonite Brethren.
^° Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 204.
34 See Christel Lane, pp. 140-141, for a detailed description of sources and
figures on membership in the Baptist denomination.
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Member churches of the CCECB are not strictly speaking underground; they
do not hide from the government but they do refuse to register or submit to
other forms of governmental reform. An interesting relationship has developed
between the CCECB and the ACECB, according to Gleb Yakuntn, an Orthodox
priest. As official pressure is exerted upon the ACECB to compromise further to
the regime, members of the registered ACECB churches transfer to the
unregistered CCECB. The government is thus constrained from exerting too
excessive pressure in order to preclude these transfers, Father Yakunin
considers this phenomenon to be an "ideal form of existence for churches"
under Soviet rule as it "enables them to sustain the heavy repressions inflicted
by an aggressively atheistic government." 00
As have the Lithuanian Catholics, Evangelical Christian Baptists have
appealed to the West for support. The Western World Council of Baptists
maintains official relations with the ACECB and official visits by representatives
of Western Baptists are conducted with regularity. Tourists also visit with the
rival CCECB, which receives literature, correspondence, and financial and
prayer support from fellow Baptists in the West. Petitions signed by tens of
thousands of Western Baptists have been sent to the Soviet leadership
appealing for the release of Baptist prisoners, In the spring of 1 379, Georgy
Vins, one of the original leaders of the CCECB was released from prison and
was allowed to emigrate to the United States in exchange for Soviet spies.
After arriving in the U. S., Georgy Vins met with President Carter and now
continues the program of aiding the CCECB from the West by acting as the
foreign coordinator for Western support. ^ The right "to organize freely, to
teach their religious beliefs to children and to proselytize" remain the major
unmet demands of the Baptists dissidents. ''
°" Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 207,
36 Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 212.
37 David Lane, p. 254.
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D, PENTECOS TALISTS
While the Evangelical Christian Baptists have achieved a semblance of a
modus Vivendi with the regime, such on accommodation hos not been possible
for the Pentecostolists. This Protestant sect first emerged in Russia just prior
to the turn of the century. Like the Baptists, the Pentecostolists escaped the
initial persecutions of the post-revolution years. According to official figures,
there were 200,000 members in the Soviet Union by 1928.-'-' Along with the
other Protestant denominations, the Pentecostolists were forced to register-
their communities with the Council on Religious Affairs and Cults in August 1 945,
However, the Pentecostolists were not registered as a separate religion: they
were included under the All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian Baptists,
The primary cause of the almost constant persecution of the sect is the
Pentecostalist's emphasis on evangelism and a lifestyle in strict conformity with
doctrinal principles, Unlike the Baptists, who with the exception of the
'nitsiativnikhrxv^. often described as politically loyal and hardworking citizens,
Pentecostolists are frequently described as "politically hostile, anti-Soviet and
are charged with more extreme and consistent withdrawal from general social
life", -3 For example, E. G. Filimonov, Deputy Director of the Institute of
Scientific Atheism, says the "extreme'' Pentecostolists ''evade registration . , ,
,
refuse to s^rve in the Soviet Army and to vote, and many forbid their children to
join the Young Pioneers or the YCL, to watch movies or television, and to read
fiction". 40
Pentecostolists rarely condemn the Soviet regime outright, but neither do
they vocally support the communist state. This silence is in stark contrast to
most other faiths v.vhich at least occasionally provide some rhetorical acclaim to
'-
-' David Lane, p. 216.
y
- Christel Lane, p. 183,
40 E. u. Filimonov, p. 1 0.
the regime. 4 ' Some anti-Soviet feelings are expressed during reiigious services
In connection with the Interpretations of "unknown tongues", charismatic gifts
being a prime focus of the Pentecostalisfs services. These interpretations
frequently denounce the Soviet system yet usually in moral rather than political
terms. As Christel Lane points out, "such denunciations of Soviet moral
standards., endowed with supernatural authority., must make a deep impact on
belie vers'-'. 4;=:
Repression by the regime is generally directed against unregistered
communities in the form of fines for conducting services, confiscation or
destruction of private homes used for services, and job discrimination. The form
of protest taken by the Pen tec osta lists is requests for en masse emigration.
This provides a dilemma for the regime. Since the majority of the
Pentecostalists belong to the indigenous Slavic populations, their request to
emigrate cannot be justified as a desire to join family or return to an historic
homeland. The reason given by the Pentecostalists for requesting emigration is
a desire to escape religious persecution; a reason that is unfortunately
unacceptable to the leaders of the "socialist paradise'', The regime has declared
that they ''do not and never will acknowledge emigration on religious grounds",
This impasse with the regime has resulted in thousands of 'Tefuseniks'', A
recent example of a group of these refuseniks is the ''Siberian 70''; a group of
Pentecostal Christians in the town of Chuguyevka. According to information
from Keston College, many of the adults in this group lost their jobs when it
became known they desired to emigrate. Since early 1385, they reportedly have
subsisted on ten rubles a month and have been forced to slaughter all of their
farm livestock to feed themselves. Although concerned Westerners have sent
parcels of food, the group has been unable to claim these packages due to high
41 Christel Lane, p. 133,
4c! Christel Lane, p. 134.
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import duties. They have been harassed by the KGB, local militia, and even other
townspeople and there appears to be little prospect for change. **-'
The Pentecostalists sole recourse has been a steady appeal to the West for
assistance. Some of the appeals ars pathetic in their plea for assistance, 4
Probably the most famous Pentecostal protest to reach the West v./ as the case
of the V'ashchenkos and the Chmykhalovs, the two Pentecostal families who
forced their way into the American embassy in Moscow and who lived in the
embassy for five years. The Soviet press repeatedly discredited the two
families, referring to the senior Vashchenko, Pyotr, as an embittered, alienated,
lawbreaker with a "fourth -grade education and no particular occupation.*'™
Even though the two families managed to eventually emigrate, and then only
after a hunger strike, the remainder of Pentecostalists remain prisoners in the
USSR to the present time.
43
•'"'Siberian 70'' Face Hunger, Assault", Mews Wire , (Wheaton, IL: Slavic
Gospel Association, Inc., April/May 1986).
4^ A letter to President Reagan in 1331 is illustrative; "The government of
the Soviet Union responds to all our lawful requests either with silence or with
the curt response: 'You are not going anywhere and you are needed by no one.'
Our appeals to international organizations have only succeeded in bringing the
wrath of our own government down on our heads. . . . We have no one we can
rely on. May God inspire you to act on our behalf, Mr. President! Accept us into
your country! . . . We beg of you, Mr. President, to make a public statement on
our behalf and to appeal to Brezhnev to allow us to leave. , , , Please, Mr.
President, answer us." (quoted in Ludmilla Alexeyeva, pp. 230-231).
4 '-' E. G. Filimonov, p. 10,
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IV, POLITICAL DISSENT
The human rights movement was born out of the experience of
people who lived their lives under conditions of lawlessness,
cruelty, and assault on the personality 'in the interests of the
collective' or for the sake of 'the bright future of humankind'.
Ludmilla Alexeyeva
The final category of dissidence is political dissent. Included in this group
ar& Soviet dissidents who seek changes in the political and economic system of
the communist regime, as opposed to the social changes desired by the national
and religious groups. The human rights movement has been variously
characterized in the West as the "democratic movement", the "liberal
movement'" and the "civic protest movement*. Often this movement has been
considered synonymous with dissent in the USSR although as we have seen
Soviet dissidence is quite diverse. This confusion results from two factors. The
first is the exposure this category of dissent received in the West especially in
the 1970s during the trials and subsequent imprisonments of the leaders of the
movement
—
primarily intellectuals of some world notoriety prior to their
involvement in the movement. The second is the role the human rights movement
began to assume as the unofficial but widely accepted "central clearing house"
for information about the other dissident movements.
A. THE HUMAN RIGHTS MOVEMENT
Ludmilla Alexeyeva, who was herself a key figure in the unfolding events,
considers December 5, 1965, as the birthday of the human rights movement, for
on this day the "first demonstration using human rights slogans took place in
9i5
Moscow's Pushkin Square 1' J The reason for this demonstration was the
beginning of the trial of two popular jram/Zifai authors, Andrey Sinyavsky and
Yuly Daniel, who were accused of dissiminating "libelous works . , . with
subversive intent" to the West since 1 353. ,=l Friends of the two authors
organized a rally in front of the courtroom on the opening day of the trial and
called for open proceedings. Approximately two hundred demonstrators
appeared as did a number of foreign correspondents who were intrigued by this
unique event on the streets of Moscow, News of the trial and the harsh
sentences I.Sinyavsky received seven years in a strict-regimen labor camp and
Daniel, five) was broadcast internationally and also back into the Soviet Union by
means of foreign radio stations. Instead of stopping the growth of som.izdot the
trials inspired its production, exposed an ignorant public to the concepts of
human rights, and led to the coordination and integration of diverse human rights
groups into an organized movement.
The first consequence of the trial was the appearance of The White Book in
samtzdai literature, This publication provided a transcript of the trial and a
collection of protest letters written in behalf of Sinyavsky and Daniel. Soon
after its appearance the authorities arrested four more Soviet citizens --
Gaianskov, Ginzburg, Dobrovolsky and Lashkova— on charges of publishing The
White Book and sending it to the West. The resulting "Trial of the Four" in
January 1363, and their subsequent convictions and sentences, continued to
spark the growth of the movement. A human rights samizooi journal, Chronicle
of Current Events , first appeared on April 30, 1363. This journal continues to
the present (under constantly changing editors due to their arrest as soon as
they are uncovered) as the primary communication mechanism of not only the
human rights movement but of many national and religious dissidence groups as
w ell.
' Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 263.
^ Peter Reddaway, ed., Uncensored Russia , p. 61,
QQ
Communication was and remains the main interest of the human rights
diovimen*. with Jt&mfJPet&t the primary mechanism. Especially important are
contacts with the West. By these contacts, somizdoi is transformed into
iarrs.izo'Gi ° and can be reproduced in larger quantities and reach a broader and
more diverse audience. What little organization and coordination exists within
the movement is primarily directed toward the accomplishment of this
communication function. The first specifically identified human rights
organization had as its sole reason for existence the support of this
communication effort. On May 28, 1363, fifteen human rights activists sent a
letter complaining of civil rights violations in the USSR to the United Nations,
The activists called themselves the Initiative Group for the Defense of Human
Rights in the USSR. They justified this appeal to an international organization on
the basis of frustrations in communicating with the Soviet government, The
openness of the group's protest had two immediate effects. The first was the
arrest of most of the signatories. The second was the identification of the
group as a focal point for other widely dispersed human rights activists and
sympathizers.
The following year, the Committee for Human Rights in the USSR was formed
in Moscow by three Soviet physicists of international notoriety—Valery
Chaliaze, An drey Tverdokhlebov, and An drey Sakharov. This group quickly
attracted additional leading academicians, scientists, literary figures, lawyers
and other intellectuals, who believed their international emunence and legal
knowledge would protect them from repression by the regime. The group
adopted parliamentary procedures and rules of membership and became the
''first independent association in the Soviet Union to receive membership in an
^ Literally ''published over there", can refer to both material originating in
USSR, sent to the West and then returned to the Soviet Union for distribution,
or material originating in the West for distribution in the Soviet Union, There is
also rodixdoi, unauthorized material disseminated by foreign radio broadcasts:
7)ogn/isxo'at, tape recordings of foreign broadcasts or internally produced
material; and somoteincr, "self-produced"" movies,
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international organization" when in 1371 it became an affiliate of the
International League of Human Rights, a consultive agency under the United
Nations. 4
What of the goals of the movement? In May 1370, the Initiative Group
outlined its goals in an open letter subsequently published in the Chronicle of
Current Events . It explained that although the group had *no program, no staff,
and no organizational structure", it was united "by the conviction that the basis
for any normal life of society lies in the recognition of the unconditional value of
the individual", It '...vent on to state that its "attempts to defend human rights-
spring from this belief. We understand social progress to mean, above all, an
increase in freedom. We or^ also united in our desire to act openly and in the
spirit of the law, whatever our personal attitude to particular laws.'"-' This
insistence upon the universality of a concept stood in sharp contrast to the
political culture of the Soviets, with its emphasis on the materialism of Marxist-
Leninism, '•Rights'" conjures the specter of the absolute, the spiritual, the
transcendent--all of which ar& denied by the regime's dialectic determinism.
Respect for law as ultimate guarantor of human rights seems in such direct
opposition to traditional Russian culture and Soviet political practice.
The goals of the Committee for Human Rights were less theoretical and more
pragmatic than those of the Initiative Group. As stated in its founding statement,
the Committee was to conduct "joint consultations with government
organizations in the creation and application of human rights guarantees; [to
study] the theoretical aspects of [the human rights] issue and its specific
manifestations in Soviet society; [and to provide] legai education of the public,
including the publication of international and Soviet documents on human
4 Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 234.
" "Initsiativnaya gruppa po zaschite prav cheloveka v SSSR", Sbornik
dokumentov (New York; Khronika Press, 1376), p. 21, Quoted in Ludmilla
Alexeyeva, p. 232.
rights.*" This generous offer to join in a dioloque with the regime on human
rights and assist the regime in denning and implementing laws and procedures to
guarantee these rights was unfortunately (but predictably) not accepted by the
Soviet authorities. To be sure, members of the group were provided the
opportunity to study and comment on the conformity of the regime to the
principles of civil rights in the criminal law system, but this opportunity was to
take place as they became defendants in criminal law proceedings.
The next significant event in the growth of the human rights movement was
the agreement by the Soviet Union to "Basket Three" of the so-called Helsinki
accords. The full text of the Final Act of this international agreement, including
the human rights provisions, were published in Soviet newspapers, On May 12,
1376, Yury Orlov announced the creation of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group,
an organization that would monitor and report on Soviet compliance with Basket
Three. The group announced it would s^rv^ as a central clearing house for
reports by Soviet citizens on noncompliance, compile appropriate documents,
and educate the public on the humanitarian provisions of the Helsinki accords as
well as other international agreements on human rights to which the Soviet
Union was a signatory. The Moscow group called upon other countries to form
similar groups, but the first new groups to be formed were in four of the non-
Russian republics: the Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia and Armenia.-' Shortly
afterwards, groups appeared in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and then in the
United States.
The significance of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group and the other watch
groups in the Soviet Union was their conscious efforts to integrate and
coordinate the diverse dissidence throughout the USSP. Never before had such
an attempt been made in the Soviet Union, What had previously been a
c
° Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p, 293,
•' The Ukrainian Helsinki Group was formed 3 November 1376; the Lithuanian
Helsinki Group, on 1 December 1376: the Georgian Helsinki Group, on 14 .January
1377; and the Armenian Helsinki Group, on 1 April 1377.
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phenomenon of isolated voices briefly crying out and then as quickly being
silenced by the full force of the totalitarian regime., now began to take shape as
an organized opposition movement. National and religious groups began to
provide information to the watch groups and Chronicle of Current Events ,
which became an unofficial organ of dissemination for the Moscow group, began
to carry regular sections on religious and national issues. Coordination among
the watch groups both within the USSR and beyond its borders spread
information to a wider audience than had previously been possible.
Naturally the authorities did not allow the groups carte bfoncne to espouse
their condemnation of the regime's violations of the accords. No arrests,
however, occurred for almost a year following the formation of the Moscow
group. Persecution of such a group with such visibility in the West could
undermine the substantial gains the Soviet Union obtained by the other
provisions of the Helsinki procedures. Nevertheless, the threat of unification of
the disparate elements of dissent ultimately forced the authorities to take action.
In February 1377, Yuri Qrlov, Mykola Rudenko, Aleksandr Ginzburg, and Oleksa
Tykhy, all leaders or prominent members of the group, were arrested, and in
March, so was Anotoly Shcharansky. The West protested, but in the view of
many in the Moscow group, not forcefully enough.
Like previous persecution efforts by the government, the arrests of the five
focused public interest on the goals of the group and added more substance to
the charges of the human rights dissidents. The evidence that the movement
had deeper roots than the regime expected is that despite the continuous
iopping off of the top leadership, the movement continued to grow with direction
and purpose. The effect of the regime's campaign of repression in 1973-13S0 y
,
did, however, transform the movement. According to Ludmilla Alexeyeva,
''dissent lost its liberal homogeneity and in all the movements spokespersons of
-' Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 344,
3 Further described below.
extreme points or view grew stronger".'" The movement returned to the
underground and also returned to a pre-Helsinki level of protest-
One of the problems of the human rights movement was its restriction to
intellectuals. The movement was never able to create a viable relationship with
workers os did the intellectuals and workers in Poland in the early 1980s,
Alexeyeva tries to explain this failure by means of ideological principles of the
intellectual leadership: "The majority of Moscow activists were ill suited to
effect this [union between intellectuals and workers]. Their pluralism and
concept of free will did not allow them to propagandize their ideas.: they were
only disseminators'".' ' Again this emphasizes that the human rights movement
was less an organized opposition movement that sought to transform Soviet
society into a democratic state, than it was a mechanism for the dissemination
of ideas counter to communist orthodoxy. What may be taking place since the
imprisonment of the original leaders of the movement is a shift to a more
politically oriented agenda to achieve human rights in the USSR.
B. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC MOVEMENTS
A final dissident grouping that bears some mentioning is social and economic
dissent, This type of dissent., 'which has received so much attention in the West
through its manifestations in Eastern Europe and especially Poland, is much less
prevalent in the Soviet Union than the other forms of dissent. This is ironic
since the factors that has encouraged its growth in Eastern Europe are much
more intense in the USSR than in the Soviet satellites.
It is not Qi- if workers as a socio-economic class are not involved in dissent.
Dissidence in the Soviet Union is scarcely the sole pursuit of the intelligentsia, in
fact, only the human rights movement in its initial stages was primarily a
phenomenon of the intellectuals. Since 1976, even the human rights movement
^
'-' Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 389.
1 1 Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p, 352
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expanded its participation so that ''more than 40 percent of those sentenced for
human rights activities were worhers", ' ^ In the national and religious dissent
movements, workers have always comprised a large proportion of the
membership often even a majority.'*
The first public group to advocate social and economic reforms in the Soviet
Union was the Free Trade Union, which was founded in February 1373. ^ 4 The
group stated in an open letter printed in the Chronicle of Current Events that it
represented "the vast army of the Soviet unemployed, thrown out of the gates
of factories for demanding the right to complain, the right to criticise, the right
to free speech,"' Vladimir Klebanov, the founder of the group, claimed to be
neither a dissident nor to be associated with the human rights movement; his
goal was rather "to help in the successful construction of communism and to
combat bureaucracy and red tape*.'*' Klebanov's disclaimer was not accepted
by the KGB, however, who confined him to a mental hospital and later prison,
Other groups sprang up in the late 1 370s, among which were the
Independent Trade Union of Workers in the USSR; the Working Group for the
Defense of Labor and Socioeconomic Rights in the USSR; and the Free
Interprofessional Association of Workers. The latter, known as SHOT, had the
most impact. Its goal was to give its members legal, moral and financial help
through the organization of "cooperatives'" such qz mutual aid funds, house-
hunting groups, childcare, barter groups, and the publication of an informational
bulletin. '' Only the last mechanism, the informational bulletin, survived
'* Ludmilla Alexeyeva, p. 401,
•3 See Ludmilla Alexeyeva, "Quantitative and Qualitative Characteristics of
Soviet Dissent", Russia
,
(New York: Foundation for Soviet Studies, 1383), no,
718, pp. 1 14-35.
14 Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent , p. 406,
•* Chronicle of Current Events , no, 48, pp. 164-165,
'** Gleb Vysotin and Sereda velentin, "Independent Trade Unions'", Chronicle
of Current Events , no. 33, p. 28.
1 ^ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent
, p. 403.
repression. The movement never achieved the degree of organization of the
other categories of dissent., but the emergence of such groups indicates the
underlying interest within the working class.
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VIII. THE REGIME'S RESPONSE
In England, everything that is not prohibited is permitted.
In Germany, everything thct is not permitted is prohibited.
In France, everything that is prohibited is permitted.
In the Soviet Union, everything that is permitted is prohibited.
Russian ioke
A. REASONS
Considering the great diversity of dissident issues and the lack of
organization, coordination, and communication among the various groups, one
might wonder at the concern of the regime about this relatively small proportion
of the Soviet population actively involved in dissent activity. There on.,
however, some compelling reasons for the persistent and intense campaign of
the regime against dissidence. First, dissidence ''"violates the regime's monopoly
over the ''word'/' ' The communist system, by its very nature, must remain
intolerant of ideological challenges in order to maintain control, There can be
but one interpretation of reality. This requirement compels a complete control
over information. The dissident movements challenge this hegemony over
information by disseminating alternative views of reality. And this challenge
taUes place not only within the borders of the Soviet Union, but increasingly
beyond them through contacts between dissident groups and supporters in the
West,
A second reason for repression is the Soviet leadership's fear that both the
precedent and content of what is now primarily an elite-based dissent will
spillover into the blue-collar working population, * Dissent is seen <js having the
1 Robert Sharlet, "Growing Soviet Dissidence", p. 3;
Robert Sharlet, "Growing Soviet Dissidence", p. 3;
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potential of acting as a catalyst to unify the widespread sociological, economic,
and political resentment in the Soviet Union and incite the masses, This danger-
is all the more real following the Polish crisis of 1980-81. The linkage in Poland
between intellectual dissidents and the working people resulted in a situation
that had to be contained by the imposition of martial law. Soviet leaders hope to
preclude such an eventuality in the USSR by eliminating at least one of the two
components, the intellectual dissidents.
Finally, the regime continues to attempt to eliminate dissent because its
resiliency and longevity has taken on "the appearance, if not the actuality of an
organized opposition in a one-party authoritarian system,''' Especially since
1975 and the emergence of the ''Helsinki Watch Groups", the dissident
movements have sought to increase cooperation and integration, The watch
groups have consistently called attention to the regime's noncompliance with its
own laws as well as with international treaties and lav./, There is some
indication that these groups have acted as "independent ombudsmen" within
Soviet society, in that they have received complaints and grievances from a
broad spectrum of Soviet citizens- 3
B. MECHANISMS
The regime attempts to deal with dissent by a variety of active and passive
means, In order to avoid the danger of "mirroi— imaging", it is first necessary to
view the phenomenon of dissent and the regime's counter-dissent efforts within
the particular political and social culture of the Soviet Union, The culture that
we recognize today as that of the USSR is a synthesis of traditional Russian
culture, Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and the experiences of the Soviet state.
For our purposes it will be sufficient to speak about three manifestations of this
culture: community, authority, and nationalism, The first manifestation, that of
community, implies that within the Soviet state the notion of communal values
'J Robert Sharlet, "Growing Soviet Oissidence", p. 9.'
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takes precedence over individual values. This is reflected in Soviet law and
practice which continually define such civil rights as speech, press, association
and demonstration in relation to their "conformity with the working people's
interests" and which exist "for the purpose of strengthening the socialist
system". 4 Individual rights in the Soviet Union ar^ always defined in relationship
to responsibilities to the community. An example of this is Article 130 of the
Soviet Constitution, which states, "the exercise of rights and liberties is
inseparable from the performance by citizens of their duties." '-'
One major effect of this preeminence of community is the general attitude of
the Soviet masses toward dissidents, an attitude which is ambivalent at best,
Dissidents ore often viewed as antisocial, under the malign influence of
foreigners, or mentally ill,® This characterization is of course fostered by
Soviet propaganda. For example, E. G. Filimonov characterizes religious
dissidents as "an insignificant minority of all believers. Among them are a good
many people with shady pasts, adventurers who are dissatisfied with the Soviet
way of life and Soviet laws, who may be in a protracted conflict with the Soviet
authorities and who often hide their true antisocial visages behind the mask of
religion", ''
A related cultural distinctive is the characteristic of subservience to
authority. The Soviet people have no political tradition of democracy or
participation by the masses in the political process. This again works against
the dissidents, who cannot appeal to domestic tradition but rather qvq forced to
appeal to the experiences of foreign nations. Despite the fact that democratic
processes ar& guaranteed by the letter of the Soviet law, the appeal to this
4 Articles 50-51 of the Soviet Constitution. Quoted in Robert Sharlet, "The
New Soviet Constitution", Problems of Communism 26 (September-October
1 377): 3.
5 Robert Sharlet, "The New Soviet Constitution", p, 3,10,
b Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p. 1 4.
* E. 6. Filimonov, p. 3.
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letter carries little weight within the borders of the Soviet Union. The effect
of this subservience Is a lack of restraint upon the leaders to employ violence
and terror against dissidents, which is in fact what is done. The police control
mechanisms, which or<i exerted throughout the Soviet society, remain
overwhelmingly strong despite the end of the Stalinist era.
A third and final phenomenon within the Soviet culture is what might be
termed "Russian chauvinism", Chauvinism is a characteristic that, to a greater
or lesser extent, is prevalent within all countries. However, because of the
authoritarian nature of the Soviet system and the predominant role of the
Russians within this system, chauvinism is especially troublesome for the spread
of dissidence in the USSR. The Russian population often perceives the
dissident's assault upon a specific issue to be an assault upon the society itself.
For the most part, the Russians (as well as many of the other Soviet peoples)
are proud of their emergence as a world power, They ar^ proud of their
scientific achievements and satisfied with the apparent improvement in their
general economic well-being, The criticism by non-Orthodox religious groups or
by the non-Russian national dissidents is often viewed as an attack by the non-
Russian minorities upon the Russian culture itself. This results in a polarization
between dissidents and the masses, which limits the effect that dissidence has
upon the political structure,
In addition to these somewhat passive limitations upon dissidence that result
from the political and social culture, the regime takes a variety of active
measures to restrain the spread and eliminate the loci of dissidence. These
measures can be divided into judicial and nonjudicial. Arrest and imprisonment of
dissidents is the prime means of judicial action against dissidents and is a normal
occurrence in Soviet society. Peter Reddaway claims that in 1380, for example,
°'
It does, however, carry weight beyond these borders, and is a frequently
used tactic which is discussed later in this paper.
arrests of dissidents averaged five to ten per week.' While it is true that the
rate of arrests varies depending on the climate of repression [az will be seen
below), dissidents, or what would be termed "political prisoners" in the West,
make up a not insignificant number of those incarcerated at the present time. Of
the estimated three million or so prisoners in the USSR in 1979, at least ten
thousand were incarcerated specifically for political crimes.' 1-1
The whole phenomenon of prisons and prisoners in the Soviet Union bears
some examination, as the small percentage of those charged with political crimes
may be misleading. Yuri Qrlov, a prominent Soviet dissident, points out, the
sheer number of prisoners and forced laborers in the Soviet Union—about two
percent of the total population— demonstrates the failures of the economic,
social and political features of the socialist system, He asserts that "if the
regular army of the unemployed is the characteristic evil of the capitalist
system, then by the same token, the regular, and similarly large, army of those
engaged in forced labor is the characteristic evil of 'applied socialism"'. 1 ^ He
further points out that the absence of diversionary activities, the lack of
opportunity to strive for a higher standard of living, the economic and social
disparities, the loss of faith in moral principles among youth--in short, all of the
aspects that we examined earlier as factors of social instability— ar^ the root
causes of such high numbers of prisoners. Specifically-identified dissident
prisoners only reflect that element of the general population that has articulated
the various social and political failures of the system, The breakdown by
® Peter Reddaway, The Times (London), May 7, 1980, Quoted in Robert
Shariet, "Growing Soviet Dissidence", p. 96,
' (-1 Reliable figures of both prisoners in general and dissidents in prison are
hard to come by. I have used the figures provided by Yurii Qrlov, a prominent
dissident who, along with others, prepared a documentation of the Soviet prison
system that appeared as somixdot smuggled out of prison and eventually
published in English as "On Prisoners in Soviet Camps", in Survey 24 (Spring
1979): 67-91.
1 1 Yurii Orlov, "On Prisoners in Soviet Camps", p. 68.
nationalities would tend to reinforce this interpretation. In the Mordovian and
Ural labor camps from which Oriov and hi? collaborators gleaned their data, 30-
40 percent of the population of the camps were Ukrainian, 30 percent were from
the Baltic areas, and less than 30 percent were Russians or other-
nationalities.' =
The purpose of the labor camps and prisons is neither punitive nor
rehabilitative, at least in the Western sense. The purpose is rather "the
destruction of the personality",^ j i6i/ the reintegration of what ar& perceived
by the authorities as cultural deviants bach into the prevalent cultural imperative
of community. As Valeri Marchenko puts it, "the relationship between the
administration and the prisoners is based on a single goal— 'the re-education
and correction of the convicts', This means getting them to renounce their
beliefs." He goes on to say that this goal is served by "exhausting work, an
inadequate low-calorie diet, a string of punishments doled out for the slightest
offence and the strictest isolation from the outside world" ' ^ Yuri Galanskov
and Alexander Ginzburg use even stronger language to stress the same point:
Russia is still criss-crossed by a network of camps where--
despite all the international conventions signed by the Soviet
government—forced labor and cruel exploitation ar^ the norm,
where people on systematically kept hungry and constantly
humiliated, where their human dignity is debased. Through these
camps passes an uninterrupted human flow, millions strong, which
gives bad-: to society physically and morally crippled people. This
is the result of a deliberate penal policu.> worked out by experts
and presented by them in special handbooks with a cynicism
worthy of the concentration-camp experts of the Third Reich. 10
But this violation of Western concepts of law and civil rights is not just
limited to the treatment of dissidents while in prison, The gross violations of
1
^ Yurii Orlov, p. 70,




'-' Quoted in Peter Reddaway, ed., Uncensored Russia , p. 20,
safeguards to protect the individual against indiscriminate and arbitrary actions
by the state take place throughout the entire judicial process, Despite the fact
that the Soviet Constitution provides for these safeguards, "the dissident
defendant routinely finds his due process rights violated both in the preliminary
investigation and during the subsequent trial. In fact., the constitutional due
process clauses in [the Soviet Constitution] am frequently inverted to the
disadvantage of the dissenter, 1' For example., instead of protecting the
defendant against official capriciousness, the Procurator frequently is a part of
it. The defendant's right to defense counsel is subject to KGB interference and
frequently denied. Instead of receiving a fair and impartial trial, the result is
almost always prearranged. 1 * As one wag has put it "in political cases
'socialist legality' breaks down into its constituent parts— socialism versus
legality". 17
Ironically, dissidents often employ a "legalist defense", that is they call
attention to the violations of the letter of the Soviet law by the authorities
during their trials. These dissident defendants will provide the judge and
prosecutors a detailed account of the violations of their due process rights.
While the ''legalist defense" has not "won any cases for dissenters, ... in using
it, political defendants have succeeded repeatedly in indicting the regime and
putting it 'on trial' in the court of Western public opinion." 11- Accounts of trials
and the counter—charges levelled by accused dissidents against the regime <ir^
frequently published in sosxszo'Gi for distribution within the Soviet Union, but
more importantly published abroad for Western audiences. 1y
16 Robert Sharlet, "The New Soviet Constitution", p. 12.
17 Harold J. Berman, "The Educational Role of Soviet Criminal Law and Civil
Procedure", in Barry, et al., Contemporary Soviet Law
, p, 1 4.
1y Robert Sharlet, "The New Soviet Constitution", p. 13,
1
- See Peter Reddaway, ed,, Uncensored Russio , for a collection of
translated accounts of dissident trials that originally appeared in the sa.mtzdct
journal Chronicle of Current Events,
The regime also employs a variety of nonjudicial means to deal with
dissidents; in fact the nonjudicial methods comprise the bulk of the government's
effort. The primary means is that of ''bureaucratic harassment", This
harassment includes dismissal from a job, limitations on employment
opportunities, evictions from residences and/ or withdrawal of residence
permits, forced internal or external exile and the like. Bureaucratic harassment
frequently is the prelude to judicial action. For example, in the Soviet Union it is
a crime to be unemployed; the crime is called ''parasitism" and is often charged
against dissidents who have been fired or forced off a job and an unable to find
other employment.
In the late 1970s the use of psychiatric terror to deal with dissidents gained
widespread exposure in the Western press.*11-1 An engineer who criticised the
unfair distribution of work bonuses was diagnosed as having "tendencies to
litigation" and committed to a psychiatric hospital. A woman was diagnosed as
"suffering from nervous exhaustion due to her search for justice". And Vasily
Shipilov has been incarcerated in psychiatric hospitals since 1 949 for
participation in a religious seminar, 1^
Official "hooliganism" is yet another form of nonjudicial action against
dissidents. As a means of intimidation and reprisal, police forces and parapolice
forces employ a variety of techniques ranging from •"anonymous letters,
threatening phone calls, open beatings, crypto-muggings and occasionally,
murder."" Sergei Kourdakov, a Soviet seaman who jumped ship and sought
asylum in the U, S. in 1 971 , claims he was in charge of an "anti-Christian attack
^'-' See Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddowoy, Ps ychiatric Terror (New York:
Basic Books, 1977] and Harvey Fireside, Soviet P s u e ho prisons (New York:
Norton, 1 979).
21 Robert Sharlet, "Growing Soviet Dissidence", p. 99.
22 Robert Sharlet, "Growing Soviet Gissidence", p. 100,
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squad" who routinely infiltrated underground church services and beat the
O Q
p a rti cipantsi*- °
C. CAMPAIGNS
Official reactions to the dissident movement, whether they are judicial or
nonjudicial, are not applied at a constant level over time. There appear to be
periods in the past twenty years when the degree and extent of repression has
varied. Three especially severe campaigns have been identified in recent times:
in 1972, in 1978-77, and again in 1979-80.
The 1972 campaign was a wave of arrests targetted at human rights
dissidents and Ukrainian nationalists. The purpose of this campaign may have
been to "convey the message that the incipient detente with the West, and the
forthcoming visit to the USSR of President Richard Nixon, did not portend any
relaxation of political or ideological controls. -"" Key human rights activists
were arrested and tried both before and after President Nixon's visit in May
1972, among which were Vladimir Bukovsky on 5 January and Viktor Krasin an'd
Peter Yakir on 21 June. The letter's trial elicited strong public support from a
variety of activists, but significantly also from Andrey Sakharov and Alexandr
Solzhenitsyn, something the authorities had evidently not expected.
Consequently, Western interest in the proceedings was aroused to an
unprecedented level, Apparently the realities of detente overcame the need for
a crackdown on dissent and the campaign against the dissidents gradually
tapered off. During the two years of 1974 and 1975, human rights advocates
and other dissidents enjoyed a respite from s^vsire repression and managed to
regain some of the lost ground of 1 972-1 973.^5
^^ See Sergei Kourdakov, The Persecutor (uld Tappan, NJ: Fleming H.
Revell, 1973).
t4 Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p. 7.
2
- Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p. 7.
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The second campaign began in 1375, a year after the Soviet Union signed the
"Final Act* of the 35-nation European Conference on Security and Cooperation
held in Helsinki. The reason for this campaign was the emergence of the
"Helsinki Watch Groups* and their ability to capture Western attention by their
exposure of Soviet violations of ''Basket Three". With the imminent arrival of
follow-up meetings in June and October 1377 in Belgrade on the compliance of
all signatories to the Helsinki accords, the Soviets recognized that they would
have to silence these watch groups. According to a report allegealy obtained
from a high-level party meeting and subsequently published in Chronicle of
Current Affairs , Soviet authorities decided to "imprison the fifty most active
dissidents and deal severely with their associates,''' This was to be
accomplished in order to "show strength and not pay attention to the West".^'
In February, Yuri Orlov and others were arrested (as discussed above],
Predictably, world condemnation was immediate and intense, The pressure
exerted by this condemnation was apparently effective as the Soviet leaders
stopped the campaign after arresting only twenty of the -most active
dissidents". The net effect was that almost all the Helsinki groups survived. *'
Robert Sharlet notes that there were two differences between the
''Belgrade Campaign" of 1376-77 and the "Nixon Campaign" of 1372-73 in
regards to the regime's response. '^ First, in the earlier campaign, the regime
had refrained from acknowledging publicly that there was any dissidence in the
USSR. In March 1377, Brezhnev not only acknowledged their existence but also
promised to take firm action against them,'
Our opponents would like to find forces of some sort opposed
to socialism inside our countries, Since there am no such forces,
because in socialist society there are no oppressed or exploited
classes or opposed or exploited nationalities, some sort of
c!b Chronicle of Current Events No. 44 (1377), p. 185, Quoted in Peter
Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p, S,
*' Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p. 3.
28 Robert Sharlet, "Dissent and Repression in the Soviet Union", p. 1 16.
substitute has been invented and an ostensible 'internal opposition'
in socialist countries is being fabricated by means of false
publicity. That is the reason for the organized clamor about the
so-called 'dissidents'
1
and why a worldwide hullaballoo is being
raised about 'violations of human rights' in socialist countries.
It is a different matter when a few individuals, who have
estranged themselves from our society., actively oppose the
socialist system, embark on the road of anti-Soviet activity, violate
the laws, and, finding no support inside the country, turn for
support abroad. . . . Our people demand that such. so-called public
figures be treated as opponents of socialism, as persons acting
against their own motherland, as accomplices, if not agents, of
imperialism. Naturally, we take and will continue to take measures
against them under Soviet law."
In the Belgrade campaign dissidents were charged on criminal counts as
opposed to the earlier technique of political indictments. According to Sharlet,
some of the Helsinki watch group members were tried on ordinary criminal
charges based on planted or doctored evidence in order to de-politicize their
activity and defame their characters to the Soviet public. On the other hand,
especially with respect to Jewish emigration dissidents, the government sought
to "over-politicize" their activities by implicating -Jewish activists in alleged CIA
activities or, as in the case of Anotoly Shcharansky, to actually accuse a Jewish
dissident of CIA employment. 30
A third campaign of intense repression against dissidence was initiated in
1979. This era of repression, called the ''Olympic Campaign", was precipitated
by the upcoming Summer Olympic Games to be held in Moscow in 1980, The aim
was to '"intimidate, imprison, or force abroad as many as possible of the
dissidents or malcontents who might spoil the image of a universally popular
regime," The campaign began with a widespread and non-stop imprisonment of
^ y Speech at the 16th Congress of Trade Unions of the USSR, 21 March
1977, Translated in Leonid I. Brezhnev, Socialism , Democrac u and Human Ri g hts
(Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 151-152.
30 Robert Sharlet, "Dissent and Repression in the Soviet Union", p. 1 16.
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dissidents of all movements. Beginning in the autumn of 1973 the rate of arrest
more than doubled end since then continued at a known rate of 300 dissidents a
year at least until 1983. Key individuals, no matter what their status had been,
were removed from the scene— the most illustrious example being Andrey
Sahharov. Prison sentences for dissidents increased to an average of ten
years, while those who were fortunate to avoid the labor camps or psychiatric
wards experienced an increase in "official hooliganism", i.e., beatings and in
some cases murders. Finally, emigration was practically halted. ^
The difference in the regime's conduct of this campaign was that the one
factor that had restrained and ultimately turned around the previous
campaigns-- world opinion and pressure from the West--was effectively
neutralized by the Politiburo decision to invade Afghanistan, The attention of
the world was diverted from the domestic abuses of the regime toward this
supreme violation of human rights. Just as the West recovered from the shock
of Afghanistan, the events in Poland captured attention, and following that the
KAL 007 incident. The West grew somewhat immune to the excesses of this
state that continued seemingly without scruple to violate the most basic rights
of individuals and sovereign states. The end of detente was seemingly the end
of restraint upon the Soviet's war on internal deviance.
~J] Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union*, p. 9.
IX. THE PROSPECTS
Ths currents of distant . . . will not just fade away as ideology
prescribes and the leadership often seems to expect. They derive
from real injustices which the regime is not addressing. They
express, by-and-large, the powerful emotions of responsible
people. They ore bound to make themselves felt in various ways
until the injustices are taken seriously, In many cases they are
also, of course, the seedbeds of future political opposition.
Peter Reddaway
A. CURRENT IMPACT
Having examined the goals of the various groups and the regime's attempts
to manage the " dissident phenomenon, what, if any, impact have the various
dissident movements made on Soviet society, and what are the prospects for
the future? In order to evaluate the impact it is necessary to reemphasize a
point made earlier: the dissident phenomenon is only incidentally a political
movement. Almost all of the various groups desire an accommodation of their
respective needs within the existing socialist system (notable exceptions ore
Jewish, German and other emigration movements). Dissidence in the Soviet
Union is above all a communication phenomenon, All of the respective groups
have attempted a dialogue with the authorities to achieve their desired ends. It
is in the evolution of this dialogue that the movement has made one of its more
important contributions: drawing external pressure upon the regime.
Dissidents attempt to communicate to three audiences: the general
population, the authorities, and foreigners, The general population includes all
those citizens of the Soviet Union who are not directly connected with the
dissenter's group. By appealing to the general population, the dissident hopes to
gain sympathy for his cause and gain recruits to his movement, Historically
speaking; however, dissidents have had the least impact among this audience.
This lach of impact can be explained by three factor?: the parochialism of the
dissent phenomenon, the lack of widespread communication mechanisms, and
the constraints of Russian culture. All of these factors have been discussed
previously. Suffice it to say that the general ineffectiveness of appeals to this
audience has encouraged the movement to deemphasize it and concentrate
efforts towards the other two audiences. While appeals to the general
population will undoubtably continue to a minor extent, as long as dissidence
continues to be apolitical in method and parochial in manifestation, this pattern
of deemphasis will be continued.
The second audience is the leadership of the regime. This audience has
historically ignored appeals from dissidents "despite the explicit desire of almost
all groups to be treated as partners in a dialogue, as loyal citizens critical only
of particular policies*.' Peter P.eddaway points out three exceptions to this
pattern, however, The first was the decision by the Politburo in 1 371 to open
up the restrictions ofi Jewish emigration and allow significant numbers of Jews
to leave the USSR for Israel. The second concession to pressure was the
regime's acceptance in 1373 of the appeal by Jewish dissidents for abolition of
the heavy education tax on emigrants that had been imposed in 1 972. Reddawau
notes, however, that the regime's acceptance of the emigres'1 demand was
greatly influenced by pressure from the U.S. Congress. The third concession
was made in 1337 when the Crimean Tartars were "exonerated from the charge
of having committed mass treason during World War IP in response to their
petitions and demonstrations. •=• But in comparison with the more important
demand of the Tartars, return to their homeland, which was flatly denied, this
concession pales in significance.
' Peter Reddawau, "Dissent in the Soviet Union, p. 3.
^ Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union, p. 2.
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For reasons we hove already examined, the regime is not particularly
interested in offering dissidents or any other non-CPSU group o chance for
significant participation in the political decision-making process. While
participation at the local and regional levels by non-party elements occasionally
occurs, participation in core policy issues by others than the Party elite is
perceived by this elite as a loss of control. As Frederick Barghoorn explains,
the Soviet leaders are ''apparently afraid that if they do not hold the line against
any and all challenges, as they see them, to such basic priciples of 'Leninism' as
the Communist Party's monopoly over policy formation and implementation . . ,
disintegration will set in".3 Dissidents have begun to realize this basic reality of
Soviet political culture and direct their appeals to another audience. This
realization came slowly and with great pain. As the Initiative Group for the
Defense of Human Rights in the USSR concluded in their first appeal to the
United Nations:
We appeal to the United Nations because we have received no
reply to the protests and complaints which we have been sending
for a number of years to the top political and legal bodies in the
Soviet Union. The hope that our voice may be heard, that the
authorities will stop the lawless acts which we have continually
pointed out--this hope has expired.
While appeals to governmental authorities ar& now viewed as generally
ineffective in achieving significant changes in policy, they continue to be made as
a means of reassuring the regime that demands or^ not political in nature but
rather restricted to the resolution of particular unfair policies. This is
perceived by the dissenters to serve an important function in and of itself,
unfortunately, the regime has not always been reassured. In so far as providing
3 Frederick C. Barghoorn, A'Regime-Dissenter Relations after Khrushchev:
Some Observations", in Susan Gross Solomon, ed., Pluralism in the Soviet Union
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), p. 160.
4 quoted in Peter Reddaway, ed., Uncensored Russia , p. 150.
a serious possibility of achieving particular aims, dissident communication has
thus evolved toward concentration upon the last audience— foreigner?,
Appeals to foreigners have quite frequently made an impact on moderating
regime policies if not resolving the specific interests involved. Again, according
to Peter Reddaway, ''most helpful of all have been nongovernmental bodies with
professional, political, or religious concerns directly related to those of the
Soviet group or individual"."-1 Obviously the primary beneficiaries of this are the
members of the Jewish emigration movement, the Protestant dissenters, and the
human rights activists, as previous examples have shown, But other dissidents
have been helped by these appeals, if only indirectly. In the World Psychiatic
Association, Soviet psychiatrists were accused for almost ten years of the use
of psychiatric terror against dissidents. Data used in these accusations was
provided by dissidents, especially the human rights activists, In 1983, the Soviet
society of psychiatrists responded to this pressure and resigned from the
international body to avoid expulsion 6
While appeals to non-governmental agencies have certainly been effective,
appeals to Western governments should not be minimized. The interest by
Western governments and direct responses to appeals by dissidents have in
certain cases modified Soviet action, On 8 January 1877, several citizens were
killed when an explosion occurred in the Moscow subway. Ordinarily
catastrophes and disasters are not mentioned in the Soviet press, but in this
instance the press and media coverage was extensive, Human rights dissidents-
were implicated by innuendo in the official reports and the police began rounding
up known activists throughout Moscow. The Moscow Helsinki Group held a
press conference with foreign correspondents at which it stated that dissidents
''absolutely reject violence or calls for violence as a means to their goals. v/
,J Peter Reddaway, ''Dissent in the Soviet Union", pp. 3-4,
* Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p, 4.
'' Sbornik dokumentov obshchestvenno u qruppg sode g stviua/ vol. 4, pp. 42-
43. Quoted in Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent
, p. 343.
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Andrey Sakharov wrote a letter in which he speculated about the K6B s role in
the incident: "I cannot rid myself of the notion that the Moscow subway
explosion and the tragic loss of life it caused are the latest and most dangerous
in a series of provocations perpetuated in recent years by the organs of
repression",* The U.S. State Department "reacted with an expression of
admiration for and full confidence in Sakharov". 9 This was apparently enough
for the regime which dropped any further reference to the event as being
conducted by human rights or any other dissidents.
However, appeals to certain Western and/or international audiences have
had absolutely no effect— often despite the seeming appropriateness of the
audience. The United Nations is a prime example of a completely unresponsive
body when faced with appeals by Soviet dissidents, and yet Soviet dissidents
often make their appeals on the basis of United Nations'' human rights
agreements and the provisions of international treaties. The Initiative Group
made five separate appeals to the United Nations between 1969 and 1972 to
which the United Nations failed to even acknowledge much less respond. The
third of these letters reminded U Thant, the Secretary -General of the UN at the
time, that the "silence of an organization of international law unties the hands of
those who will be inspired to further persecutions."' - The prediction proved to
be accurate as eight of the fifteen leaders were arrested and the Initiative
Group stopped sending letters to the West.
Some groups— despite their expressed and often impassioned desire--
unfortunately receive almost no support from the West. This is especially
pitiable since in attempting contact with the West leaders of these groups
subject themselves to more severe repression, Groups such as the Crimean
Tartars and the Muslim Meskhetians find little Western interest in their
° Uhronicle of Current Events , No. 44. Quoted in Ludmilla Alexeyeva,
Soviet Dissent
, p. 349.
y Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent
, p, 343,
1 IJ Ludmilla Alexeyeva, Soviet Dissent
, pp. 231-292.
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respective causes, or, in the case of the Russian nationalists, their goals are
incompatible with Western political philosophy. Many of these ignored
dissidents continue to make these futile appeals right up to moment of their
arrest.
While communication mechanisms and the evolution of communication or<i the
major impacts the dissent movements in general have achieved to date, there
are some other current effects. The national movements have been instrumental
in maintaining a sense of ethnic distinctiveness despite the long-standing
attempts by the regime to mold a "New Soviet Man -', Though cultural and
linguistic Russification has been widespread, it has by no means eliminated
national differences and the national dissidents must be afforded much of the
credit for this.
The religious movements have maintained the connections of the various
Soviet peoples with their historical religious roots, Despite the aggressive
atheism of the regime, Christianity, Judaism and Islam continue to be viable
religions in the Soviet Union, and particular groups within these three religions
have indeed grown. George Caiman has said that religion offers a "spiritual
alternative for those who feel deeply the bankruptcy of the communist
ideology". ' ^ This is undoubtably true and is especially testified to by the
situation of the Lithuanian Catholic movement which blends genuine religious
feelings with nationalist desires. But as one syy/ith strong religious beliefs myself,
I am reluctant to accept a purely psychological motivation for the appeal and
growth of religion in the Soviet Union.
Closely allied with this maintenance of historical religious roots is the
maintenance of universal ideas of political culture--for example, accountability
of political leaders, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, Some would
argue that these ideas or^ not universal, that they are in fact counter to the
political culture of the Soviet Union and Russia before it, that they have
1 1 George T. uolman Jr., p. 30.
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somehow been imported from the West. Yet how to explain the prevalence of
such ideas throughout the history of the Soviet Union., the use of such ideas and
symbols even by the very political leaders who routinely violate the same
concepts? On the rule of law and the conformity to universal standards, Leonid
Brezhnev said in a speech to the World Congress of Peace Forces:
Soviet laws afford our citizens broad political freedoms. At the
same time, they protect our system and the interests of the Soviet
people from any attempts to abuse these freedoms. And this in full
conformity with the International Covenants on Human Rights
ratified by the Soviet Union, which say that the rights they
enumerate 'shall not be subject to any restrictions except those
which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national
security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and
freedoms of others . . ,'' We subscribed to this.'*
Dissidents maintain these notions by reminding Soviet society and the regime of
these concepts and attempting to persuade compliance with them.
All of the above factors of influence ore well and good as restraints on
domestic behavior and hold out the prospect for domestic change, but or^ there
any practical effects of dissidence on Soviet behavior in the international
sphere? George Colman argues that there are: dissidence restrains Soviet
expansionism, and repression of dissidence is constrained by Soviet needs for
Western resources. ' ' Unfortunately, the historical record is rather
ambiguous. The Politburo's actions in the 1970s regarding emigration of Jews
is especially illustrative of conflicting evidence. In 1372-1373, the Soviet Union
began to open the gates to Jewish emigration, primarily in response to dissident
pressures. As soon as these gates were ajar, a flood of prospective emigres
pressed against them, a flood well in excess of that anticipated by the regime.
1
- Speech given at Kremlin, 2b Uctober 1373. Translated in Leonid I.
Brezhnev, p, 33.
•3 George T, Colman Jr., pp. 31-32. His example of restraint on
expansionism, as it was given in 1 975, has been unfortunately overtaken by
events; i.e., central Asian and Moslem nationalists being a restraint on historical
Soviet and Russian desires for expansion toward Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq.
Exacerbating this were large numbers of Germans and Armenians that desired
to be carried along in the Jewish \*.»ahe. Congress., tailing advantage of the situ-
ation launched the Jackson-Vanik ammendment that linked emigration with one of
the key prizes of detente: most-favored-nation status for the Soviet Union, The
USSR did not respond favorably to this initiative. In January 1 975, following
passage of the amendment, Moscow broke off the 1372 trade agreement with
the United States citing attempts by the U.S. to '-'interfere in the internal affairs"
of the USSR, and cut back on emigration. Nevertheless, emigration was not
reduced to its pre-1970 levels, and, after this moderate decline that lasted until
1976, increased steadily until 1379--the end of the era of detente,
B. SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK
Having examined the current effects of the dissent movements it is fair to
ask about future prospects, I believe these can be divided into short-term and
long-term predictions, In the short-term, I think one can conclude along with
Peter Reddaway that the "Politburo is not--anyway as yet--especially alarmed
by the dissenting groups and movements, because they have made little or no
headway among the mass of ordinary people in the Russian heartland,'' 1 ^ Of
course while this is true in the most general of terms, it is not true when
considering the popular makeup of the particular groups. As we have seen, the
national and religious dissidence movements are made up of "ordinary people"
and thus have the potential for evolving into mass movements. This mass
movement phenomenon has already occurred with the Lithuanian and Crimean
Tartar movements. But most analysts and the majority of human rights
dissidents continue to conclude that fundamental changes in the political,
economic and social structure of regime will only be realizable as the various
groups can minimize differences and unite efforts, This is not a short-term
prospect.
1
^ Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p. 14
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One might expect the dissenters in the short-term to develop a multiplicity of
single-issue groups similar to Western special-interest groups. Already there
has been the appearance of feminist samizdoi journals and the emergence of
groups with such revealing names as the Christian Committee for the Defense of
the Rights of Religious Believers, the Working Commission against Psychiatric
Abuses, the Initiative Group for the Defense of the Rights of Invalids, and Right
to Emigrate. The appearance of such groups demonstrates on the one hand the
fragmentation of the umbrella movements of the human rights activists, but on
the other hand, the consolidation of other groups across national and/or
religious lines. George Dolman appears to be on the right track when he claims,
"despite the lacl-:, except in a few instances, of [coordination among dissident
elements], they do appear to have some accumulative effect on Soviet society
merely because their targets are essentially the same--the abuses of the
oppressive regime and the hierarchy that dominates it" J - The short-term
realization that the regime is either unable or unwilling to "provide for the
multiplying needs of its citizens in a changing society," will force, in the words
of Robert Sharlet, "unofficial groups [to] emerge to fill the vacuum and meet
their needs." 16
On the part of the regime, there would appear to be two fears regarding
dissidence in the short-term. The first would be the development of
underground groups that the KGB cannot easily monitor. Herein lies another
dilemma: on the one hand a desire to repress dissent to preclude its ideas being
transferred to the general population, and on the other hand a desire to keep
dissent out in the open in order to monitor and control it. Some analysts have
even gone so far as to argue that the toleration of a certain level of public
dissent has a positive use as a "safety-valve for pent-up emotions", a source of
information about grievances, and as evidence for external audiences of the end
' - George T. Uolman Jr., p. 30.
ie Robert Sharlet, "Growing Soviet Dissidence -
, p. 100.
of Stalin-like terror.'' A second short-term fear for the regime would be a
shift by dissidents to the use of violence as a mechanism of change. Acts of
violence have hitherto been rare, yet "Russian traditions of the 19th century,
the contagious violence of the modern woNd, and the extreme rigidity of the
Soviet system" all forebode the possibility of a change in dissident technique,
especially if communication fails to achieve substantive results.' °
C. LONG-TERM OUTLOOK
I have already alluded to the prime factor required for dissent to achieve any
fundamental changes in the Soviet system: consolidation of the various groups
into an organized political opposition. This is of course the great dilemma of the
movement for it is precisely this that the regime is attempting to prevent through
its pattern of repression. On the part of the dissidents, the key to achieving any
consolidation would be to overcome the traditional worker-intelligentsia gap, as
has occurred in Poland, George Caiman offers a strategy to achieve this goal:
What would seem essential is for the intelligentsia to break cleanly
with their messianic tradition and emphasis, to take advantage of
the workers' distrust of technology as an enslaver rather than the
road to happiness, to reflect mass anxieties in their protests, and
above all, to find further common ground with the aspirations of
the non-Russian nationalities and the religious believers in order to
exploit their intrinsic involvement with, and inbred attachment to,
the worker/peasant massesJ y
While consolidation of the various movements is one possible long-term
development, another possible course is continued fragmentation among the
three broad categories. If this is the direction of the movements, it is fair to
examine how each might develop separately. In relation to one another, national
groups have the widest base of popular support, religious groups the second,
'' Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", pp. 6-7,
1 y Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p. 15,
13 George T. Caiman Jr., p. 52,
and political a distant third. The strength of nationalist groups can only be
enhanced in the long-term by the demographics of the USSR; i.e., the growth of
the non-Russian ethnic groups and the relative decline of the Russian
population. This "time bomb" of the nationalities has been well described by V,
Stanley Vardys:
Despite the assimilationist gains the Russians are still making
among the Slav and non-Slav groups, Soviet nationalities ore bound
to become more involved in the country's development and gain
more influence in determining the direction of its life both positively
and negatively. Non-Russian nationalities played a crucial role in
the success of the Bolshevik revolution in 1917-20, and while
history does not necessarily repeat itself, forces that moved
Russia's social development in the past have not disappeared; on
the contrary they ar<i gaining in strength,^*-1
Under the current situations, the strength of national dissent has depended
in many cases on the degree of integration with religious dissident movements,
This is especially notable in Lithuania, where the integration has almost achieved
''Polish" levels, and where national dissent is, therefore, "endemic and
ineradicable",^ It is potentially true in the Ukraine as well. But in the Ukraine,
the Soviet authorities have taken steps to insure that such an integration does
not happen, The Uniate Catholic Church, which historically has been the
dominant church in the western Ukraine," was outlawed in the mid- 13405
primarily to preclude this integration. The church continued to exist "in the
catacombs", and in 1 332 the Initiative Group for the Defense of Religious
Believer's Rights and the Church emerged, having as its express purpose
legalization of the church. Its chairman, losif Terelya, was immediately
arrested. In both western and eastern Ukraine, national dissidence has been
forced underground since 1 383, but nationalism remains a powerful force in this
second largest Republic of the USSR.
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Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p.l 1.
" The church had fourteen million followers at the end of World War II.
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Prospects for the growth of religious dissent over the long-term ore good
due to ''its intensity, its appeal to ordinary people and its potential for taking on
a moss character."" Although religion was just spoken of in terms of
nationalistic relationships, the essence of religion is its ability to transcend
national lines and appeal to the entire Soviet population. Increasingly Soviet
believers are recognizing that the demands of their faiths are wholistic demands
and cannot be satsfied by being restricted to the occassional practice of a
religious ritual. This recognition necessarily brings the Soviet believer into
direct conflict with his state. As has been shown, many traditional Islamic
religious practices have not been appreciably curtailed despite the government's
attempts at reeducation and even show evidence of growth.
The Christian groups, according to Peter Reddaway, continue to be divided
into two categories: the Russian Orthodox and the other denominations, e.g..
Baptist, Catholics, Adventists and Pen tec os talis ts. The brunt of the regime's
persecution in recent years has been borne by the non-Orthodox denominations.
This may be because, as we have already examined, the regime has attempted to
develop a less tense relationship with Orthodoxy in order to "harness Russian
nationalism more decisively to Marxism-Leninism, and also to try to use the
Church's influence to combat the erosion of moral values in society"."
As we have seen, dissidents within Orthodoxy have been few in recent
years. Notable exceptions have been Fathers Eshliman, Yakunin and Dudko and
the dissident group, the Christian Seminar, The priests linked Orthodoxy with
the human rights movement in contrast to the Christian Seminar, which desired
to merge Orthodoxy with Russian nationalism and anti-communism in the vein of
Solzhenitsyn, There is currently little evidence that either of these two strands
of dissent or^ still present in any great force within Orthodoxy. Therefore,
while it would be tempting to argue that Orthodoxy and Russian nationalism are
2^ Robert Sharlet, "Dissent and Repression in the Soviet Union", p. 1 14.
24 Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union'", p.l 1.
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the key to unleashing evolutionary change within the system, the proof at the
present time is insufficient.
Prospects for the non-Orthodox religions are better. Rather than submit to
an accommodation, most have a long history of resistance and underground
existence. They have a strong social base in the working classes and offer an
attractive alternative to rampant ideological disillusionment amongst these
classes, This identification and provision can only increase, considering the
sociological factors of instability discussed in the first chapter. In addition to
the domestic support base of these religions there is also the very powerful
assistance of foreigners. Non-Orthodox religious denominations receive
extensive moral and material support from abroad. The combination of strong
domestic and international ties make these groups potentially very dangerous to
the stability of the existing regime.
Religious pressures, while seldom being the sole cause of political change,
are frequently a major contributing element in social and political instability. This
is especially notable in those cases in which religious and national differences
ore combined; e.g., Croatians in Yugoslavia, Basques in Spain, Armenians in
Turkey, Kurds in Iraq, and Muslims in the Philippines. What must be extremely
troublesome to Moscow is the recent example in Iran, where Islamic
fundamentalism was able to galvanize opposition to an extremely authoritarian
regime, and--despite the extensive mechanisms of control enjoyed by that
regime—overthrow it . The potential power of religious groups, especially in
light of events in Iran and Lebanon, may partially explain the Politburo's
continued repressive campaigns against the Baptists, Pentecostalists, Sufi
brotherhoods and others.
Long-term prospects for the third category, political dissent, and especially
the human rights movement, or^ not as favorable as with national and religious
dissent. As Peter Reddaway says, "The democratic movement , . . has been
virtually destroyed. Surviving remnants have fallen silent, emigrated, or been
driven underground, from where they still circulate individual or group writings
o con an anonymous or pseudonymous basis. '> >~'J Nevertheless., the primary
contribution of the movement has always been communication. This function
continues and the mechanisms of somizdoi are still in place and functioning, The
regime, despite its continuous efforts has been unsuccessful in eliminating the
mechanisms. Thus, for both the short and long-term, communication mechanisms
should continue to provide all categories of dissent contact with the three
audiences that can effect needed changes.
What of the prospects for fundamental changes in the political structure of
the Soviet Union? I believe these are inevitable; the factors of instability
outlined in the chapter four show no sign of responding to policy initiatives by
the existing regime. In fact, on the few occasions the regime even admits their
existence, ideological rhetoric is applied rather than any concrete or physical
remedies." This institutional cognitive dissonance is not surprising considering
that the contradictions imposed by these factors of instability threaten the very
linchpin of regime legitimacy— the ideological framework upon which the regime
resides.
Assuming change is inevitable, it remains to ask by what means this change
will occur. Will it be through an evolutionary process or through the forces of
revolution? Will the change be the result of a recognition by the regime elites
that change is needed or a result of pressures from the population at large?
Will the process require some precipitating crisis, either domestic, international,
or a combination of both? Would revolution, if it were the mechanism of change,
follow the "Western"' or "Eastern"' pattern, i.e., a collapse of the political
institutions of the regime followed by the mobilization of new groups and
creation of new institutions, or the mobilization of new groups and creation of
"'-' Peter Reddaway, "Dissent in the Soviet Union", p. 13.
2G For example, on the national self-determination issue, see the opening
quote for chapter five.
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shadow political institutions followed by an overthrow of the existing regime? •=•'''
All these choices have their own advocates and convincing proofs,' however, it
is beyond the scope of this study to explore the myriad of options to effect the
ultimate demise of the Soviet empire. Thus, I intend to sidestep this debate and
outline what I believe would be the role of dissent in the most Hkeiy scenario—
a
revolution from below.
In choosing the option of revolution from below, I do not want to imply that
this is the option that Soviet dissidents themselves have in the past favored.
When dissidents have discussed the matter—which, as we have seen, is a rare
event—it has usually been done in the context of an evolutionary process with
the impetus for change resting with the political elites, This was the thrust of
the leadership-directed communication campaigns used by almost all the
dissident groups during the 1960s and 1970s. The goal of these campaigns was
to convince the political elites of the reasonableness and necessity of initiating
structural changes. My selection of the revolution from below as the most likely
scenario of change is based on the categoric failure of these appeals to political
elites over the past twenty or so years,
Samuel Huntington provides two basic prerequisites for revolution in any
society: 1.1) the existence of political institutions that or& incapable of providing
participation channels for new social forces, and (2) the desire by these social
forces to participate in the political process. *** Both of these conditions are met
in the Soviet Union: the political elites do not offer the general population
opportunities for participation in the political process, and, increasingly,
segments of this population are demanding this participation, 'vVhile these are
=- / See Samuel P, Huntington, Political Urder in Uhan qinq Societies (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1368), pp. 264-343, for a more thorough
explanation of these two models of revolution.
23 c- amuel P. Huntington, Political urder in Chang ing Societies
, p. 274.
77
the two basic prerequisites, they ore by no means sufficient in and of
themselves to effect a revolution.
The additional factors that are necessary to effect a revolution depend on
the particular revolutionary model adopted; i.e., the "Western* model or the
"Eastern -" model. Huntington's Eastern model (the mobilization of new groups
and creation of shadow political institutions followed by an overthrow of the
existing regime) appears to be inappropriate for the Soviet situation. The Soviet
regime has proven itself quite adept at controlling organized armed opposition,
as the Lithuanian experience of the 1940s and 1350s demonstrated. It is unlikely
in the foreseeable future that the regime will not be able to contain any such
obvious threat to its power.
On the other hand, the application of Huntington's Western model of
revolution to the Soviet system seems not only possible, but entirely likely.
Huntington describes the necessary prerevolutionary conditions leading to the
collapse of a government as:
1. a ''highly traditional regime " headed by an absolute monarch or
by a land-owning aristocracy
2. a crisis, such as "severe financial straits'"
3. a failure to assimilate the intelligentsia and other urban elites
4. a loss of "moral self- confidence" and the "will to rule" by the
political elites*"01
The first three conditions, seemingly, already exist within the Soviet Union
and should continue to exist. What would appear to be lacking is the loss of a
"will to rule" on the part of the Party elite. Such a loss is not likely in the short-
term, as the political socialization process for the CPSU appears to be quite
effective. Perhaps the numbing effect of Marxist-Leninist ideology and its
apparent desensitivization of youth and scientists spoken of earlier may
eventually spillover into the political elite. This spillover might then deemphasize
^ Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Chan ging Societies
, p. 273.
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the messianic nature of the regime and decrease its reliance on ideology.
However, as the latest Party program and Gorbachev's speech to the Party
Congress show, the political elites obviously still realize the necessity for
maintaining the communist mythology as the basis for their legitimacy and
stability. Therefore, it is difficult to foresee about how this loss of a "will to
rule -" will eventually work itself out.
Of course, it is not as if this is all so much speculation and wishful thinking.:
there is the experience of the Russian revolution. It was precisely Huntington's
Western model of revolution that was played out in 1317, Nicholas II was no
less an ideologue than the current Soviet leaders. He, like they, concentrated
political power in a small group, refused participation to emerging social groups,
and was faced by repeated economic crises. The difference between the Tzar's
situation and that faced by the present regime, was the external crisis of the
war. It is important to remember that the collapse of the Tzar was not brought
about by the Bolsheviks or any other organized opposition. Rather, these groups
emerged in force in the aftermath of the collapse. This is not to minimize the
role of dissidence and opposition prior to 1917— it was indeed present and a
constant irritation to the Romanov regime--but, it was not the cause of the
regime's collapse.
Thus, the implication for modern Soviet dissidence in the process of
revolutionary change in the USSR is to act as an irritatating factor of instability
in the short-term, but more importantly, to address itself to political
organization of the country in the aftermath of an eventual and inevitable
political collapse. This is the lesson to be learned from the Polish experience of
1330-1981. The workers, intellectuals and Church were instrumental in
encouraging the economic crisis to occur, were effective in exploiting the crisis
as it occured, but were unable to adopt an effective political agenda as the
crisis developed. This was also Alexander Kerensky's experience in 1317, and
proved to be the difference between the large number of "dissidents" who
eventually lost arid the small group of revolutionaries who eventually won in th>
aftermath of the Tzar's collapse.
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X. CONCLUSIONS
The time has come for the party to look people in the eye and
revise its ways. If, however, all our methods of struggle give no
positive result, then time will present the task of creating a new
party, which, after a prolonged ideological struggle, will lead a
socialist society to the triumph of Reason, Justice arid Humanism,
and enable Intellectual Freedom to flourish in our country , , .
Russia is watting for new people.
Grennadu Gavrilov
I have tried to show in this study that support of international rights in
general and the Soviet dissidence movement in specific is in the national interest
of the United States. I have argued that American leaders ore obliged by morai,
legal and strategic considerations to support Soviet dissent through U.S.
declaratory foreign policies, and where possible, through operational policies.
Such support has been shown to be consistent with American diplomatic history
and tradition.
I have examined the Soviet dissidence phenomenon in detail and discovered
that it is far from a homogeneous movement: that the term dissent is an umbrella
for the multitude of individuals and groups that perceive themselves as aliens
within a hostile social system lacking legitimate mechanisms to influence the
situation. I have noted that dissidence lacks organization, institutions for
recruitment and coordination, and above all a political agenda. But I have tried to
stress that the movement is far from powerless; its power, however, cannot be
defined in terms of political structures but rather in the embodiment and
perpetuation of ideologies that run counter to the monolithic ideology of the
socialist regime.
37
This desire to maintain a differing world view is perceived as a threat to the
regime and thus an impetus for repression, I have examined the mechanisms
employed by the Soviet state to conduct this repression and its effectiveness in
dealing with dissent. We have seen that these mechanisms are effective in
limiting the organization of the various groups and coordination among
themselves but ineffective in ultimately eliminating dissent as a factor of regime
instability. In fact, I have examined the dialectic relationship between repression
and dissent and concluded that repression plays a l-:ey role in perpetuating the
very phenomenon it attempts to eliminate.
Finally, I examined the future of dissent in the USSR and concluded that
national and religious dissent have the most likely chances of eventually
achieving their goals. This conclusion was reached due to their potential mass-
appeal and the intensity of their adherents. As far as changing the nature of the
Soviet system itself, in the foreseeable future dissent will continue to offer only
a mechanism for articulating and maintaining ideologies counter to that of the
regime. The ability to effect fundamental changes to the political structure of
the Soviet Union will thus be quite limited until such time as dissidents adopt a
more forceful political agenda. While it remains possible that the articulation of
counter-ideologies may have a positive effect on the political elites— thus
resulting in an eventual revolution from above— I find this prospect unlikely. The
more likely scenario would appear to be a revolution from below, precipitated by
the convergence of the aforementioned factors of instability within a context of
domestic or international crisis.
As Ludmilla Alexeyeua notes, the predictions of George Orwell's 1354 have
been neither completely fulfilled nor completely refuted as regards the nature of
the Soviet system or the nature of dissent. The regime has not progressed to
the stage of Big Brother's thought control, in fact it has regressed; the height
of repression and terror being the Stalin years. The dissidents have awakened
many in the Soviet Union to the dangers of "double-think", but by no means a
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majority. On their own part, the dissidents are submerged, but not destroyed,
and somisdoi has become the reality of Orwell's fictional "Booh*.
It is somewhat dangerous to appear more optimistic than the dissidents
within the country, for it is they who must daily fight the battle. Nevertheless,
history repeatedly demonstrates the power of ideas to shape events and
political institutions. To be optimistic about the future of dissent in the Soviet
Union one need only examine the role of other dissenters in other times. Men
and women who challenged the existing ideas and institutions of their day and by
doing so brought about fundamental changes in their worlds—men like Luther,
Locke, Rousseau., and Marx. Or perhaps the greatest example in history: the
ideas of one itinerant philosopher, who never ventured further than thirty or so
miles from his hometown. Who took on the ideas and values of the most
authoritarian and expansive empire in Western history and in so doing changed
the course of Western history. Whose ideas continue to revolutionize and
liberalize the world nearly two thousand years later—even, I dare say, the
world of the Soviet Union.
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